Philosophy of Science

Abstract Abstract
The question of what is the aim of science has been one of the most thought-provoking topics in the field of philosophy of science. Watkins, a follower of Karl Popper and a proponent of scientific rationality, argues that the optimal aim for science can be identified and the certainty of science can be released by categorizing the conditions of sufficiency and the demands associated with it, while You can still ask for the confirmed truth. The aim of this article is to examine Watkins 'demands for achieving the aim of science, to promote them, to recall the challenges posed by the optimal aim of science and Watkins' response to them, and to explain the pragmatic principle of induction in the selection of theories. It is one of the competing theories. Watkins believes that by pursuing the optimal aim for science, scientists have the freedom to do research on any subject, but the optimal aim of science prevents them from adopting erroneous theories

Abstract Kyle Stanford poses a new challenge to scientific realism, known as the new pessimistic induction. According to him, for every scientific theory, there are "unconceived alternative theories" that go beyond the understanding of scientists; Therefore, one can never be realistic about the unobservable entities of theories. This article tries to defend scientific realism against Stanford's argument by emphasizing the convergence of successful theories in the history of science. This article emphasizes that under the new pessimistic induction, given the unlimited number of unconceived alternative theories to any successful theory, the possibility of "matching" and "unifying" independent theories will be very unlikely. Whereas in the history of science, we see frequent examples of successful theories being linked. We also try to defend the idea of convergence against critiques.

Abstract According to methodological naturalism, in scientific explanation we can only appeal to natural laws, forces and entities, without assuming any role for supernatural entities and parameters. Philosophical naturalism is an ontological view according to which there is nothing but natural elements, principles, and physical entities. To justify their views, naturalists usually use Darwin's theory of evolution and extend its domain over all phenomena. In this paper, we will explain Daniel Dennett's views on these issues and critically evaluate his arguments. Then, Alvin Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism will be discussed. The conclusion of the paper is that ontological naturalism is not a correct and tenable opinion.

Abstract The theory of technological embodiment is the first contribution of philosophy to technology. In order to elucidate how the theory evolved historically, this paper first offers a theoretical framework with respect to the stages, approaches, and components of the theory. Next, different accounts of the theory are reconstructed according to the proposed theoretical framework. And finally, based on a comparative study of the accounts, the paper draws new conclusions concerning how the theory evolved historically, suggesting a divergence among contemporary accounts in terms of the (1) components, (2) direction, and (3) basis or cause of the human-artifact relation; this divergence seems to be the effect of a different interpretation on human, not on technology, offered by phenomenology when compared to that of the earlier philosophies.

Abstract Information technology has been intertwined with the social. That’s why the number of social actions, including religious practices, mediated by information technology is increasing. "Dhikr" is one of the last actions that has become possible through smart phone applications. However, IT mediation in dhikr is not possible without changing the practical-empirical aspects of it. Intelligent salawat-counters mediate and change the user, the practice and religious experience of dhikr, as well as the way of looking at ‘dhikr’. How IT mediation does change the religious? Exploring some instances of existing salawat-counters, this paper tries to answer the question from the perspectives of post-phenomenology and the actor-network theory.

Abstract This paper investigates the evolution of the concept orb in order to give a rational explanation for the concept's introduction and dissolution. This concept, we will argue, was initially introduced in the Greek culture, while suffering from some conceptual ambiguitites. In particular, two geometrical and physical understandings were associated with the concept and they were indistinguishable among different passages. For Ptolemy, the concept of orb had both geometrical and physical realizations in different treatises. But such conceptual ambiguity was gradually eliminated in the Islamic age of science. We believe that this concept articulation was initiated from the early tenth century by the works of Ibn al-Haytham and Al-Bīrūnī and by the end of the thirteenth century ultimately the concept was used with its highest clarity. We will enumerate some key conceptual characteristics of the concept in this period in order to show how these components marked the beginning of its dissolution in the sixteenth century. In particular, Tycho Brahe and his fellow astronomers in the sixteenth century decided to abandon the concept for some contradictions between these conceptual components and their own empirical observations.

Abstract In contemporary discussions, the philosophy of time, in a general division, in the dynamic theory of time future events don’t exist and in the static view they exist.But not all of them conform to some of the findings of modern physics.The present article has reached a different point of view with the aim of explaining the compatibility of these evidences with a correct philosophical attitude . By considering the gradation of the reality of the temporal events series, future events are neither absolutely actual existence nor absolutely in potential existence but in a gradational category.That is, neither a fully actual existence nor a completely potential existence; Rather, they have a weak actuality, so that weak effects of them are realized at the present time . In modern physics, evidence of time asymmetry negates the static theory of time, and evidence of the nonlocalizability quantum essences in time — such as the delayed choice experiment — negates the static attitude. But such evidence can strengthen the autonomous view; For while the passage of time is real, the weak effects of future temporal phenomena give rise to their own specific causal properties from the present. This attitude can be a correct interpretation of the of quantum nonlocality in time.

Abstract «طبیعت» در واپسین آثار کانت، یکی از مفاهیمی است که در مباحث مربوط به سیاست و حقوق و تعلیم و تربیت بسیار مورد استفاده قرار گرفته است. کانت این مفهوم را محور تحولات دانش‌های حوزه عقل عملی و نظام دانش قرار داده است. به‌عقیده وی، نظام دانشِ موجود در دانشگاه‌ها، به‌دلیل دوری از این مفهوم کلیدی نه تنها تا کنون ایده نظام کلی دانش را- که بنیاد فلسفی تمامی علوم است- مورد توجه قرار نداده بلکه همچون مانعی در راه تحقق آن عمل کرده است. لذا برای نیل به چنان مطلوبی، دانشگاه باید از اساس دگرگون شود و شکل و محتوای آن تغییر کند. در این طرح دیگرگون، دانشکدة فلسفه باید عملکرد دانشکده‌های الهیات و حقوق و پزشکی را با خواست و طرح طبیعت که همانا تحقق نظام جمهوری در عرصه عینی و تحقق خیر اعلا و ملکوت غایات در عرصه ذهنی است، همراه سازد. برای تحقق این دو مطلوب، دانشگاه باید ایدة علم مطلق را تبیین و رهبری کند. به‌عقیده کانت، از میان دانشکده‌های برتر، دانشکده پزشکی نزدیکی بیشتری با دانشکده مادون فلسفه دارد و به‌دلیل همین نزدیکی بیش از دیگر دانشکده‌ها می‌تواند دانشکده فلسفه را در تنظیم حرکت دانشگاه بر مدار طبیعت یاری کند. این نوشتار درصدد است علاوه‌بر تبیین فلسفی ایدة علم مطلق به‌مثابه بنیاد تمامی علوم و یافته‌های پژوهشی در اندیشه کانت، نشان دهد در رساله نزاع دانشکده‌ها به چه معنا دانش پزشکی نزدیکترین دانش موجود به فلسفه انتقادی است و چگونه این نزدیکی می‌تواند در خدمت ایدة علم مطلق و خواست طبیعت قرار گیرد.

Abstract Teller has argued that in our complex world, applying standard referential semantics is successful only in idealized environments. Most of the time, however, reference fails, leading to a failure of referential as well as scientific realism. This is due to a feature of objects in our world that I call spectralness. That is why Teller turns to perspectival realism as a pis aller. I will argue that not only the standard referential semantics but also the standard modal semantics is doomed to fail as a result of spectralness. This, however, does not mean that spectralness is not a modal property. I will discuss that counterpart theory prepares an appropriate framework to deal with spectralness, in light of which the failure of the standard referential (modal) semantics can be explained. I will thus argue that spectralness is a modal property of objects, which the best interpretation of it is the structural one. I accept Teller's perspectival realism but argue that it is a kind of modal structural realism, as Ladyman has in mind.

Abstract In this article, I examine Fodor's modal argument for individualism and for narrow content. Fodor's modal argument wants to show that my twin-earth and I have thoughts with the very same causal powers; XYZ-thoughts and water-thoughts are not different causal powers with respect to water- behaviors and XYZ-behaviors. If this is so, Fodor argues, then my twin and I do not differ in any psychological state, and individualism is true. Fodor examine his argument by “no-conceptual-connection test” or “New Logical Connections Argument”. Therefore To see whether causal powers are the different, there must be the no-conceptual connections between cause-properties and effect-properties. Fodor argues that the difference between my water-thoughts causing his intentional water-drinking behavior and my twin's XYZ-thoughts causing his XYZ-drinking is a conceptual difference. Hence, the water/XYZ thoughts are not different causal powers. finally, I show that Fodor’s version of the New Logical Connections argument or Fodor’s no-conceptual-connection test don’t work. If this is so, Then Fodor's defense of narrow content and individualism does not sufficient.

Abstract As is well known, special theory of relativity rests on two postulates: (1) the postulate of “relativity”; (2) the postulate of “the constancy of the speed of light in vacuum in all inertial frames”. In this theory, the second postulate is neither an obvious principle nor a logical consequence of other obvious principles. Therefore, in order to evaluate the validity of this postulate, its experimental verification is necessary. In this paper, it becomes clear that by accepting the common thesis of the conventionality of distant clocks synchronization, the experimental verification of the second postulate is not possible. However, it is shown that by conducting experiments to examine “the independence of the speed of light from the speed of its source”, the experimental refutation of the second postulate is possible. It is explained that under what conditions these experiments are crucial.

Abstract Phenomenal qualities of conscious mental states are commonly known as “qualia”. We say that a particular mental state has qualia if and only if There is something that it is like to be the mental state. Some philosophers have challenged the epistemic and explanatory values of qualia. They argue that the concept of qualia has no role to play in a mature and well-organized psychological theory. Consequently, this concept has no epistemic value. This paper aims at explaining and criticizing these arguments. It will be argued that these arguments are ineffective and cannot establish that the concept of qualia can not have functions in a scientific theories. The distinction between metaphysical subjectivity and epistemic objectivity, as it will be shown, can establish a scientific place for the concept of qualia.