The examination of the Fodor's Humean argument for individualism

Mahdavi, Abbas

doi:10.30465/ps.2021.28461.1392

The examination of the Fodor's Humean argument for individualism

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Abbas Mahdavi

Phd of Philosophy of the Mind of Religions and Religions of Qom

https://doi.org/10.30465/ps.2021.28461.1392

Abstract

In this article, I examine Fodor's modal argument for individualism and for narrow content. Fodor's modal argument wants to show that my twin-earth and I have thoughts with the very same causal powers; XYZ-thoughts and water-thoughts are not different causal powers with respect to water- behaviors and XYZ-behaviors. If this is so, Fodor argues, then my twin and I do not differ in any psychological state, and individualism is true. Fodor examine his argument by “no-conceptual-connection test” or “New Logical Connections Argument”. Therefore To see whether causal powers are the different, there must be the no-conceptual connections between cause-properties and effect-properties. Fodor argues that the difference between my water-thoughts causing his intentional water-drinking behavior and my twin's XYZ-thoughts causing his XYZ-drinking is a conceptual difference. Hence, the water/XYZ thoughts are not different causal powers. finally, I show that Fodor’s version of the New Logical Connections argument or Fodor’s no-conceptual-connection test don’t work. If this is so, Then Fodor's defense of narrow content and individualism does not sufficient.

Keywords

Individualism

Externalism of content

Fodor

conceptual connection

contingent connection

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