Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Ph.D. student of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology

Abstract

Teller has argued that in our complex world, applying standard referential semantics is successful only in idealized environments. Most of the time, however, reference fails, leading to a failure of referential as well as scientific realism. This is due to a feature of objects in our world that I call spectralness. That is why Teller turns to perspectival realism as a pis aller. I will argue that not only the standard referential semantics but also the standard modal semantics is doomed to fail as a result of spectralness. This, however, does not mean that spectralness is not a modal property. I will discuss that counterpart theory prepares an appropriate framework to deal with spectralness, in light of which the failure of the standard referential (modal) semantics can be explained. I will thus argue that spectralness is a modal property of objects, which the best interpretation of it is the structural one. I accept Teller's perspectival realism but argue that it is a kind of modal structural realism, as Ladyman has in mind.

Keywords

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