The Challenges of the

افضلی فر, ناصر; Haghi, Ali

doi:10.30465/ps.2022.38609.1560

The Challenges of the "Optimum Aim for Science" by John William Neville Watkins

Document Type : .

Authors

ناصر افضلی فر ¹

ali haghi ²

¹ PhD Student in Philosophy of Science, Faculty of Law, Theology and Political Science, Research Sciences Branch, Azlad Islamic University, Tehran, Iran.

² Associate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Wisdom, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Iran.

https://doi.org/10.30465/ps.2022.38609.1560

Abstract

Abstract
The question of what is the aim of science has been one of the most thought-provoking topics in the field of philosophy of science. Watkins, a follower of Karl Popper and a proponent of scientific rationality, argues that the optimal aim for science can be identified and the certainty of science can be released by categorizing the conditions of sufficiency and the demands associated with it, while You can still ask for the confirmed truth. The aim of this article is to examine Watkins 'demands for achieving the aim of science, to promote them, to recall the challenges posed by the optimal aim of science and Watkins' response to them, and to explain the pragmatic principle of induction in the selection of theories. It is one of the competing theories. Watkins believes that by pursuing the optimal aim for science, scientists have the freedom to do research on any subject, but the optimal aim of science prevents them from adopting erroneous theories

Keywords

Keywords: Watkins

The Aim of Science

Scientific Rationality

Adequacy Requirements

Popper

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