sayyed mahdi biabanaki
Volume 8, Issue 16 , March 2019, Pages 1-17
Abstract
Scientific naturalism is a doctrine that consists of two ontological and methodological components. On the basis of the methodological component, the scientific method is the only source for validation (about nature), and based on the ontological component, all that exists (causation) can be investigated ...
Read More
Scientific naturalism is a doctrine that consists of two ontological and methodological components. On the basis of the methodological component, the scientific method is the only source for validation (about nature), and based on the ontological component, all that exists (causation) can be investigated by science. Some naturalist philosophers believe that the ontological component, that is, ontological (or metaphysical) natureism, is an essential or structural philosophy for science, in the sense that if science is eliminated from metaphysics, then what is obtained will no longer be science. In contrast, many naturalist critics believe that ontological naturalism is a lesson outside metaphysics of science, and only methodological naturalism (not a metaphysical principle) is a disciplining or methodological principle for science. In this sense, naturalism is used only as a pragmatic predicate for scientific action of scientists. In this paper, we will show that none of the two approaches are correct in relation to the relation between naturalism and science; and we are not allowed to block the flow of Hwites and supernatural causes into the realm of science, based on a metaphysical or pragmatic default, and the metaphysics of the universe We presuppose nature to science, which is free from such an echo and causation from the beginning.
Hamed Bikaraan-Behesht; amir ehsan karbasizade
Volume 8, Issue 16 , March 2019, Pages 19-41
Abstract
The problem of old evidence allegedly poses the most serious challenge to the Bayesian confirmation theory. All proposed solutions to this problem can be divided into two types: classical (treating the challenge as serious and trying to meet it) and non-classical (with denying that there is a real problem ...
Read More
The problem of old evidence allegedly poses the most serious challenge to the Bayesian confirmation theory. All proposed solutions to this problem can be divided into two types: classical (treating the challenge as serious and trying to meet it) and non-classical (with denying that there is a real problem and trying to dissolve it in one way or another). Classical solutions have been proposed by Garber, Jeffery, and Niiniluoto, and have been criticized by many, among them, Eells and Earman. One of the non-classical solutions is to choose an objective (rather than Bayesian’s subjective) interpretation of probability; this view has been proposed by Rosenkrantz. In this paper, we thoroughly examine the classical solutions and objections that have been raised against them, trying to show that the classical approach is deficient. In the end, we try to make a case for Rosenkrantz’s proposal as the only solution which, we believe, gets to the root of the problem correctly
Mohsen Abbaszadeh Marzbali
Volume 8, Issue 16 , March 2019, Pages 43-63
Abstract
The prevalence of reductionist dualisms, driven from some conceptual opposites such as realism vs. constructivism or rationalism vs. relativism, has been one of the most significant impacts of post-positivist challenge in epistemology. How one can explain ‘rationality’, as objective examination ...
Read More
The prevalence of reductionist dualisms, driven from some conceptual opposites such as realism vs. constructivism or rationalism vs. relativism, has been one of the most significant impacts of post-positivist challenge in epistemology. How one can explain ‘rationality’, as objective examination of reasonability of a sentence or standpoint, despite the challenges driven from anti-foundationalism? To respond the question, the present paper hypothesizes that such possibility can be found in a particular narrative of Pragmatism which is founded on a commonsensical perception of reality and practical definition of the reasonable. A feature in rationalistic process of examining the scientific sentences or normative standpoints on which the principle of the truth / rational validity might be founded is the axis to the above-mentioned explanation. The feature is “deliberation” and openness to verification. Accordingly, the present paper seeks to highlight a central common feature by which a wide range of theorists in fields of philosophy of science and social science epistemology could be interrelated. Inasmuch as the narrative deals with issues like the nature of reality and the conditions required for acquiring rational understanding of the reasonability, the paper would be organized based on a meta-theoretical framework driven from Aristotle`s notion of Pharonisis.
seyedali kalantari
Volume 8, Issue 16 , March 2019, Pages 65-84
Abstract
As moral principles constrain our actions normatively, distinguish them into correct and incorrect categories; according to normativity of logic thesis, logical principles constrain normatively our thinking and reasoning (e.g. see MacFarlane 2004; Steinberger 2017a, 2017b, 2017c). There are various formulations ...
Read More
As moral principles constrain our actions normatively, distinguish them into correct and incorrect categories; according to normativity of logic thesis, logical principles constrain normatively our thinking and reasoning (e.g. see MacFarlane 2004; Steinberger 2017a, 2017b, 2017c). There are various formulations for the normativity in the literature which have been subject to sever debates in the last decades. In this paper I will consider such formulations on the basis of Harman's (1984, 1986) famous objections. Harman's strategy to criticize the normativity is try to justify the claim that there is no rational way to formulate the thesis. I will argue, however, that there is a plausible formulation for the normativity of logic thesis such that survives Harman's attacks. In the last step, I will explain the normativity of logic thesis, on the basis of the concept of belief. In order to do so, I will elucidate the normativity of belief thesis, and then argue that the thesis entails the normativity of logic thesis.
reza mosmer
Volume 8, Issue 16 , March 2019, Pages 85-106
Abstract
Paul Horwich has criticized Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s (KW) rule-following argument. In this paper, I shall explore one of Horwich’s multiple objections to KW and argue that it is not effective. In section 2 I will discuss KW’s meaning skepticism. Of various candidates that KW explores ...
Read More
Paul Horwich has criticized Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s (KW) rule-following argument. In this paper, I shall explore one of Horwich’s multiple objections to KW and argue that it is not effective. In section 2 I will discuss KW’s meaning skepticism. Of various candidates that KW explores for the facts that meaning-ascription sentences are meant to correspond, I will explain exclusively dispositional facts. In section 3 Horwich’s explanation of KW’s “rational guidance argument” against dispositionalism about meaning-ascription sentences. This will be followed by a discussion of Horwich’s objection to the argument in section 4. By introducing the idea of “self-correction disposition,” as it will be explained, Horwich tries to save the dispositionalism. In the final section of the paper I shall try to show that Horwich’s appeal to the disposition to self-correct faces the problem of “rational guidance argument” again
saeid masoumi
Volume 8, Issue 16 , March 2019, Pages 107-130
Abstract
The concept of general covariance is one of the most important concepts in general theory of relativity, which there are a lot of confusing in the understanding of its correct meaning. In this paper I explain and try to elucidate this concept and I will discuss Anderson- Friedman’s absolute object, ...
Read More
The concept of general covariance is one of the most important concepts in general theory of relativity, which there are a lot of confusing in the understanding of its correct meaning. In this paper I explain and try to elucidate this concept and I will discuss Anderson- Friedman’s absolute object, regarded as what distinguishes between general relativity and other space – time theories. I also consider Earman’s two definitions of general covariance; formal general covariance and substantive general covariance which by introducing these two definition he gives the distinguishing characteristic of general relativity which is its realization of substantive general covariance. Eventually I compare those two viewpoints and discern their distinction
Ali Paya; alireza mansouri
Volume 8, Issue 16 , March 2019, Pages 131-158
Abstract
There is a significant conceptual difference between science and technology. Epistemologically, the so-called 'applied science' is a redundant concept; it can be included under the category of technology. In this paper we discuss, from a philosophical point of view, some of the reasons for the conflation ...
Read More
There is a significant conceptual difference between science and technology. Epistemologically, the so-called 'applied science' is a redundant concept; it can be included under the category of technology. In this paper we discuss, from a philosophical point of view, some of the reasons for the conflation of science and technology. We shall further argue that such a conflation is not only an epistemological mistake, it also has many undesirable conceptual and practical consequences which impact on epistemological investigations as well as policy making in the fields of science and technology.There is a significant conceptual difference between science and technology. Epistemologically, the so-called 'applied science' is a redundant concept; it can be included under the category of technology. In this paper we discuss, from a philosophical point of view, some of the reasons for the conflation of science and technology. We shall further argue that such a conflation is not only an epistemological mistake, it also has many undesirable conceptual and practical consequences which impact on epistemological investigations as well as policy making in the fields of science and technology
mahdi homazade abyane
Volume 8, Issue 16 , March 2019, Pages 159-173
Abstract
The paper address one of the most important objections against representational theory of Michael Tye: The inverted earth exam, which is a counterfactual example has proposed by Ned Block to challenge Tye ,s theory on phenomenal mental states.Tye, in contrast, has illustrated two response which are the ...
Read More
The paper address one of the most important objections against representational theory of Michael Tye: The inverted earth exam, which is a counterfactual example has proposed by Ned Block to challenge Tye ,s theory on phenomenal mental states.Tye, in contrast, has illustrated two response which are the main topic of this paper. The first response – according to author ,s arguments – faces with a significant problem; regardless of some peculiar requisites of the theory. The second – final – response, also, can be hit by a counterexample about inverted spectrum proposed by the author.He, finally, concludes that Tye ,s attempts to rescue wide representational theory from the hardship was not successful, and it seems that the above theory should try to find some paths to solve the problem
