Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Researcher of the Institute of Philosophy and Philosophy of Iran

Abstract

The paper address one of the most important objections against representational theory of Michael Tye: The inverted
earth exam, which is a counterfactual example has proposed by Ned Block to challenge Tye ,s theory on phenomenal mental states.
Tye, in contrast, has illustrated two response which are the main topic of this paper. The first response – according to author ,s arguments – faces with a significant problem; regardless of some peculiar requisites of the theory. The second – final – response, also, can be hit by a counterexample about inverted spectrum proposed by the author.
He, finally, concludes that Tye ,s attempts to rescue wide representational theory from the hardship was not successful, and it seems that the above theory should try to find some paths to solve the problem

Keywords

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