saide bagheri; Shahin Iravani; Khosrow Bagheri NoaParast; Mohammd Reza Sharafi
Volume 7, Issue 13 , September 2017, Pages 1-22
Abstract
This study consists of three parts: reviewing approaches in philosophy of science; presenting Mary Hesse’s hermeneutic approach and, finally, extracting Hesse's view on the understanding of scientific concepts. In order to clarify Hesse’s approach, we, in the first part, review the post-positivistic ...
Read More
This study consists of three parts: reviewing approaches in philosophy of science; presenting Mary Hesse’s hermeneutic approach and, finally, extracting Hesse's view on the understanding of scientific concepts. In order to clarify Hesse’s approach, we, in the first part, review the post-positivistic space of philosophy of science in the second half of the 20th century. In the second section, the models Hesse has proposed to explain the mechanism of science advancement and scientific theories are described. Emphasizing the explanatory function of metaphor in scientific theories, suggesting minimalistic realism as a requirement for scientific activity, and explaining the dual objectivity for science, are among the achievements of Hesse's view in philosophy of science. Scientific concepts have a certain place in Hesse's discussions, and it can be argued that, in Hessian approach, scientific concepts are historical and theoretical and can be used as metaphors in the metaphorical language of science. Finally, people's understanding of scientific concepts would be different according to the characteristics of the concepts. Also peoples’ understanding of scientific concepts is dynamic due to the dynamics of the language of science
Abolfazl Sabramiz; Roohollah Haghshenas; Mehdi Zakeri
Volume 7, Issue 13 , September 2017, Pages 23-44
Abstract
Imitation game is one of the most famous thought experiments in the history of artificial intelligence. In this experiment, Allen Turing introduced a criterion and argued that if a thing can satisfy this criterion, we can call it ‘intelligent’. One objection to this intelligence criterion ...
Read More
Imitation game is one of the most famous thought experiments in the history of artificial intelligence. In this experiment, Allen Turing introduced a criterion and argued that if a thing can satisfy this criterion, we can call it ‘intelligent’. One objection to this intelligence criterion is known as ‘Lovelace’s objection’ or free will objection. This objection expresses that machines never act beyond their programmers’ anticipation, so they can never be intelligent. This paper investigates Lovelace’s objection and Turing’s responses. As we try to show, Turing responses seem right in this stage. But we think this objection can be rewritten the objection in relation to Chomsky’s ‘Descartes Problem’ about the creative aspect of language use. The relationship between this objection and Descartes problem has not been addressed in the literature of artificial intelligence. In the end of paper, we will show that there is no theoretical solution to this revised objection yet. So, without a good answer to this problem, we cannot have intelligent machines just through technological developments.
hale Asgarinia; Saeedeh Babaii; Moslem Solhi Rad; Mohammad Namazi; Seyed Hassan Hosseini
Volume 7, Issue 13 , September 2017, Pages 45-71
Abstract
Can one distinguish between natural objects and artifacts? Or should one look at the universe without considering natural-artifact dichotomy? The answers of these questions, determine the position of philosophy of technology in confronting with the technical artifacts, and bring about challenging issues. ...
Read More
Can one distinguish between natural objects and artifacts? Or should one look at the universe without considering natural-artifact dichotomy? The answers of these questions, determine the position of philosophy of technology in confronting with the technical artifacts, and bring about challenging issues. In this paper, we try to answer these questions from different perspectives. First, we will express the contemporary philosophers’ views about the distinction between artifacts and natural object, which the boundary between these two worlds seems to be unclear to some extent in their views and one can’t, without controversy, categorize things into these two categories.
Seyed Ali Kalantarin
Volume 7, Issue 13 , September 2017, Pages 73-85
Abstract
According to Russell’s (1905) definite description theory, the content of a sentence such as ‘the present king of France is bald’ can be presented by the logical form of the sentence, that is, ‘there is exactly one thing which is the king of France and the thing is bald’. ...
Read More
According to Russell’s (1905) definite description theory, the content of a sentence such as ‘the present king of France is bald’ can be presented by the logical form of the sentence, that is, ‘there is exactly one thing which is the king of France and the thing is bald’. This paper has a modest aim to consider specific evidence against Russell’s theory. In order to challenge this theory, we will first argue that if one in a situation in which France does not have king asserts that ‘the present king of France is bald’ and in another situation one asserts the logical form of the sentence, our judgment will be different about their truth values (call it ‘the disparity problem’). We will then consider the question that whether proponent of Russell’s definite description can explain the disparity problem or not. On behalf of proponent of Russell’s definite description, and on the basis of Grice's (1970) distinction between speaker meaning and sentence meaning, we will propose an explanation for the disparity problem; it also should be mentioned that the explanation is already endorsed by some proponents of Russell’s definite description (e.g. Sainsbury (1979, 1991); Morris (2003)). I will however argue that the explanation is not plausible. My argument will leave Russell’s theory in an un-defensible position in the sense that it shows Gricean defense against disparity problem is not plausible.
Gholamhossein Moghaddam Heidari
Volume 7, Issue 13 , September 2017, Pages 87-104
Abstract
Observation, as an action, is one of the most important and controversial topics of philosophy of science. Analytic philosophers of science have examined this subject from a variety of perspectives. They have shown that what is observed is influenced by the observer’s goals and his/her past experiences, ...
Read More
Observation, as an action, is one of the most important and controversial topics of philosophy of science. Analytic philosophers of science have examined this subject from a variety of perspectives. They have shown that what is observed is influenced by the observer’s goals and his/her past experiences, thus observation is influenced by epistemological, semantic, psychological or sociological factors. However observation is not only of interest to analytic philosophers, but it also has been addressed by continental philosophers. One of these philosophers is Michel Foucault, who in his book the birth of the clinic, describes how human body turns into the object of observation in medicine. He points out that in addition to the factors influencing observation as expressed by analytic philosophers, it should be noted that observation basically is a political act. We use Foucault's views in this regard. Although Foucault referred to this issue in his various works, it can be said that observation is the central theme of the birth of the clinic. The purpose of this article is to reveal this political aspect of observation. We discuss what is exactly mean for observation to be a political act, and why the philosophers of science should consider the political aspect of observations in their studies
aziz najafpoor; Fatemeh Gitipasand
Volume 7, Issue 13 , September 2017, Pages 105-114
Abstract
In line with his cultural concerns and protecting various social traditions, Feyerabend denounces the rationality of modern science, emphasizes the principle of ‘anything goes’ and prioritizes individual freedom over the truth. Denying the absolute truth, Feyerabend tries to make room for ...
Read More
In line with his cultural concerns and protecting various social traditions, Feyerabend denounces the rationality of modern science, emphasizes the principle of ‘anything goes’ and prioritizes individual freedom over the truth. Denying the absolute truth, Feyerabend tries to make room for cultural pluralism and to remove science from the state of being the only reference for determining the authenticity of phenomena. In this paper, it is tried to show that Feyerabend in fact, after criticizing scientific rationality, raises a new rationality which its aim is freedom and has its own method and tradition. Besides some conflicts and ambiguities in his approach, he does not provide a reason for the preference of his rationality over other existing rationalities. We conclude that Feyerabend not only is not an epistemological anarchist, but has its own particular rationality.
