Document Type : Research Paper
Authors
1 Researcher at Institute for Humanities and Social Studies (IHSS), and PhD student in philosophy, university of Isfahan
2 Researcher at Institute for Humanities and Social Studies (IHSS) and PhD student in philosophy, university of Tehran
3 Associate professor of Philosophy deopartment, University of Tehran
Abstract
Imitation game is one of the most famous thought experiments in the history of artificial intelligence. In this experiment, Allen Turing introduced a criterion and argued that if a thing can satisfy this criterion, we can call it ‘intelligent’. One objection to this intelligence criterion is known as ‘Lovelace’s objection’ or free will objection. This objection expresses that machines never act beyond their programmers’ anticipation, so they can never be intelligent. This paper investigates Lovelace’s objection and Turing’s responses. As we try to show, Turing responses seem right in this stage. But we think this objection can be rewritten the objection in relation to Chomsky’s ‘Descartes Problem’ about the creative aspect of language use. The relationship between this objection and Descartes problem has not been addressed in the literature of artificial intelligence. In the end of paper, we will show that there is no theoretical solution to this revised objection yet. So, without a good answer to this problem, we cannot have intelligent machines just through technological developments.
Keywords
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