Philosophy of Science

Abstract The question of the reality of social kinds—such as money, nationality, and gender—is a central issue in social ontology. This paper defends a framework we call gradational realism, according to which the reality of social kinds is neither absolute nor binary but varies according to the degree to which four operational criteria are satisfied. These criteria are: (1) explanatory–predictive role, meaning that removing the social kind would reduce our ability to explain or predict social phenomena; (2) intersubjective and institutional stability, meaning that agents and institutions consistently reproduce the kind; (3) structural adequacy, whereby institutional rules and material or documentary anchors support its stabilization; and (4) empirical tractability, meaning that the kind can be systematically assessed and investigated. Three case studies—money, group type II, and the state—show that social kinds possess different degrees of reality: money and the state exhibit strong reality, whereas group type II has a moderate and conditional reality. The proposed framework enables a shift from absolutist judgments to gradational and structure-sensitive evaluations of social kinds.

Abstract In the development of risky technologies, such as genetic modification organisms, the issue is that the value of safety cannot be ethically ignored and the users/consumers of risky technological artifacts should not be exposed to a risk beyond a certain threshold. On the other hand, technology policymakers generally view ethical considerations as abstract claims and as obstacles to economic and technological growth. All together considering ethical considerations and the perspectives of all stakeholders in policymaking on risky technologies, without leading to the halt of these projects, requires a multilateral, multi-layered and well-ballanced approach. To this end, this article proposes a policy approach corresponding to John Rawls' philosophical theory, and finally, within this framework, the process of developing genetic modification organisms in Iran and its challenges are examined.

Abstract This article explores the role of the concept of "moral sensibility" in the relationship between mind and reality within the framework of the idea of liberation as articulated by Theodor Adorno. This exploration is situated in relation to the question of how a philosophical theory of ethics can become a material force in society, meaning a force that not only guides agents' actions at the epistemic level but also motivates them materially at the level of will. The article compares Kant’s concept of Categorical Imperative, which emphasizes the universality and unconditionality of moral obligations, with alternative philosophical perspectives that assert the conditioned nature of ethics and emphasize its rootedness in human desires and emotions. Through this comparison, it underscores the importance of formulating the question of moral requirements, including moral sensibility, in terms of the "problem of normativity" and positions liberation as a fundamental element of ethical life in modern society. Utilizing Fabian Freyenhagen’s thesis of "negative Aristotelianism," the article emphasizes the necessity of recognizing the "bad" as the starting point for ethical critique while simultaneously challenging the limitations of overly simplistic frameworks that focus solely on basic human needs through a critique of Freyenhagen’s reading of Adorno. By incorporating insights regarding the unconscious and the socio-historical context, it demonstrates how moral sensibility is shaped not only by rational reflection but also by deeper psychological and social forces. Ultimately, the argument advocates for a more nuanced understanding of moral agency that emphasizes the interplay between individual experiences and social structures, thereby offering an account of moral sensibility that acknowledges both the subjective conditions of possibility for ethics and the real conditions of possibility for ethics.

Abstract The transformation of reading tools and text medium —from printed paper books to e-readers and digital screens— is not merely a technological shift; it brings about a profound change in the perceptual and cognitive experience of the human reader. This article, drawing on contemporary phenomenological approaches in cognitive science, introduces and analyzes the concept of “embodied reading.” This concept highlights how the act of reading, depending on its material substrate, engages the reader’s mind and body in different ways and shapes their semantic experience. In traditional reading, not only vision but all human senses are activated in encountering the book, serving as material anchors for memorizing and decoding information. This sensory engagement creates a spatial and temporal sense of presence for the text, functioning as a scaffold for imagination and mental imagery. Language, too, is saturated with orientational and embedded metaphors. We learn and understand language through our bodily interaction with the world, and we recall our perceptual and emotional experience through recollection of our bodily situation in the environment. In contrast, digital texts, by reducing materiality and physicality, diminish this sensory involvement and challenge the cognitive and memory structures associated with it. Moreover, the weakening of the book’s integrity and coherence as a unified entity affects the reader’s sense of familiarity and control. Thus, different reading technologies and media are not mere carriers of information; they have specific affordances for the practice of reading and lead to different user experiences.

Abstract Proof paradoxes refer to situations where naked statistical evidence supports the conviction of a defendant, yet the resulting judgment appears counterintuitive when considered solely from this evidence. The prevailing approach to addressing proof paradoxes involves distinguishing naked statistical evidence from other types of evidence. In this framework, Thomson (1986) proposes that the existence of a causal relationship between the evidence and its source can serve as a criterion for this distinction. Conversely, Redmayne (2008) contends that Thomson's proposal is unhelpful, arguing that even with naked statistical evidence, a causal relationship can be established in accordance with Thomson's view. In this study, we demonstrate that, by leveraging Pollock's nomic probability theory and Woodward's causal model, Thomson's proposed criterion can be refined to effectively address Redmayne's criticisms.

Abstract In the history of modern psychology, Freud appears as a thinker who stands at the point of rupture between philosophy and Kantian science, a point at which the Cartesian conscious subject could no longer be the bearer of the whole truth. This article argues that Freud’s turn from consciousness to the unconscious, rather than being a mere shift of focus from the conscious to the unconscious, is a response to the internal crisis of a psychology of consciousness and to the critique of the doctrine that identifies consciousness with the mental. This turn is deeply intertwined with Freud’s engagement with the German tradition (from Leibniz to Nietzsche) and with the physiological concepts of the Helmholtzian school.
Using a historical-philosophical method and drawing on Freud’s primary texts and related sources, the paper shows that the Freudian unconscious is neither a return to a metaphysical “soul” nor a reduction of the psyche to biological mechanisms but is instead conceived through the gaps and dysfunctions of consciousness, thereby transforming the very object of psychological science. It concludes that Freudian psychoanalysis should be understood as a radical alternative to a psychology of consciousness—one that is situated between philosophy and physiology, grounded in clinical experience and the analysis of the failures of consciousness, and that thereby makes possible a science of the unconscious.

Abstract For the ancients, the Euclidean axiom system was a desirable model for deductive system building. Avicenna used this model to construct a metaphysical propositional system. However, some have ruled out the possibility of constructing such a system for metaphysics and have considered the attempt to construct such a system to be a mistake. The issue that this article has tackled is posed in the form of the question of how and under what possibility did Avicenna construct a deductive propositional system for metaphysics? This issue is of great importance and necessity in that it questions the conditions of possibility of the first deductive propositional system of metaphysics. In order to answer this question, the present article first examines the structure of the propositional system of Avicenna's metaphysics with regard to its "components" and "order" in a descriptive-analytical manner, and then searches for the possible conditions for its realization. According to Avicenna's scientology, metaphysics based on the lemma method should only use conventional principles. However, metaphysics based on the immediate method also has the possibility of using axioms. According to Avicenna, metaphysics using the lemma method is possible in itself, but difficult in practice. This difficulty, on the one hand, and educational purposes, on the other hand, have caused Avicenna to resort to the immediate method in addition to the lemma method; and thus, to form a "conventional principle-subjective principle" structure. The results of the article show that the structuring of Avicenna's propositional system of metaphysics is possible only within the combined framework of these two methods. And this combination is also possible based on the theory of issuance in ontology and the theory of knowledge in Ibn Sina's epistemology.

Abstract Proponents of objectivity, by calling upon scholars and obliging them to eliminate subjective characteristics in their engagement with natural and social phenomena, have promised the attainment of "true" theories that correspond and align with "reality." Numerous philosophers and scholars of science have critiqued this claim and rejected the possibility of its realization. With the emergence of artificial intelligence systems, and owing to their remarkable and unprecedented capabilities, the question of the feasibility of achieving objectivity is once again raised. This article examines the concept of objectivity by reflecting on prominent conceptions of artificial intelligence, particularly its applications in the field of urban planning—systems which, according to Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig's classification, fall under the category of those that "act rationally." It appears that in supervised forms of AI systems, the realization of objectivity is impossible for several reasons, including the value alignment problem. In unsupervised forms, the influence of subjective or intersubjective factors becomes deeper and more complex. Technological efforts to approach this goal in more advanced AI systems are not only improbable but would also approximate a dangerous condition.

Abstract This study aims to present an adapted methodology based on critical realism for the investigation of social phenomena in Iran. According to the critical realist approach, social reality is multi-layered, encompassing the empirical level, underlying structures, and causal mechanisms, and understanding it requires moving beyond surface-level observations to deeper layers. By reviewing and comparing existing realist methodological models, this article highlights the necessity of localizing and redesigning research methods for the Iranian context. The proposed model comprises eight stages: description, analytical decomposition, retroductive prediction, retroduction, comparison and refinement, objectification and contextualization, triangulation, and correction. Each stage is designed to enable researchers to identify the constituent elements and generative mechanisms of social reality, produce multi-layered and valid explanations, and align their analysis with Iran’s historical, cultural, and institutional context. Emphasizing reflexivity, continuous critique, and flexibility, this methodology facilitates the discovery of unseen causal mechanisms and the provision of realistic, context-sensitive explanations of complex social phenomena in Iran. The findings provide both practical and theoretical guidance for social science researchers in Iran, enabling them to employ critical realism to generate deep, valid, and locally grounded analyses.

Abstract The central claim of this article is that the philosophy of medicine emerged through a critical confrontation with classical philosophy of science, a confrontation that coincided with the very possibility of articulating the contemporary medical crisis. This simultaneity is not accidental; rather, it discloses the inability of classical philosophy of science to grasp the practical, clinical, and social character of medicine. The rise of the philosophy of medicine is thus presented as internally connected both to the limits of classical philosophy of science and to the formulation of the modern medical crisis. The paper first reconstructs the conceptual framework of classical philosophy of science and identifies its shortcomings in accounting for the nature of medicine. It then examines the idea of medical crisis, arguing that excessive scientification and technologization have dehumanized the clinical encounter and prompted critical reflection. The Kaplan–Pellegrino debate is analyzed as a key historical moment. Drawing on Wieland, Fleck, and Sadeghzadeh, the article develops a positive account of medicine as a distinct kind of knowledge and considers its implications. The implications of this shift include a critique of contemporary medicine and a rethinking of the relationship between science, practice, and the modern human sciences.

Abstract This paper analyzes the pivotal role of Nicholas of Cusa in the intellectual transition from medieval cosmology to modern science. The main argument is that Cusanus’s philosophical and scientific concepts—while deeply rooted in theology—provided the metaphysical framework necessary for subsequent scientific revolutions. In cosmology in particular, building on his central idea of the whole and the part and through theories such as learned ignorance and the homogeneity of the universe, Cusanus undermined the absolute distinctions of the Aristotelian‑Ptolemaic worldview, including those between center/periphery and rest/motion. This conceptual and historical analysis demonstrates how his ideas prepared the ground for later cosmological models. Ultimately, the paper presents Cusanus not merely as a religious thinker faithful to tradition, nor simply as a speculative scientist with bold and modern ideas, but as a philosopher of transition—a threshold figure whose thought embodies the very passage that enabled participation in this cosmological transformation.

Abstract This article offers an exposition of McTaggart’s paradox and examines several influential interpretations of it. Its principal aim is to reconsider the argument of John Ellis McTaggart, the prominent early twentieth-century metaphysician, for the unreality of time as articulated through a fundamental opposition between two ideas: “absolute reality” and “tensed reality,” and to draw from this opposition a number of conclusions relevant to contemporary philosophical debates concerning the nature of time. To this end, it reconstructs, with close attention to McTaggart’s own formulation, the structure of his argument—an argument intended to demonstrate that time involves a contradiction and therefore cannot be real. It then analyzes and assesses several alternative interpretations of the paradox: Heather Dyke’s account of the contradiction of tense, Huw Price’s view regarding the tension between inclusivity and exclusivity, and, most notably, Michael Dummett’s interpretation. Dummett maintains that the success of McTaggart’s paradox depends upon the acceptance of a substantive philosophical presupposition, namely, that a complete description of reality is, in principle, possible. Finally, the article argues that understanding McTaggart’s paradox within this framework has significant implications for assessing the legitimacy of the philosophical dispute between the A-theory and the B-theory of time. In particular, appeals to naturalistic arguments—that is, those invoking physical theories—in support of the B-theory rely upon a specific philosophical presupposition concerning the possibility of an absolute description of reality and are therefore vulnerable to the charge of begging the question.