The Role of Moral Sensibility in Analyzing the Relationship Between Social Theory and Practice in Adorno’s Perspective: A Critique of Freyenhagen’s Reconstruction of Adorno

This article explores the role of the concept of "moral sensibility" in the relationship between mind and reality within the framework of the idea of liberation as articulated by Theodor Adorno. This exploration is situated in relation to the question of how a philosophical theory of ethics can become a material force in society, meaning a force that not only guides agents' actions at the epistemic level but also motivates them materially at the level of will. The article compares Kant’s concept of Categorical Imperative, which emphasizes the universality and unconditionality of moral obligations, with alternative philosophical perspectives that assert the conditioned nature of ethics and emphasize its rootedness in human desires and emotions. Through this comparison, it underscores the importance of formulating the question of moral requirements, including moral sensibility, in terms of the "problem of normativity" and positions liberation as a fundamental element of ethical life in modern society. Utilizing Fabian Freyenhagen’s thesis of "negative Aristotelianism," the article emphasizes the necessity of recognizing the "bad" as the starting point for ethical critique while simultaneously challenging the limitations of overly simplistic frameworks that focus solely on basic human needs through a critique of Freyenhagen’s reading of Adorno. By incorporating insights regarding the unconscious and the socio-historical context, it demonstrates how moral sensibility is shaped not only by rational reflection but also by deeper psychological and social forces. Ultimately, the argument advocates for a more nuanced understanding of moral agency that emphasizes the interplay between individual experiences and social structures, thereby offering an account of moral sensibility that acknowledges both the subjective conditions of possibility for ethics and the real conditions of possibility for ethics.