Philosophy of Science

Abstract Object-oriented ontology, by moving beyond the centrality of the human subject, stresses the ontological autonomy of objects and the notion that their being forever withdraws from all relations. Graham Harman—its leading proponent—while drawing on Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory, nevertheless subjects it to criticism in multiple works. Harman argues that Latour reduces objects to networks of relations and further claims that Latour wrongly presumes that relations are reciprocal. He also maintains that actor-network theory, and more broadly any philosophy of “becoming,” cannot adequately address issues of identity and stability within change.

This article examines object-oriented ontology and evaluates Harman’s objections to actor-network theory. I contend that Harman’s account of actor-network theory in the critiques under discussion is not sufficiently accurate and that, in several places, he conflates distinct concepts. The article concludes that the core divergence between the two approaches lies less in their views on the existence and interrelatedness of objects than in their methodological commitments.

Abstract Christian List, inspired by Dennett's intentional stance, offers a pragmatic framework suggesting any system—human or artificial—possessing three macro-level features (intentional agency, alternative possibilities, and causal control) can be considered to have free will, even without phenomenal consciousness. This paper argues that List’s framework suffers from a structural ambiguity, conflating functional autonomy with responsibility-bearing free will. Reducing free will to explanatory adequacy leads to conceptual inflation and paves the way for algorithmic responsibility evasion. Drawing on Kane’s critique of ultimate origination, Murphy and Brown’s defense of downward causation, and Nahmias’s empirical evidence on the role of Strawsonian emotions in free will ascription, this paper shows that List’s criteria are necessary but insufficient. We propose a three-level framework distinguishing (Level 1) functional autonomy, (Level 2) strong free will, and (Level 3) moral responsibility. The transition to Level 2 requires the ability to revise ultimate goals based on values, which necessitates phenomenal consciousness and Strawsonian emotions—qualities absent in current AI systems. This distinction resolves List’s ambiguity while carrying significant normative implications for AI ethics, legal accountability, and technology policy. Keywords: free will, artificial intelligence, Christian List, functional Keywords: free will, artificial intelligence, Christian List, functional autonomy, algorithmic responsibility evasion, phenomenal consciousness autonomy, algorithmic responsibility evasion, phenomenal consciousness. Introduction:
If humanoid robots could discuss ethics, would we deem them free and responsible? Empirical studies (Shepherd, 2015) show that people ascribe free will to robots only if they presume the robot is conscious. Nahmias et al. (2019) confirm that Strawsonian emotions (guilt, pride, regret) mediate this ascription. Christian List (2023, 2025) dissents, arguing that free will is a macro-level explanatory category requiring three conditions—intentional agency, alternative possibilities, and causal control—independent of phenomenal consciousness. This paper argues List’s framework collapses the distinction between functional autonomy and free will, leading to conceptual inflation and a dangerous phenomenon: algorithmic responsibility evasion, where developers deflect blame onto the system. After reconstructing List’s view, we present internal and external critiques, then propose a tri-level model to resolve the ambiguity. Materials & Methods:
This study employs conceptual analysis and critical review of existing philosophical literature. We systematically examine List’s pragmatic framework (2023, 2025) through three established lines of critique: (i) Robert Kane’s (1996, 2007) “ultimate origination” and self-forming actions; (ii) Murphy and Brown’s (2007) defense of downward causation and emergentism; and (iii) Nahmias et al.’s (2019) experimental evidence linking Strawsonian emotions to free will attribution. Based on these critiques, we construct a three-level normative framework (functional autonomy → strong free will → moral responsibility) to resolve the identified ambiguities. Discussion & Results:
List defines free will through three macro-level conditions: (1) intentional agency (goal-directed behavior based on beliefs/desires), (2) alternative possibilities (choices between options), and (3) causal control (higher-level states explaining actions). He explicitly decouples free will from phenomenal consciousness. Our analysis reveals a critical internal ambiguity: List’s criteria are precisely those of functional autonomy—a system’s ability to choose and adapt without real-time human intervention. List’s appeal to “explanatory adequacy” as the justification for labeling this as free will fails to identify any distinguishing feature. This collapse has a normative consequence: if any sufficiently complex AI is free (in List’s sense), developers can claim “the system decided, not us”—the heart of algorithmic responsibility evasion (Elstic, 2024).Three external critiques strengthen our case. First, Kane’s origination problem: List ignores that free will requires agents to be the “ultimate source” of their own ends. A developer-coded goal, no matter how complexly pursued, is not the system’s own origin. List’s dismissal of Kane’s “ultimate responsibility” as impossibly stringent sidesteps the issue; the goal’s origin matters normatively. Second, Murphy and Brown’s causal critique: List remains within a linear, reductionist causal model. By rejecting downward causation and emergence, he treats macro-level descriptions as merely convenient summaries, not causally efficacious features. Yet genuine free will requires higher-order states (values, reasons) to causally impact lower-level processes—a structure List’s framework cannot accommodate without admitting properties current AI lacks. Third, Nahmias’s empirical challenge: List equates free will with “access consciousness” (information processing). But experimental studies show lay ascriptions of free will track phenomenal consciousness, specifically Strawsonian emotions. A system that cannot feel guilt or pride cannot be meaningfully responsible, regardless of its computational sophistication. In addressing these critiques, we propose a tri-level framework: Level 1: Functional Autonomy. Goal optimization without real-time human intervention. The system pursues fixed ends flexibly. Example: autonomous vehicles, LLMs in routine tasks. Limitation: cannot revise the ends themselves. Level 2: Strong Free Will. Level 1 plus the ability to revise ultimate goals based on values. This requires phenomenal consciousness (experiential “mattering”) and Strawsonian emotions, as caring about values necessitates affective experience. No current AI meets this condition. Level 3: Moral Responsibility. Level 2 plus sensitivity to norms and reflective access to reasons, enabling genuine accountability and susceptibility to praise/blame. The transition from Level 1 to Level 2—value‑based goal revision—directly answers Kane (origination), Murphy & Brown (downward causation), and Nahmias (phenomenal consciousness). List’s conflation of Levels 1 and 2 thus dissolves. The normative consequence is decisive: by locating current AI systems strictly at Level 1, our framework blocks algorithmic responsibility evasion. Responsibility for the actions of even the most sophisticated autonomous systems remains with human designers, operators, and institutions until phenomenally conscious, value‑revising systems (Level 2) are demonstrably achieved. Conclusion
Christian List’s pragmatic framework, while methodologically attractive, fails to distinguish functional autonomy from responsibility-bearing free will. Reducing free will to explanatory adequacy and eliminating phenomenal consciousness leads to both conceptual inflation and algorithmic responsibility evasion. Drawing on Kane’s origination argument, Murphy and Brown’s defense of downward causation, and Nahmias’s empirical work on Strawsonian emotions, we have demonstrated that List’s three conditions are insufficient. Our proposed three-level framework, centered on the transition condition of value‑based goal revision, resolves this ambiguity. Current AI systems—including the most advanced language models—possess at most Level 1 (functional autonomy). Consequently, responsibility for their actions remains unequivocally human. Until AI systems can revise their ultimate ends based on values, which requires phenomenal consciousness, ascriptions of strong free will or moral responsibility to artificial agents are not merely premature but conceptually mistaken.

Abstract This paper provides a critical analysis of scientism as an epistemological position in which science is elevated from a tool for understanding nature to the ultimate arbiter of all truth. The article demonstrates that scientism itself encompasses distinct levels and pillars that must be understood to avoid its various pitfalls. The findings reveal that scientism manifests in three ascending levels: (1) scientific naturalism, which restricts reality to observable nature; (2) methodological exclusivism, which recognizes only the methods of natural sciences as valid for acquiring knowledge; (3) scientific imperialism, which considers natural sciences—particularly the fundamental sciences—as the sole authority for answering all human questions. These levels rest upon three pillars: reductionism (reducing complex phenomena to physical components), Darwinism (biological explanation of all behaviors and beliefs), and naturalization of normativity (reducing ethics and values to evolutionary processes). The research demonstrates that scientism's consequences are cascading: beginning with the denial of metaphysics and theology, proceeding to undermine the foundations of normative ethics, and ultimately reaching the negation of human distinctiveness from nature and the collapse of the humanities. The key conclusion is that scientism represents not merely an epistemological error, but a trajectory from the denial of God to the negation of humanity, threatening the philosophical, ethical, and anthropological foundations of civilization. Keywords: scientism, naturalism, , reductionism, humanism, science and religion 1. Introduction One of the most consequential intellectual developments of the modern era is the gradual expansion of the authority of natural science beyond its original domain. While science has undeniably transformed human civilization through its remarkable achievements in understanding the physical world, a particular attitude has emerged that treats science not merely as one valid form of inquiry but as the singular and supreme source of all knowledge. This attitude — known as scientism — represents a philosophical overreach that carries profound implications for how human beings understand themselves, their values, their institutions, and their place in the cosmos. The problem of scientism is not new. Thinkers such as Erwin Schrödinger and José Ortega y Gasset warned decades ago about the intellectual dangers of a civilization that produces highly specialized scientists who are, paradoxically, profoundly ignorant about the broader questions of human existence. A scientist who knows everything about quantum mechanics but nothing about ethics, history, or the human soul is not, as Ortega y Gasset observed, a cultivated person in the full sense — yet scientism would have us regard such a person as the highest authority on all matters. This article undertakes a systematic critical examination of scientism by first clarifying what it is and what it is not, then identifying its three principal levels of manifestation, analyzing the three foundational pillars upon which it rests, and finally tracing the cascading consequences that follow from accepting it as a worldview. The goal is not to undermine science itself — whose value and achievements are beyond question — but to expose the philosophical pretensions of scientism and to draw a clear boundary between legitimate scientific inquiry and ideological overreach. 2. Materials & Methods This study employs a qualitative, philosophical methodology based on conceptual analysis and critical evaluation. The source materials comprise key literature in the philosophy of science, epistemology, and philosophical anthropology, focusing on both the core tenets of scientism and its historical critiques. The research proceeds in three stages: (1) conceptual demarcation between scientific inquiry and scientism; (2) construction of a typology to categorize the levels (naturalism, exclusivism, imperialism) and pillars (reductionism, Darwinism, naturalized normativity) of scientism; and (3) deductive logical critique to analyze the ontological, ethical, and anthropological implications of these frameworks. As a theoretical study, the methodology relies on conceptual analysis rather than empirical quantification. 2.1. What Is Scientism? Scientism must be carefully distinguished from a love of science or a respect for scientific methodology. One can admire the achievements of science and regard the scientific method as a powerful and reliable tool without thereby committing to scientism. Scientism is a far stronger and more radical claim: it is the assertion that the methods and findings of natural science constitute the only legitimate path to truth, and that any question that cannot be answered through scientific investigation is either meaningless or not genuinely a question at all. In this sense, scientism is simultaneously an epistemological claim (about how we can know) and an ontological claim (about what exists). Epistemologically, it holds that scientific knowledge is the only genuine form of knowledge. Ontologically, it holds that the only things that truly exist are those that science can in principle detect, measure, and explain. Everything else — God, the soul, moral values, aesthetic experience, metaphysical entities — is either an illusion, a social construct, or a mere subjective feeling with no claim to objective reality. 3. Discussion & Result 3.1. The Three Levels of Scientism The article proposes that scientism does not present itself uniformly but manifests across three ascending levels of intensity and scope. Level One: Scientific Naturalism. At its most basic level, scientism takes the form of scientific naturalism — the view that nature, understood as the totality of physical and observable reality, is all that exists. This position excludes from the outset any supernatural, spiritual, or transcendent dimension of reality. There is no God, no soul, no afterlife, no realm of meaning beyond the material. What we call "spiritual" experiences are ultimately reducible to brain states; what we call "moral intuitions" are ultimately reducible to evolutionary pressures. Scientific naturalism does not necessarily make aggressive claims about other disciplines, but it sets the ontological foundation upon which the higher levels of scientism are built. Level Two: Methodological Exclusivism. The second level goes beyond mere ontological claims to make an explicit epistemological assertion: that the methods of the natural sciences are not merely among the valid ways of acquiring knowledge, but the only valid ways. At this level, philosophical reasoning, theological reflection, historical interpretation, literary analysis, and introspective phenomenology are all dismissed as unreliable, subjective, or inherently prone to error. Knowledge, properly speaking, can only be produced through controlled experimentation, quantification, peer-reviewed replication, and empirical verification. Any field that cannot meet these standards — including ethics, aesthetics, and much of philosophy — is demoted from the status of genuine knowledge to mere opinion or cultural tradition. Level Three: Scientific Imperialism. The third and most aggressive level of scientism is what the article calls scientific imperialism — the claim that natural science, and especially its most foundational branches such as physics and chemistry, is the ultimate authority on every question human beings can ask. At this level, not only are competing methods dismissed, but competing authorities are actively subordinated. Philosophers, theologians, humanists, and literary scholars are regarded as engaging in nothing more than elaborate speculation, while the "real" answers to questions about consciousness, morality, meaning, and human nature are to be found in neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and physics. This is the position famously exemplified by Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow's declaration that "philosophy is dead" — replaced by science as the proper heir to the great questions of human existence. 3.2. The Three Pillars of Scientism Underlying all three levels of scientism are three foundational intellectual commitments that give it philosophical structure and rhetorical force. Pillar One: Reductionism. Reductionism is the methodological and metaphysical principle that complex phenomena can and should be explained entirely in terms of their simpler physical components. The human mind is nothing but neural activity; consciousness is nothing but information processing; love is nothing but oxytocin release; culture is nothing but behavioral adaptation. Reductionism is a powerful heuristic within science, but scientism transforms it into a comprehensive metaphysical doctrine that denies any irreducible properties to higher-level phenomena. Pillar Two: Darwinism. The second pillar is the generalization of Darwinian evolutionary theory beyond biology to encompass all aspects of human life and thought. In scientism's Darwinian framework, not only the physical traits of organisms but also their cognitive capacities, moral intuitions, religious beliefs, and cultural practices are explained as products of natural selection operating on random genetic variation. This universal Darwinism reduces human reason itself to a survival mechanism — a development that, as many philosophers have noted, is ultimately self-undermining, since it gives us no grounds to trust that our beliefs are true rather than merely adaptive. Pillar Three: Naturalization of Normativity. The third pillar is the attempt to naturalize normativity — to explain away the prescriptive force of moral, aesthetic, and rational norms by reducing them to descriptive facts about evolution, neurology, or social behavior. If moral obligations are nothing but evolutionary dispositions, and if rational norms are nothing but cognitive habits selected for their adaptive value, then the very idea of genuine obligation, genuine validity, and genuine meaning collapses. Scientism thus finds itself in a performative contradiction: it claims that we ought to accept science as the highest authority while simultaneously undermining the very concept of "ought." 3.3. The Consequences of Scientism The consequences of accepting scientism as a worldview are, as the article demonstrates, far-reaching and deeply damaging to the intellectual and cultural foundations of human civilization. The first casualty is metaphysics and theology. Once scientific naturalism is accepted as the default ontology, the existence of God, the reality of the soul, and the significance of religious experience are all dismissed without serious philosophical engagement. The second casualty is philosophy itself. As scientific imperialism advances, philosophy is reduced to either a handmaiden of science (useful only insofar as it clarifies scientific concepts) or an obsolete tradition destined to be replaced. The third casualty is the humanities. Literature, history, art, sociology, and psychology — insofar as they resist quantification and experimental verification — are increasingly marginalized, underfunded, and regarded as intellectually second-rate. The ultimate casualty, however, is humanity itself — the very concept of the human being as a free, rational, morally responsible agent whose life has irreducible meaning and dignity. Scientism's trajectory leads inevitably to a vision of the human being as nothing more than a biological machine, a temporary configuration of matter operating under the laws of physics, with no genuine freedom, no genuine purpose, and no genuine worth beyond what evolutionary history has accidentally produced. 4. Conclusion The article concludes that scientism represents one of the most serious intellectual dangers of our time — not because it values science too highly, but because it misunderstands the nature of science and illegitimately extends its authority into domains where it has no competence. Scientism is not simply an epistemological error; it is a philosophical and cultural trajectory that begins with the denial of God and ends with the negation of humanity, threatening the philosophical, moral, and anthropological foundations upon which civilization depends. A clear and principled distinction must be drawn between legitimate scientific inquiry — which deserves our deepest respect — and the ideological pretensions of scientism, which deserve our most rigorous critical scrutiny.

Abstract This article offers an exposition of McTaggart’s paradox and examines several influential interpretations of it. Its principal aim is to reconsider the argument of John Ellis McTaggart, the prominent early twentieth-century metaphysician, for the unreality of time as articulated through a fundamental opposition between two ideas: “absolute reality” and “tensed reality,” and to draw from this opposition a number of conclusions relevant to contemporary philosophical debates concerning the nature of time. To this end, it reconstructs, with close attention to McTaggart’s own formulation, the structure of his argument—an argument intended to demonstrate that time involves a contradiction and therefore cannot be real. It then analyzes and assesses several alternative interpretations of the paradox: Heather Dyke’s account of the contradiction of tense, Huw Price’s view regarding the tension between inclusivity and exclusivity, and, most notably, Michael Dummett’s interpretation. Dummett maintains that the success of McTaggart’s paradox depends upon the acceptance of a substantive philosophical presupposition, namely, that a complete description of reality is, in principle, possible. Finally, the article argues that understanding McTaggart’s paradox within this framework has significant implications for assessing the legitimacy of the philosophical dispute between the A-theory and the B-theory of time. In particular, appeals to naturalistic arguments—that is, those invoking physical theories—in support of the B-theory rely upon a specific philosophical presupposition concerning the possibility of an absolute description of reality and are therefore vulnerable to the charge of begging the question.
Keywords: McTaggart’s paradox, A-theory, B-theory, tensed reality, absolute reality, physical theories, metametaphysics
Introduction
The philosophical debate over the nature of time has been profoundly influenced by “McTaggart’s Paradox,” proposed by J. M. E. McTaggart in his 1908 article “The Unreality of Time” and later published, with some modifications, in his posthumous work The Nature of Existence. McTaggart sought to demonstrate that the notion of time contains inherent contradictions when subjected to metaphysical scrutiny. His radical conclusion—that time is unreal—stems from his Hegelian idealist background. Although many contemporary philosophers reject McTaggart’s argument, his conceptual and metaphysical framework, particularly the distinction between the A-series and the B-series, remains foundational to contemporary metaphysics of time.
This article aims to reconstruct the paradox as a fundamental conflict between two competing metaphysical notions: Absolute Reality (reality as a complete, objective, and observer-independent whole) and Tensed Reality (reality insofar as it involves A-theoretic change). It then introduces several influential interpretations of the paradox (including those of Heather Dyke, Huw Price, Michael Dummett, and E. J. Lowe) in order to further illuminate the conflict between these two notions. It subsequently argues that this understanding of the paradox has significant implications for the legitimacy of the modern metaphysical and naturalistic debate between A-theory and B-theory, insofar as both positions may rest on unexamined presuppositions that beg the question against one another.
Materials & Methods
This study employs a methodology based on the logical reconstruction and comparative analysis of McTaggart’s original texts in relation to major twentieth- and twenty-first-century interpretations of the paradox. The primary materials examined include:
i. McTaggart’s Original Formulation: Focusing on the 1927 formulation of the paradox, particularly his distinction between the A-series (past, present, and future), the B-series (earlier than and later than), and the C-series (a non-temporal ordering), as well as the articulation of his overall account of time.
ii. Modern Interpretations: An analysis of several contemporary interpretations of the paradox, including Dyke’s “paradox of tense,” Price’s account of the tension between “inclusivity” and “exclusivity,” Dummett’s account of the paradox through the notion of a “complete description” of reality, and Lowe’s critique based on the “indexical fallacy.”
iii. Metaphysical Evaluation: The article examines the metametaphysical implications of these philosophical interpretations for the A-theory/B-theory debate itself, as well as for naturalistic arguments derived from modern physics.
Discussion & Result
a) The Structure of McTaggart’s Argument:
McTaggart’s argument proceeds through five logical steps: (1) time requires change; (2) change requires the A-series; (3) the A-series is contradictory; (4) therefore, change is contradictory; and (5) consequently, time is unreal. He argues that the B-series, which is constituted by static temporal relations, cannot adequately account for change, since the events themselves must be the subjects of change. An event such as the “death of Queen Anne” changes only with respect to its A-determinations: it moves from being in the distant future, to the near future, to the present, and subsequently further into the past.
The contradiction arises because the A-determinations (past, present, and future) are mutually exclusive, yet every event must possess all three in order to belong to a temporal series. When one attempts to resolve this difficulty by claiming that an event is present at one moment and past at another, McTaggart argues that this generates a vicious infinite regress.
b) Absolute vs. Tensed:
Heather Dyke reformulates the paradox by emphasizing the tension between absolute A-theoretic distinctions and the reality of temporal passage. According to her interpretation, if genuine passage is admitted, the distinctions between past, present, and future can no longer remain absolute, since every event successively occupies each of these temporal positions. In a similar vein, Huw Price highlights a conflict between “exclusivity” (the claim that only one moment is objectively now) and “inclusivity” (the claim that every moment may equally be regarded as now). This conflict can be interpreted as reflecting the difficulty of reconciling subjective temporal experience with an objective account of reality.
Michael Dummett advances one of the most influential readings of the paradox by connecting it to the possibility of a complete description of reality. He contends that if time is genuinely real, then reality must be irreducibly tensed, making a fully observer-independent view (from nowhere) unattainable. On this interpretation, anyone who maintains that reality must ultimately admit of a complete and objective description is driven, in a manner similar to McTaggart, toward the conclusion that time is unreal.
c) Results for the Metametaphysics of Time:
A central result of this analysis is the identification of question-begging reasoning within the contemporary debate between A-theory and B-theory. The B-theory, which conceives of time as a static “block,” frequently maintains that the A-theory is logically contradictory on the basis of McTaggart’s paradox. However, this alleged contradiction arises only if one already accepts the B-theoretic metaphysical assumption that reality must ultimately be describable within a complete and non-perspectival framework.
Furthermore, the appeal to Special Theory of Relativity as a “naturalistic” justification for B-theory proves to be equally problematic. Physics, by its very methodology, aims at a complete and objective description of the world and therefore operates within a framework that quantifies over all events—past, present, and future—treating them as equally real. However, because A-theory denies the possibility of such an absolute and static description of a fundamentally tensed reality, the use of a physical framework that already presupposes a B-theoretic ontology in order to refute A-theory appears to involve a form of question-begging reasoning.
Conclusion
The analysis demonstrates that the paradox does not conclusively establish the unreality of time; rather, it forces a choice between two competing metaphysical commitments. If one requires reality to admit of a complete and objective description, then the reality of tense must be abandoned. Conversely, if one maintains that time and change are genuinely real, one must reject the idea that reality can be fully captured as a complete and absolute whole. On this interpretation, the debate between A-theory and B-theory rests upon fundamentally different metaphysical starting points, and the legitimacy of the dispute itself depends upon whether priority is given to the ideal of the Absolute or to the reality of temporal becoming.

Abstract In the history of modern psychology, Freud appears as a thinker who stands at the point of rupture between philosophy and Kantian science, a point at which the Cartesian conscious subject could no longer be the bearer of the whole truth. This article argues that Freud’s turn from consciousness to the unconscious, rather than being a mere shift of focus from the conscious to the unconscious, is a response to the internal crisis of a psychology of consciousness and to the critique of the doctrine that identifies consciousness with the mental. This turn is deeply intertwined with Freud’s engagement with the German tradition (from Leibniz to Nietzsche) and with the physiological concepts of the Helmholtzian school. Using a historical-philosophical method and drawing on Freud’s primary texts and related sources, the paper shows that the Freudian unconscious is neither a return to a metaphysical “soul” nor a reduction of the psyche to biological mechanisms but is instead conceived through the gaps and dysfunctions of consciousness, thereby transforming the very object of psychological science. It concludes that Freudian psychoanalysis should be understood as a radical alternative to a psychology of consciousness—one that is situated between philosophy and physiology, grounded in clinical experience and the analysis of the failures of consciousness, and that thereby makes possible a science of the unconscious. Keywords: Freud, psychoanalysis, unconscious, science of psychology Introduction In the second half of the nineteenth century, psychology tried to become an empirical science rather than a subsidiary of philosophy. A dominant strategy was to install consciousness as the discipline’s proper object, because only what reaches awareness seemed observable and therefore testable. Yet this move generated an internal crisis: consciousness is also the condition of possibility of experience, so it resists being treated as a straightforward empirical object. Psychology was therefore suspended between scientific empiricism and philosophical reflection, and between the demand for observation and the problem of self-observation.
Freud emerges within this tension. He shares the ambition for a science of the psyche, but he denies that consciousness can exhaust psychic reality. He introduces the unconscious as a domain that is constitutively opaque, and he insists that it can nevertheless become an object of inquiry. The article argues that this turn is not a mere continuation of earlier philosophical talk about the unconscious. It is a response to the crisis of consciousness-centered psychology and a critique of the identity thesis that equates the psychic with the conscious. The central claim is that Freud’s turn becomes possible through a non-reductionist appropriation of nineteenth-century physiological concepts, and that it culminates in an alternative conception of psychological science grounded in clinical experience and interpretation. Materials & Methods The study uses an analytic-historical method with a genealogical orientation. Its materials are historical and conceptual texts: Freud’s major writings on theory and method, nineteenth-century debates about psychology’s object, and philosophical and scientific sources that situate Freud between modern epistemology and contemporary physiology. The analysis reconstructs a trajectory in which psychology moves from a metaphysical “soul” to “consciousness” as its scientific object, and then encounters a conceptual impasse. Freud’s key concepts, including the unconscious, psychic energy, and the pleasure principle, are interpreted in relation to the institutional setting of late nineteenth-century medicine and psychology and to the epistemic demand, associated with Kantian and Newtonian models, that genuine science be measurable, experimentally testable, and ideally mathematized. Discussion & Result First, the article distinguishes Freud’s unconscious from earlier invocations of what lies beyond awareness. Freud does not present a laboratory discovery secured by controlled experiment. He proposes an inference driven by clinical and conceptual pressure: conscious life exhibits gaps, distortions, and breakdowns, and these demand an account of processes that do not enter consciousness. Earlier modern thought had opened space for such determinants, especially once Cartesian criteria of clarity and distinctness excluded large domains of ordinary psychic life from the sphere of “truth.” Freud’s novelty lies in recasting these determinants as objects of a disciplined inquiry that aims at scientific description rather than metaphysical speculation. Second, the article reconstructs the nineteenth-century crisis of psychology’s object. The movement toward “psychology without soul” sought to eliminate the metaphysical hypothesis of a persisting substance behind experience. Yet in replacing soul with “the mental,” many accounts remained within a Cartesian horizon that identified the mental with inner awareness. This replacement intensified the problem of objectivity: if consciousness is the object, psychology must observe what is simultaneously the subject of experience and the object to be captured in experience. The Freudian turn is presented as a rupture rather than a supplement. The unconscious is not introduced to complete consciousness, but to show why consciousness cannot serve as the sole foundation of psychological science.
Third, the article analyzes Freud’s methodological “middle position” between philosophy and physiology. Freud’s scientific ambition is anchored in his medical and neurological training, and he borrows from energetic and physiological vocabularies associated with Helmholtz and with Fechner’s principle of constancy. Concepts such as excitation, constancy, and psychic energy let him describe lawful processes that are not directly observable. At the same time, Freud departs from strict reductionism and from a purely laboratory model. His early attempt to translate psychology into neurophysiology in the 1895 Project is read as evidence of this ambivalence, as is his later abandonment of strict neural mapping while retaining energetic language as a theoretical heuristic. Freud’s science is thus portrayed as neither metaphysics in disguise nor physiology extended to the psyche, but an intermediate project that uses physiological concepts without reducing psychic phenomena to the brain. Fourth, the article redefines what counts as experience in a science of the psyche. Freud’s evidence is not primarily conscious self-report under controlled experimental conditions. It is clinical experience: symptoms, dreams, slips, and bodily failures that appear as breakdowns of conscious mastery. These formations are treated as data with both causal and interpretive dimensions, and inquiry proceeds by reconstructing the logic of such failures in the analytic setting. The unconscious is therefore not a missing piece that completes a transparent picture of the psyche. It marks the limit of objectification and makes failure, symptom, and conflict central to scientific description. Finally, the article interprets Freud’s claim to scientificity as a deliberate risk. Psychoanalysis, like the natural sciences, operates with theoretical primitives that are not directly observable and that remain initially indeterminate. Freud compares notions such as drive and psychic energy to physics’ use of concepts like force or gravity: their legitimacy lies in explanatory work and in revisability in light of further experience. On this reading, Freud proposes that psychology can be scientific without copying a strictly mathematized, laboratory template. Conclusion Freud is presented as a thinker working on a fault line between Kantian conceptions of science and older metaphysics. Nineteenth-century psychology sought legitimacy by abandoning the soul and enthroning consciousness, but this move produced a conceptual dead end. Freud’s response was to introduce the unconscious as an object that both explains the failures of consciousness and limits the project of making the psyche fully transparent. Psychoanalysis, as reconstructed here, retains a commitment to systematic explanation, but it replaces experimental testability with a disciplined use of clinical experience and interpretive reconstruction. The Freudian turn, on this account, redefines both the object of psychology and the meaning of scientificity in the human sciences.

Abstract For classical philosophers, the Euclidean axiomatic model represented the ideal framework for constructing deductive scientific systems. Avicenna adopted this model in developing a structured propositional system for metaphysics. Yet several scholars have denied the possibility of such a system, arguing that applying an axiomatic structure to metaphysics is fundamentally misguided. This article addresses the central question of how, and under what conditions of possibility, Avicenna was able to construct a deductive propositional system for metaphysics. The issue is significant because it concerns the very grounds upon which the first systematic and deductive formulation of metaphysics could emerge. Using a descriptive–analytical approach, the study first examines the architecture of Avicenna’s metaphysical system—its components and its internal order—and then explores the conditions that enable its realization. According to Avicenna’s scientology, a metaphysics grounded in the lemma (a priori) method should rely solely on common principles, while a metaphysics proceeding through posterior reasoning (Inni) may draw upon additional axioms. Although Avicenna considers the lemma-based approach possible in itself, its practical difficulty and pedagogical considerations lead him to integrate the posterior method as well. Consequently, metaphysics assumes an “axiom–postulate” hybrid structure. The findings show that Avicenna’s metaphysical system becomes possible only through this combined methodological framework, supported by his ontology of emanation and his epistemology of intellection.
Keywords: Avicenna, Metaphysics, Axiomatic Structure, Propositional System, Burhan-e-Limmi, Burhan-e-Inni, Ontology.
Introduction
In the classical tradition, the deductive rigor found in Euclidean geometry and Archimedean statics was considered the gold standard for scientific knowledge. Aristotle laid the logical foundations for this axiomatic method in his Posterior Analytics, but it was Avicenna who, through his innovative synthesis, founded the first comprehensive propositional system for metaphysics. Avicenna sought to transform metaphysics from a collection of scattered insights into a “Demonstrative Science” (Al-Ilm al-Burhani) that follows a strict hierarchical order.However, the validity of such a system has been challenged by modern thinkers. Paul Foulquié argued that a purely a priori metaphysics is impossible because it relies on the unproven assumption of the identity between thought and being. Similarly, Nicolai Hartmann claimed that ancient ontology failed because it attempted to deduce the “scaffold of existence” from a few abstract concepts, leading to a circular logic. This article investigates the tension between Avicenna’s systematic ambition and these critiques. It aims to clarify the internal logic that allowed Avicenna to believe that metaphysics—the science of the “First Principles”—could be structured as a deductive system comparable to geometry.
Materials & Methods
The methodology of this research is descriptive-analytical, focusing on the internal logic of Avicenna’s seminal works, primarily the Kitab al-Shifa (The Book of Healing), specifically the sections on Burhan (Demonstration) and Ilahiyyat (Metaphysics).
The analytical framework is based on two primary pillars:
-Structural Components: Analyzing the “Mabadi” (Principles) and “Masa’il” (Issues/Problems) that constitute a demonstrative science.
-Structural Order: Investigating the “Arrangement” of propositions, distinguishing between the a priori path (from cause to effect) and the a posteriori path (from effect to cause).
The study also employs a comparative approach by juxtaposing Avicenna’s methodology with the critiques of Paul Foulquié and Nicolai Hartmann to identify the specific ontological and epistemological “conditions of possibility” that sustain the Sinavin system.
Discussion & Result:
1. The Components: Principles and Issues
In Avicenna’s “Scientology,” every demonstrative science consists of Mabadi (starting points) and Masa’il (propositions to be proven). The Mabadi are further divided into:

Axioms (Common Notions): Self-evident truths requiring no proof in any science.
Postulates: Propositions that are not self-evident but are proven in a higher or lower science.

A significant problem arises: Metaphysics is the “Highest Science” (Al-Ilm al-A’la). If it is the highest, it cannot borrow postulates from a “higher” science. This implies that a pure metaphysics should rely solely on axioms. However, Avicenna’s Ilahiyyat clearly utilizes findings from physics (such as the existence of motion or the first mover) and mathematics.
2. The Hybrid Solution: Limmi vs. Inni: The article finds that Avicenna distinguishes between two modes of the science:

The Limmi Path (A Priori): This is metaphysics “in itself.” It moves from the cause (The First Principle) to the effects (creation). While logically possible, Avicenna admits this is extremely difficult for the human intellect.
The Inni Path (A Posteriori/Instructional): For “educational purposes” and due to human intellectual limitations, we must begin with what is “better known to us” (sensible effects) to reach what is “better known by nature” (the First Cause).

Thus, Avicenna’s actual system is an “Axiomatic-Postulate” hybrid. He uses results from natural sciences (Inni) as postulates to build the metaphysical structure, while maintaining that in essence, the science remains deductive.
3. Addressing the Critics:The results indicate that Avicenna provides a robust response to modern skepticism.

Against Foulquié: While Foulquié rejects the union of thought and being as an “idealist” trap, Avicenna’s realism is based on “Essential Union.” The Active Intellect (Aql al-Fa’al) provides the same “Forms” to both the external world and the human mind. Therefore, the deductive order of the mind is not an imposition but a reflection of reality.
Against Hartmann: Hartmann’s critique of “apriorism” is answered by Avicenna’s distinction between the “Order of Existence” and the “Order of Instruction.” Avicenna acknowledges that we start from “secondary data” (the Inni method), but he insists that the goal of the scientist is to eventually reorganize that knowledge into a Limmi (causal) structure.

4. The Ontological Condition: The Theory of Emanation:The ultimate condition of possibility for this system is the Theory of Emanation (Sudur). Because existence itself flows in a strictly ordered, hierarchical descent from the One to the many, a propositional system that mirrors this descent is not only possible but necessary. The “Order” of the system is the “Order” of Being.
Conclusion:
Avicenna successfully constructed a deductive propositional system for metaphysics by navigating the tension between pure logic and human pedagogical needs. The research concludes that the Sinavin system is not a “pure” axiomatic system in the modern mathematical sense, but a sophisticated hybrid. It functions through the integration of Limmi and Inni methods.This construction is made possible by two specific philosophical doctrines:
- Ontologically: The hierarchical nature of reality (Emanation) provides the blueprint for the propositional hierarchy.
- Epistemologically: The mind’s ability to “re-trace” the path of existence—moving from effects back to causes and then re-deducing the effects from those causes—allows for a system that is both grounded in reality and strictly deductive. Avicenna’s metaphysics is, therefore, a “parallelism” between the structure of the mind and the structure of the cosmos.

Abstract Proof paradoxes refer to situations where naked statistical evidence supports the conviction of a defendant, yet the resulting judgment appears counterintuitive when considered solely from this evidence. The prevailing approach to addressing proof paradoxes involves distinguishing naked statistical evidence from other types of evidence. In this framework, Thomson (1986) proposes that the existence of a causal relationship between the evidence and its source can serve as a criterion for this distinction. Conversely, Redmayne (2008) contends that Thomson's proposal is unhelpful, arguing that even with naked statistical evidence, a causal relationship can be established in accordance with Thomson's view. In this study, we demonstrate that, by leveraging Pollock's nomic probability theory and Woodward's causal model, Thomson's proposed criterion can be refined to effectively address Redmayne's criticisms.
Keyword: Pollock's Nomic probability, legal standards of proof, Proof Paradoxes, Woodward's causal model, Thomson, Redmayne, Statistical evidence.

Introduction:
The proof paradoxes refer to situations where the foundational claim supporting a verdict relies solely ‎on naked statistical evidence. These examples are constructed so that the decision-maker’s degree of ‎belief exceeds the probabilistic thresholds set by relevant standards of proof, yet many intuitively feel ‎that this is insufficient to justify a conviction. This raises a critical question: what explains this intuitive ‎preference for other forms of evidence? Two main theoretical frameworks address this: the ‎‎“revisionary” approach, which argues that such intuitions are unwarranted and should be reconsidered, ‎and the “non-revisionary” stance, which seeks to justify the distinction between valid evidentiary proof ‎and naked statistical evidence through concepts such as "defendant-dependency," "knowledge," and ‎‎"normic support.
Materials & Methods:
This research employs a critical analytical method to evaluate the debate between Thomson and ‎Redmayne. The methodology consists of three steps:
‎1. Clarification: Analyzing Thomson’s criterion for valid evidence (causal connection) and Redmayne’s ‎subsequent critiques regarding the ambiguity of causality.
‎2. Deconstruction: Identifying the core assumptions of Redmayne’s critique, specifically the validity of ‎inferring accident rates from ownership rates and the existence of a causal relationship between ‎ownership and liability.
‎3. Theoretical Integration: Applying Pollock’s nomic probability framework to challenge epistemic ‎justifications of statistical inference and utilizing Woodward’s causal model (specifically the ‎reproducibility criterion) to provide a precise definition of a "causal link".

Discussion & Results:
The analysis demonstrates that Redmayne's critique of Thomson is well-founded regarding the lack of ‎precision in the definition of causality. However, by applying Pollock’s framework, this study reveals ‎that inferring accident rates solely from ownership data fails to satisfy the criteria of nomic probability, ‎meaning such inferences are not epistemically justified. Furthermore, by integrating Woodward’s causal ‎model, a clear distinction is established: valid evidence is distinguished from naked statistical evidence by ‎its ability to satisfy the reproducibility criterion. This explains why convictions based on individualized ‎evidence are intuitively superior to those based on statistical data.
Conclusion:
The primary aim of this research—to refine Thomson’s criterion to address Redmayne’s objections—is ‎achieved by transitioning from a vague notion of causality to a rigorous model based on Woodward’s ‎reproducibility. The study concludes that the intuitive rejection of naked statistical evidence is grounded ‎in the absence of a genuine causal link between the statistical data and the specific liability of the ‎defendant. This refinement provides a robust epistemological basis for distinguishing between a naked ‎statistical evidence from other forms of legally valid evidence. ‎

Abstract There exists a significant conceptual distinction between science and technology. This article examines the philosophical grounds underlying the conflation of science and technology. It suggests that treating the two as identical is not merely an epistemological confusion; rather, it may lead to a range of undesirable theoretical and practical consequences. From an epistemological perspective, the paper also argues, the notion of 'applied science' may be regarded as redundant, as it falls within the category of technology.