The Reality of Social Kinds: A Gradational Realist Approach

Zarei, Mohammad Hosein; Taheri Khorramabadi, Seyed Ali

doi:10.30465/ps.2025.53257.1804

The Reality of Social Kinds: A Gradational Realist Approach

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

Mohammad Hosein Zarei ¹

Seyed Ali Taheri Khorramabadi ²

¹ Master student, Philosophy of Science Department, Sharif University of Technology. Tehran. Iran.

² Assistant Professor, Philosophy of Science Department, Sharif University of Technology. Tehran. Iran.

https://doi.org/10.30465/ps.2025.53257.1804

Abstract

The question of the reality of social kinds—such as money, nationality, and gender—is a central issue in social ontology. This paper defends a framework we call gradational realism, according to which the reality of social kinds is neither absolute nor binary but varies according to the degree to which four operational criteria are satisfied. These criteria are: (1) explanatory–predictive role, meaning that removing the social kind would reduce our ability to explain or predict social phenomena; (2) intersubjective and institutional stability, meaning that agents and institutions consistently reproduce the kind; (3) structural adequacy, whereby institutional rules and material or documentary anchors support its stabilization; and (4) empirical tractability, meaning that the kind can be systematically assessed and investigated. Three case studies—money, group type II, and the state—show that social kinds possess different degrees of reality: money and the state exhibit strong reality, whereas group type II has a moderate and conditional reality. The proposed framework enables a shift from absolutist judgments to gradational and structure-sensitive evaluations of social kinds.
Keywords: Gradational Realism; Social Kinds; Explanatory Power;Anchoring and Grounding; Institutions and Collective Acceptance

Introduction:
Social kinds are entities, categories, or groupings that exist and persist through human interaction, collective acceptance, and institutional practices. Unlike natural kinds—such as chemical elements or biological species—social kinds depend on social rules, shared understandings, and normative frameworks for their existence. Paradigmatic examples include money, citizenship, gender, and the state. Despite their apparent dependence on human practices, social kinds play a decisive role in shaping behavior, social structures, and institutional outcomes.
The central question addressed in this paper is whether social kinds are genuinely real and, if so, in what sense. If their existence depends on collective acceptance, can they still count as objective components of reality? This issue is not merely theoretical. How social kinds are understood has direct implications for social-scientific explanation, policy design, and institutional reform. For example, effective responses to inflation, migration, or governance presuppose an adequate ontological understanding of money, nationality, or statehood.
This paper defends a form of gradational social realism, arguing that social kinds are real to different degrees rather than being simply real or unreal. Reality, in this context, is assessed not by mind-independence alone but by the structural and explanatory roles social kinds play within social systems.

Materials & Methods
The methodology of this study is conceptual and analytical, grounded in contemporary debates in social ontology. The paper synthesizes insights from institutional realism, response-dependence theories, and meta-ontological approaches to construct an evaluative framework for social kinds.
Four operational criteria are developed to assess the degree of reality of a social kind:
1. Explanatory–predictive role: whether reference to the social kind is indispensable for explaining or predicting social phenomena.
2. Intersubjective and institutional stability: whether the kind is consistently reproduced across agents, contexts, and time through social and institutional mechanisms.
3. Structural adequacy: whether identifiable anchoring (rules, conventions, legal frameworks) and grounding (material or documentary bases) support the kind.
4. Empirical tractability: whether the kind can be systematically investigated, measured, or operationalized, including cases of response-dependence.
These criteria are then applied comparatively to three case studies: money, group type II (as defined by Ritchie), and the state. The analysis evaluates how each case satisfies the criteria and what degree of reality follows.

Discussion & Results
The application of the framework reveals clear gradations in the reality of social kinds.
Money strongly satisfies all four criteria. It plays an indispensable explanatory role in economics, exhibits high institutional stability through legal and monetary systems, is structurally supported by clear anchoring rules and material grounds (such as currency and digital records), and is empirically tractable through economic indicators. Its dependence on collective acceptance does not undermine but rather constitutes its form of reality.
Group type II, defined by shared social features rather than formal organization, shows a more variable pattern. Such groups often play an important explanatory role in sociology and public policy, particularly in analyzing inequality or access to resources. However, their institutional stability and structural anchoring vary widely. When supported by formal classifications or administrative records, their reality is stronger; when based on fluid or informal features, it is weaker. Their reality is therefore conditional and context-dependent.
The state represents a robust case of a social kind with strong reality. It combines organizational structure with institutional status, maintains long-term stability beyond individual officeholders, and is supported by extensive legal, administrative, and territorial grounding. While aspects such as legitimacy or recognition are response-dependent, they are empirically assessable through standardized indicators. The state thus exemplifies a high degree of gradational reality.
Overall, the results support the claim that mind-dependence and vague boundaries do not negate reality but instead shape its mode and degree.

Conclusion
This paper has argued that debates over the reality of social kinds should move beyond binary judgments toward a gradational realist framework. By introducing four operational criteria—explanatory role, institutional stability, structural adequacy, and empirical tractability—the paper provides a systematic method for assessing social reality.
The case studies demonstrate that social kinds such as money and the state possess strong, institutionally anchored reality, while others, such as group type II, exhibit weaker or conditional forms. The key insight is that dependence on collective acceptance does not undermine realism; rather, when stabilized through institutions and structures, it constitutes a distinctive mode of reality.
Methodologically, this approach supports more precise social-scientific explanations and avoids both eliminativism and metaphysical absolutism. Future research can refine quantitative measures of institutional stability and extend the anchoring–grounding distinction to emerging social kinds, particularly in digital and transnational contexts.

Keywords

Gradational Realism

Social Kinds

Explanatory Power

Anchoring and Grounding

Institutions and Collective Acceptance

Subjects

Philosophy of social sciences

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