Philosophy of Science

Abstract Habermas is a theorist who is active in the framework of critical theory and he has, in his intellectual life, combated against different dominations, particularly against the intellectual domination which intangibly dominates people. Among his most important goals in his methodology and philosophy was critique of scientism and positivistic attitude that were trying to spread quantitative and technological views in all facets of human life. Habermas for this purpose developed and analyzed the doctrine of "knowledge-constitutive interest". In the next period of his intellectual life, he introduced the theory of "Communicative rationality" to make transparent his philosophy, and thereby to give emphasis on the efficiency of reason in the mutual understanding pattern. Habermas renewed his previous ideas, such as his theory of truth, to overcome criticisms against him. The aforementioned points are discussed in this article along with his important epistemological and philosophical views.

Abstract The concept of temperament is one of the key concepts which has played an important role in, ancient medicine and physics on the one hand, and in the philosophical discussions in particular in the field of knowledge of the soul on the other. According to the ancients, temperament is a quality resulted from reaction between four elements and is, in terms of its characteristics, other than its components. The resulted quality is at different levels of balance and that how much the resulted quality (temperament) is at balance is an important agent for beings to attain different levels of existence. May such a concept have some place in the modern medicine as well? To reply, at first, we define temperament as well as the concept related to it such as balance of temperament, four elements, and four-fold humors as viewed by the ancients. Then, we introduce four popular contemporary understandings of temperament and, after it and based on the true understanding of temperament, we will select from among the above four ones. In this understanding, the quality of functions of autonomous nervous system may be taken as a contemporary alternative for the traditional; concept of temperament.

Abstract According to Hilary Putnam, two different levels of empirical investigations regarding natural kinds are available: discovering essence and distinguishing genuine samples from fake ones. Recently, Joseph LaPorte has presented a dilemma in naming natural kinds. He showed that for any kind there are some vague samples which scientists cannot decide whether take them as an unknown variation of the kind or not to consider them as extensions of that kind. On the one hand, discovering the kind’s essence is possible for scientists only when they recognize the range of differences between kind’s variations; and on the other hand, they can distinguish different kind variations only when they know the kind’s essence. Here, LaPorte has presented his own solution. According to him, the kind's essence is not discovered but stipulated. In this essay we shall try to present an alternative solution in which discovering an essence is possible.

Abstract Mohammad ibn Musa Khawrazmi, one of the most famous mathematicians of Iran in the 9th century, invented a new science which is called today ‘algebra’. Thanks this science he could solve all the quadratic equations of his time. In fact, he developed a theory for systematically solving quadratic equations. In this theory, he distinguished firstly the five types of algebraic equations. Secondly, he gave the algorithms to solve these equations. Thirdly, he gave the geometrical proofs for these solutions. Indeed, Khawrazmi went beyond merely providing the sort of algebraic recipes found in Babylonian texts,by insisting in further adding geometrical proofs for algebraic facts. Khawrazmi's contribution and influence are tremendous .In 1140 Robert of Chester translated Khawrazmi's book into Latin as ‘Liber algebrae et almucabala’. When Khawrazmi's work became known in Europe through Latin translation his influence made indelible mark on the development of mathematics in the West especially in Italy. For example, Cardano, an italian mathematician, opened his ‘Ars magna’ with a brief historical passage in which he first traced his intellectual lineage from Khawrazmi through Fibonacci to Pacioli and then outlined the sixteenth century developments on the solution of the cubic equation.

Abstract The classical problem of induction is one of the very known forms of Skepticism, which many philosophers have tried to solve or resolve it. Some epistemologists believe that Externalism could be used as a good approach to resolve the problem. They claim that ‘Process reliabilism’, the most important externalist theory, is less vulnerable to Skepticism than other theories, because of its epistemological fallibilism, and also taking modest and weak criteria to acquire knowledge. In this paper we will argue that externalist theories, including Process reliabilism, presuppose induction, so such theories don’t have considerable capabilities to solve or resolve the problem.

Abstract Popper believed that Heisenberg misinterpreted the theory of indeterminism, since the limits of attainable precision asserted by Heisenberg is not a logical consequence of the formula of the theory but rather, a separate and additional assumption. Popper believed that Heisenberg’s explanation of uncertainty principle includes metaphysical elements rendering it non-falsifiable. By proposing ‘statistical scatter’, Popper offered a new interpretation of uncertainty principle in order to show this additional assumption, prove that the possibility of observations more exact than what Heisenberg thought, is consisted with the formulae, and if formula of quantum be statistically interpreted, the additional metaphysical assumption actually contradicts them.

Abstract should be corresponded to the reality, in Mullasadra’s view the correspondence and non-correspondence is an acquired knowledge. He believes that essence is the intermediary between subject and object, which has the same existence in the both sides. The drawbacks of the theory indicate that he could not demonstrate the correspondence between subject and object. Besides, according to the priority of existence and the gradation of existence, one can propose the sameness of objective existence theory, according to which knowledge is the higher existence of known essence.

Abstract The extension of the mathematical argumentation methods, in recent decades, has led to an essential critique of classic definition of mathematical proof. The critics often have suggested alternative definitions, which have different and sometimes incompatible presuppositions and implications. Such a situation has exposed mathematics to relativism. The problem of multiplicity of definitions, therefore, can be considered as one of the most important epistemological issues in mathematics. In this paper, we try, from third order or meta-methodological position, to answer this question: ‘what is the meta-criterion for choosing the best definition of mathematical proof?’ by answering this question we will be one step closer to a justified definition of mathematical proof. The authors will show that the explanatory power meta-criterion, compared to the two other rivals, i.e. the equivalence meta-criterion and the consensus meta-criterion, is more tenable.

Abstract In this paper two viewpoints about scientific theories will be introduced. These two viewpoints are: 1- received view and 2- semantic view about scientific theories. It should be emphasized that our major focus is on the semantic view to scientific theories. The first one, now, does not have any considerable adherents and mainly logical positivist philosophers were its defenders. The received view has two important problems: 1- it is highly impractical that we want to formalize the scientific theories in the first order logic language and 2- its characterization of role and status of models in the scientific theories is inappropriate. We will notice that the semantic view, in particular the version that da Costa and French introduced, by its use of structure, can dissolve these problems and many problems that this view is involved with and this approach is in agreement with what scientists do in reality, in particular physicists try to model natural phenomena.

Abstract Some philosophers believe that natural selection guarantees the reliability of belief formation processes. From their point of view, belief formation processes that lead to true beliefs more than false ones are useful for organism reproduction and survival, and so are saved by natural selection. However, Stephen Stich’s argument, called “better safe than sorry”, shows that natural selection is not sufficient for the reliability of belief formation processes. Criticizing this argument, Cristopher L. Stephen has proposed a model that identifies situations in which natural selection supports true beliefs. He claims that the model limits Stich’s argument scope. In this article we argue that Stephens’ model is unable to limit Stich’s argument scope and has no essential determining role in the challenge of evolutionary based explanation between opponents and proponents for the reliability of belief formation processes.

Abstract Since the publication of Scientific Image, van Fraassen has criticized scientific realism and, instead, introduced constructive empiricism as an appropriate alternative. Adhering to the tenet of empiricism that ‘experience is our only source of information about the world’, he considered acquiring any knowledge of the unobservable level of the world as impossible. According to van Fraassen, the realistic belief in the (approximate) truth of scientific theories has no epistemic basis; and, in this case, he only allowed belief in the empirical adequacy of these theories. The present assay explains and examines the key elements of constructive empiricism and contrasts it with scientific realism. We will indicate that van Fraassen’s argumentation in rejecting realism and defending his position is not able to provide the necessary and sufficient justifications for the replacement of scientific realism with constructive empiricism

Abstract In the first of this three-part article, Feyerabend’s anarchistic theory of knowledge is briefly introduced. Here I explain why he is opposed to logical positivism, Popper’s philosophy of science, Lakatos and even Kuhn, and why he believes that science is not superior to other cognitive traditions.  Feyerabend emphasizes that ‘Anything goes’ is the only undying principle that can be derived from real science. The first part of the article paves the way for the clarification of the meaning of this key sentence in the third section. In fact, the first part should be considered as a representation of Feyerabend’s anarchistic thoughts. The second part, which presents the main idea of the article, explains that Feyerabend's anarchistic theory has its roots in his view on ‘being’, ‘man’ and ‘theory’.
These three categories are closely interrelated: Man develops theories through which understands being. The second part, which describes the background of Feyerabend's anarchist theory, also indicates that the origins of his philosophy are not so much anarchistic. In the final part, some of the most important corollaries of Feyerabend’s thoughts such as ‘proliferation and tenacity’, ‘free society’ and ‘the difference between the respectable thinkers and inferior ones’ will be addressed.

Abstract This study consists of three parts: reviewing approaches in philosophy of science; presenting Mary Hesse’s hermeneutic approach and, finally, extracting Hesse's view on the understanding of scientific concepts. In order to clarify Hesse’s approach, we, in the first part, review the post-positivistic space of philosophy of science in the second half of the 20th century. In the second section, the models Hesse has proposed to explain the mechanism of science advancement and scientific theories are described. Emphasizing the explanatory function of metaphor in scientific theories, suggesting minimalistic realism as a requirement for scientific activity, and explaining the dual objectivity for science, are among the achievements of Hesse's view in philosophy of science. Scientific concepts have a certain place in Hesse's discussions, and it can be argued that, in Hessian approach, scientific concepts are historical and theoretical and can be used as metaphors in the metaphorical language of science. Finally, people's understanding of scientific concepts would be different according to the characteristics of the concepts. Also peoples’ understanding of scientific concepts is dynamic due to the dynamics of the language of science

Abstract 1967, “time and physical” geometry, discussion about implications of the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) for the debate between Static vs. Dynamic models of temporal reality became serious in contemporary philosophy of time. In this article, Putnam provided an argument in favor of Static model by assuming the STR. By virtue of the STR, he assumed that the relation of simultaneity between events is a non-transitive relation. For this reason, some philosophers (e.g. Bourn 2006 and Craig 2008) have tried to defend the Dynamic model through defending a privilege frame of reference (and so, a transitive relation of simultaneity) in relativistic setting. In this paper, by distinguishing between weak static model and strong static model I will try to argue that why assuming a privileged frame of reference, even if exists, could not have any advantage for advocates of the dynamic m

Abstract Kalām Atomism defended by Ash’arī and Mu’tazila both, also includes the geometrical Atomism. Geometrical Atomism considers lines and geometrical shapes consisting of indivisible things. In other words, from this view, line is made up of points. This view conflicts with the definitions in Euclid’s Elements and subsequently classical geometry. Fakhr al-Din Razi who defended Atomism in the last decades of his lifespan was aware of this inconsistency. Through the arguments relevant to Atomism, he tried to resolve the inconsistency. Although his efforts do not result in developing a new geometry consistent with Atomism, his arguments contain subtle points which are significant from the view of the history and philosophy of Mathematics. In this paper, I will investigate several arguments from al-Maṭālib al-‘Alīyah in modern mathematical notation. And I will analyze the theoretical background of the arguments to achieve a frame to see their significance from the history of mathematics point of view. It is to show how Razi examined another geometrical structure other than the classical Geometry of his age. Furthermore, I suggest that Razi’s arguments should be considered in the history of infinitesimals as a possibility

Abstract Scientific naturalism is a doctrine that consists of two ontological and methodological components. On the basis of the methodological component, the scientific method is the only source for validation (about nature), and based on the ontological component, all that exists (causation) can be investigated by science. Some naturalist philosophers believe that the ontological component, that is, ontological (or metaphysical) natureism, is an essential or structural philosophy for science, in the sense that if science is eliminated from metaphysics, then what is obtained will no longer be science.
In contrast, many naturalist critics believe that ontological naturalism is a lesson outside metaphysics of science, and only methodological naturalism (not a metaphysical principle) is a disciplining or methodological principle for science. In this sense, naturalism is used only as a pragmatic predicate for scientific action of scientists. In this paper, we will show that none of the two approaches are correct in relation to the relation between naturalism and science; and we are not allowed to block the flow of Hwites and supernatural causes into the realm of science, based on a metaphysical or pragmatic default, and the metaphysics of the universe We presuppose nature to science, which is free from such an echo and causation from the beginning.

Abstract Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī is a thinker of the 12th century who had a significant role in the dialog between two philosophical doctrines of his age, i.e. Peripateticism and kalām. He followed peripatetic methods to develop kalām theories. Razī’s theory of motion is in the frame of kalām Atomism. In this paper, I will show how the atomistic theory of motion is in interaction with Aristotelian fundamentals in Physics. I will show that Razi asserts discontinuity of motion, by relying on Aristotelian Continuity principles and rejecting to some premises. Then, I discuss the significance of this theory from the history of science’s view.

Abstract Carnap’s view on ontology had not yet rallied that Quine attacked it; and this has caused a dispute between two philosophers for more than half a century. The question remains: which one was/is right? In this article after reviewing Carnap’s view, I have recounted Quine’s critiques, here and there, to his stands under three titles. It is shown how Carnap’s view can be justified from these three critiques. Then, after considering that Quine has identified the position of the difference incorrectly, but not the different position, I have explained, In the midst of arbitration between two philosophers, although Carnap and Quine, both, do maintain ontological relativity, the former believes in ‘general relativity’, and the latter in ‘special relativity’. From another point of view, although two philosopher do maintain ontological skepticism, the former is ‘second level skeptic’, and the latter is ‘first level skeptic’. In the other words. I have shown how in ontological approach of two philosophers “the reason for the agreement is the same for disagreement”. Among these complexities the conclusion is taken that any unilateral arbitration, on strict agreement or disagreement, will be wrong.

Abstract The history of atomism has begun from Ancient Greek. Greek atomism was materialist, causal, and Mechanical. Atomism whether the ancient atomism or modern version (after the seventeenth century), is regarded as a materialist theory. In medieval time, in the Islamic world, an atomistic theory was offered to explain nature by mūtikallimūn, (Muʿtazila and Ašʿarī). Opposite of Greek atomists, Muslim atomists were theists and they were called mūtikallimūn for begin devoted to Islam and Quran. Nonetheless, they have developed a theory that is similar in some aspects to the other atomistic theories; however, they were radical about God’s omnipotence. In this paper, I investigate the metaphysical structure of Kalām atomism in the respect that they are based on which belief, after a brief introduction. And then I analyze that those theist theorists developed a scientific account in physics, which protected their religious beliefs. I examine how the theory results in materialism and the exclusion of metaphysics, but not entailing atheism.

Abstract The main background of this research is the study of Descartes' method in our knowledge to the sensible world and its relation to the ideal theme of axiomatic knowledge. I do not accept the objection that Descartes deviated from the axiomatic method in the knowledge of the material world, and therefore I have argued that he continued to axiomatic method by developing the rules of inference and breaking the monopoly of syllogism in his Tree of knowledge. One of the most important rules of non-deductive inference developed in his work is the method of inference to the best explanation (I.B.E).
Through documentary analysis, I have shown that in addition to the basic formulation of the inference to best explanation (I.B.E), its extensive formulation can be clearly traced both in Preliminary design such as Discourse on Method and in the empirical sections of the principles of philosophy. Studying this development of inferential rules in Descartes's work not only illuminates some aspects of his important and deep idea of replacing the method with logic, but also provides a model for combining empirical knowledge with the axiomatic method. This model inspires knowledge and rational encounter with creative and constantly changing experimental and human events, and based on it, a window can be opened to get out of epistemic anarchy and even value anarchy in such areas.

Abstract Abstract: Hitchcock's counter-examples showed that Salmon's revised account of scientific explanation
cannot resolve the problem of explanatory relevance. In this model, interactions of causal processes
introduce different marks or conserved quantities. According to Hitchcock, Salmon's account fails to
distinguish marks or conserved quantities which are explanatorily relevant to the explanandum. The aim of
this paper is to examine Hitchcock's objection within Lipton's contrastive analysis and resolve explanatory relevance problem of salmon's account of scientific explanation. It is argued that by
selecting the appropriate foil and determining the difference between fact and foil, we can distinguish the
explanatory relevant marks or conserved quantities.

Abstract Philosophy is the art and science of thinking and gaining into the world and things. It seems important to identify the research fields and the scope of its subjects. This research was done with the aim of achieving a comprehensive understanding of the process and thematic structure of articles in the field of philosophy. The current research is descriptive with a scientometric approach that analyzes the content of texts using the co-occurrence of words and social network analysis. The statistical population includes articles in the field of philosophy that have been published in the Web of Science database for the 5-year period of 2017-2021 in the citation index of arts and humanities. Finally, 4829 articles were selected in order to comprehensively outline the intellectual structure of knowledge in the field of philosophy. R bibliometrix package was used for data analysis and scientific map drawing. The analysis of the data showed that the greatest increase in published documents occurred in the last 3 years, Fischer was the most prolific author in recent years. America and England are the top two countries in terms of receiving citations in the scientific field of philosophy. The most prominent organization is the INST philosophy. Studies in the field of philosophy are divided into four clusters; Philosophical schools of thought and pragmatism clusters were clusters with high density and developed and experimental philosophy and philosophy clusters were central clusters with high centrality and undeveloped. According to the findings and the high frequency of Kant's keyword and the relationship between this keyword and other keywords, it can be concluded that Kant's opinions and ideas are still of great importance in philosophical discussions. Also, according to the extracted clusters, it was observed that these researches do not have a high variety and many neglected philosophical topics still exist.
By analyzing the topics related to the articles in the field of philosophy, scientific advances and trends in scientific cooperation in this field are highlighted, and this can help policy makers and researchers to understand the current state of philosophical research in addition to predicting and knowing the future.

Abstract There are notable similarities between the later thought of Wittgenstein on language games and grammar, and Kuhn's idea of the incommensurability of scientific paradigms, which have led to comparative studies between the two. One of the issues both philosophical perspectives confront is relativism, and there are numerous problems that relativism raises for a philosophical idea. A common aspect of the ideas of these two philosophers is the centrality of conceptual and linguistic frameworks concerning issues such as meaning, understanding, and truth. This aspect has drawn attention from certain interpretations that consider Wittgenstein and Kuhn as proponents of relativism. Here, I will examine the issue of relativism, focusing on its challenges for understanding and truth, centering on the works of two interpreters of Wittgenstein and Kuhn: Hans Glock and Moyal-Sharrock. There are similarities and differences in the interpretations of Wittgenstein and Kuhn between these two interpreters. From the author's perspective: (1) Neither Kuhn's incommensurability nor Wittgenstein's idea of grammar prevents understanding between two paradigms or linguistic frameworks. (2) There is a disagreement between Wittgenstein and Kuhn regarding the precedence of language on one hand, and mental classifications on the other. (3) Wittgenstein's idea of common behavior of mankind does not lead to relativism in truth. Based on these three positions, the interpretations of Wittgenstein and Kuhn by Glock and Moyal-Sharrock have been criticized.

Abstract One aspect of naturalists' critique of contemporary analytic metaphysics is its reliance on philosophical and metaphysical intuitions. Many naturalists argue that, first, analytic metaphysics appeals to intuition as evidence, and second, there are many reasons why intuition cannot be a reliable source of knowledge. Defenders of analytic metaphysics have attempted to address this objection raised by naturalists in some ways. One response is to show that intuitions have a similar evidential role in physical sciences, just as they do in metaphysics. Jonathan Tallant has followed this approach. In this article, we will first outline the naturalist critique of metaphysics through an attack on intuition. Then we will look at some of the related responses to these critiques, with a specific focus on Tallant's approach. Finally, we will offer a critique of his argument. It is contended that Tallant's approach fails to provide a decisive answer to the objections of radical naturalists.

Abstract In contemporary societies, the increasing diversity of daily life needs and challenges has rendered psychological consultation a widespread phenomenon, addressing a broad spectrum from work stress management and family conflict resolution to life crises, self-awareness improvement, and personal growth; this article analyzes and critiques Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) as the predominant approach in counseling and psychotherapy through a philosophical lens, framing it as a form of psychological technology. Utilizing Albert Borgmann's theoretical framework, it demonstrates that CBT aligns with the "device paradigm"—a standardized approach that, despite structured efficacy, reduces the depth of human experience, neglects socio-cultural contexts, and renders the therapeutic relationship mechanical. Subsequently, employing Borgmann's concept of the focal thing and practices, the article proposes reform strategies: strengthening authentic therapeutic relationships through empathy and active participation, integrating mindfulness to enrich lived experiences, utilizing group CBT to revitalize social bonds, and designing meaningfully interactive digital tools. These transformations shift CBT from a technically reductive instrument of instrumental rationality toward a focal practice that alleviates symptoms while enriching human relationships in family and society. Finally, acknowledging the limitations in Borgmann's approach, the article emphasizes the need to integrate it with Don Ihde’s postphenomenology and Feenberg’s critical theory of technology to better encompass the cultural and contextual dimensions in contemporary psychotherapy.