دفاع از واقع گراییِ علمی در برابر

حاجی زاده, امیر

doi:10.30465/ps.2021.34415.1492

نوع مقاله : پژوهشی

نویسنده

امیر حاجی زاده

دکتر فلسفه تطبیقی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران

https://doi.org/10.30465/ps.2021.34415.1492

چکیده

کایلی استنفورد چالش جدیدی پیش روی واقع گرایی علمی قرار داده است که به استقرایِ بدبینانة جدید شهرت یافته است. طبق استدلال وی، برای هر نظریه علمی، " نظریات بدیل نامتصوری" وجود دارند که از دامنه درک دانشمندان فراتر می‌روند؛ بنابراین هیچ گاه نمی‌توان نسبت به هویاتِ مشاهده ناپذیرِ نظریات تلقی واقع گرایانه داشت. در این مقاله تلاش می‌شود با تاکید بر همگرایی نظریات موفق در تاریخ علم، از واقع گرایی علمی در مقابل استدلالِ استنفورد دفاع کنیم. این مقاله بر این نکته تاکید دارد که طبق استقرای بدبینانه جدید، با توجه به تعداد نامحدود نظریه‌های بدیلِ نامتصور در قبال هر نظریه موفقی، احتمالِ "تطابق" و "وحدت یافتنِ" نظریات مستقل بسیار بعید خواهد بود. در حالیکه در تاریخ علم، شاهد نمونه‌های مکرر در پیوند یافتنِ نظریات موفق هستیم. همچنین تلاش می‌کنیم از ایده همگرایی در برابر نقدهای مرسوم دفاع کنیم.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Defending scientific realism against the "new pessimistic induction"

نویسنده [English]

amir haji zade

PhD in Comparative Philosophy, Allameh Tabatabai University, Tehran

چکیده [English]

Kyle Stanford poses a new challenge to scientific realism, known as the new pessimistic induction. According to him, for every scientific theory, there are "unconceived alternative theories" that go beyond the understanding of scientists; Therefore, one can never be realistic about the unobservable entities of theories. This article tries to defend scientific realism against Stanford's argument by emphasizing the convergence of successful theories in the history of science. This article emphasizes that under the new pessimistic induction, given the unlimited number of unconceived alternative theories to any successful theory, the possibility of "matching" and "unifying" independent theories will be very unlikely. Whereas in the history of science, we see frequent examples of successful theories being linked. We also try to defend the idea of convergence against critiques.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

Kyle Stanford
Unconceived Alternative Theories
Pessimistic Induction
Scientific Realism
convergence

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