1. Introduction

The question of living well is a fundamental concern of moral philosophy. For Aristotle, eudaimonia means human flourishing through rational activity in accordance with virtue. Virtue develops through habit, practice, choice, and practical wisdom. Today, however, these processes are increasingly shaped by artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, algorithms, and brain–computer interfaces (BCIs), which mediate perception, decision-making, and communication. Technology is therefore not merely an instrument but an active mediator of human experience and action. If technologies shape habits and judgment, they must be incorporated into contemporary virtue ethics.

The debate remains polarized between bioconservatives, who emphasize authenticity, and transhumanists, who advocate expanding human capacities. Both approaches tend to overlook how technological environments shape character and agency. This article asks: How can Aristotelian eudaimonia be reconstructed when technology becomes part of the environment in which human agency develops? It proposes sociotechnical eudaimonia, understood as flourishing emerging from the interaction of character, agency, technological mediation, and infrastructural justice. Two concepts, mediated practical wisdom and productive effort, provide its normative foundations. The objective is to shift attention from enhancement itself to the technological conditions enabling responsible judgment, virtuous action, and equitable flourishing.

2. Materials and Methods

This philosophical-normative study employs four methods: conceptual analysis, critical reconstruction, wide reflective equilibrium, and thought experiments. First, eudaimonia, virtue, agency, effort, practical wisdom, and mediation are examined to identify assumptions underlying instrumentalist and essentialist approaches. Second, Aristotelian virtue ethics is integrated with technological mediation theory and technomoral virtue ethics, incorporating infrastructural justice. Third, following Daniels, wide reflective equilibrium establishes coherence among ethical principles, considered judgments, and background theories, including the capabilities approach. Finally, thought experiments examine BCI rehabilitation and AI decision-support systems to assess their effects on agency and virtue. Evaluation considers agency preservation, virtue cultivation, flourishing, and equitable infrastructural access. Validity rests on conceptual coherence rather than statistical generalization.

3. Results and Discussion

The findings demonstrate that technology–virtue relations cannot be reduced to questions of benefit, harm, or enhancement. The central issue is how technological systems reorganize perception, choice, action, and character formation.

The first contribution is mediated practical wisdom. Technologies can prioritize information and restrict or expand available options, but they support judgment only when individuals retain the capacity to interpret situations, evaluate reasons, recognize competing values, and assume responsibility. This addresses AI ethics concerns regarding transparency, accountability, bias, and explainability. Technological assistance is acceptable provided it does not replace human deliberation. Mediated practical wisdom thus occupies a position between unrestricted autonomy and complete delegation.

The second finding distinguishes productive effort from depleting effort. Some difficulties merely exhaust individuals, whereas others cultivate judgment, self-control, responsibility, and empathy. Automation is ethically desirable when it removes unnecessary burdens without eliminating opportunities to develop these capacities. The criterion is therefore not how much effort technology saves, but which forms of effort it removes.

Third, enhancement does not necessarily produce flourishing. Increased biological or computational capacities contribute to a better life only when accompanied by appropriate motivations, moral dispositions, and social conditions.

These findings inform sociotechnical eudaimonia, structured as a sequence: technological infrastructure → mediated agency → mediated practical wisdom → virtue formation → human flourishing. Infrastructural justice and preservation of productive effort operate as cross-cutting conditions. This model avoids both technological determinism and instrumentalism.

Thought experiments demonstrate that the ethical value of BCIs and AI depends on the architecture of human–technology relationships. A BCI may strengthen agency or create dependency; AI may improve deliberation or weaken independent judgment. Accordingly, evaluation should examine the kinds of actions and character dispositions technologies enable. This extends technomoral virtue ethics beyond individual character to the infrastructures in which virtues develop. Eudaimonia therefore requires technological environments that expand human capabilities without undermining responsibility and moral agency.

4. Conclusion

This article examined whether Aristotelian eudaimonia remains defensible under technological mediation. It argued that virtue ethics remains relevant but requires reconstruction through the integration of character, agency, technological mediation, and infrastructural justice.

The proposed model rests on five principles: preservation of agency, mediated practical wisdom, productive effort, orientation toward flourishing, and infrastructural justice. Analysis of BCI and AI scenarios demonstrates that ethical evaluation must focus on human–technology relationships rather than technological capabilities alone. Technology is neither merely an external instrument nor a substitute for human agency; it constitutes part of the environment in which judgment develops and virtues are cultivated.

The policy implication is that AI and enhancement technologies should be assessed not only for safety and privacy but also for their effects on responsibility, deliberation, virtuous habits, and equitable access. Future research should examine these relationships through empirical, longitudinal, and cross-cultural studies. Ultimately, the central question is not whether machines can make humans more capable, but what kind of individuals and societies will emerge through the exercise of these capabilities. This distinction defines the boundary between technological enhancement and human flourishing.