Philosophy of Science

Abstract The question of the reality of social kinds—such as money, nationality, and gender—is a central issue in social ontology. This paper defends a framework we call gradational realism, according to which the reality of social kinds is neither absolute nor binary but varies according to the degree to which four operational criteria are satisfied. These criteria are: (1) explanatory–predictive role, meaning that removing the social kind would reduce our ability to explain or predict social phenomena; (2) intersubjective and institutional stability, meaning that agents and institutions consistently reproduce the kind; (3) structural adequacy, whereby institutional rules and material or documentary anchors support its stabilization; and (4) empirical tractability, meaning that the kind can be systematically assessed and investigated. Three case studies—money, group type II, and the state—show that social kinds possess different degrees of reality: money and the state exhibit strong reality, whereas group type II has a moderate and conditional reality. The proposed framework enables a shift from absolutist judgments to gradational and structure-sensitive evaluations of social kinds. Keywords: Gradational Realism; Social Kinds; Explanatory Power;Anchoring and Grounding; Institutions and Collective Acceptance Introduction: Social kinds are entities, categories, or groupings that exist and persist through human interaction, collective acceptance, and institutional practices. Unlike natural kinds—such as chemical elements or biological species—social kinds depend on social rules, shared understandings, and normative frameworks for their existence. Paradigmatic examples include money, citizenship, gender, and the state. Despite their apparent dependence on human practices, social kinds play a decisive role in shaping behavior, social structures, and institutional outcomes. The central question addressed in this paper is whether social kinds are genuinely real and, if so, in what sense. If their existence depends on collective acceptance, can they still count as objective components of reality? This issue is not merely theoretical. How social kinds are understood has direct implications for social-scientific explanation, policy design, and institutional reform. For example, effective responses to inflation, migration, or governance presuppose an adequate ontological understanding of money, nationality, or statehood. This paper defends a form of gradational social realism, arguing that social kinds are real to different degrees rather than being simply real or unreal. Reality, in this context, is assessed not by mind-independence alone but by the structural and explanatory roles social kinds play within social systems. Materials & Methods The methodology of this study is conceptual and analytical, grounded in contemporary debates in social ontology. The paper synthesizes insights from institutional realism, response-dependence theories, and meta-ontological approaches to construct an evaluative framework for social kinds. Four operational criteria are developed to assess the degree of reality of a social kind: 1. Explanatory–predictive role: whether reference to the social kind is indispensable for explaining or predicting social phenomena. 2. Intersubjective and institutional stability: whether the kind is consistently reproduced across agents, contexts, and time through social and institutional mechanisms. 3. Structural adequacy: whether identifiable anchoring (rules, conventions, legal frameworks) and grounding (material or documentary bases) support the kind. 4. Empirical tractability: whether the kind can be systematically investigated, measured, or operationalized, including cases of response-dependence. These criteria are then applied comparatively to three case studies: money, group type II (as defined by Ritchie), and the state. The analysis evaluates how each case satisfies the criteria and what degree of reality follows. Discussion & Results The application of the framework reveals clear gradations in the reality of social kinds. Money strongly satisfies all four criteria. It plays an indispensable explanatory role in economics, exhibits high institutional stability through legal and monetary systems, is structurally supported by clear anchoring rules and material grounds (such as currency and digital records), and is empirically tractable through economic indicators. Its dependence on collective acceptance does not undermine but rather constitutes its form of reality. Group type II, defined by shared social features rather than formal organization, shows a more variable pattern. Such groups often play an important explanatory role in sociology and public policy, particularly in analyzing inequality or access to resources. However, their institutional stability and structural anchoring vary widely. When supported by formal classifications or administrative records, their reality is stronger; when based on fluid or informal features, it is weaker. Their reality is therefore conditional and context-dependent. The state represents a robust case of a social kind with strong reality. It combines organizational structure with institutional status, maintains long-term stability beyond individual officeholders, and is supported by extensive legal, administrative, and territorial grounding. While aspects such as legitimacy or recognition are response-dependent, they are empirically assessable through standardized indicators. The state thus exemplifies a high degree of gradational reality. Overall, the results support the claim that mind-dependence and vague boundaries do not negate reality but instead shape its mode and degree. Conclusion This paper has argued that debates over the reality of social kinds should move beyond binary judgments toward a gradational realist framework. By introducing four operational criteria—explanatory role, institutional stability, structural adequacy, and empirical tractability—the paper provides a systematic method for assessing social reality. The case studies demonstrate that social kinds such as money and the state possess strong, institutionally anchored reality, while others, such as group type II, exhibit weaker or conditional forms. The key insight is that dependence on collective acceptance does not undermine realism; rather, when stabilized through institutions and structures, it constitutes a distinctive mode of reality. Methodologically, this approach supports more precise social-scientific explanations and avoids both eliminativism and metaphysical absolutism. Future research can refine quantitative measures of institutional stability and extend the anchoring–grounding distinction to emerging social kinds, particularly in digital and transnational contexts.

Abstract In the development of risky technologies, such as genetic modification organisms, the issue is that the value of safety cannot be ethically ignored and the users/consumers of risky technological artifacts should not be exposed to a risk beyond a certain threshold. On the other hand, technology policymakers generally view ethical considerations as abstract claims and as obstacles to economic and technological growth. All together considering ethical considerations and the perspectives of all stakeholders in policymaking on risky technologies, without leading to the halt of these projects, requires a multilateral, multi-layered and well-balanced approach. To this end, this article proposes a policy approach corresponding to John Rawls' philosophical theory, and finally, within this framework, the process of developing genetic modification organisms in Iran and its challenges are examined. Keywords: Technology Ethics, Wide Reflective Equilibrium, Advocacy Coalition Framework, Policy-Oriented Learning, GMOs. Introduction The development of Risky Technologies is almost invariably accompanied by tensions between ethical acceptability, economic interests, policy objectives, and social acceptance. Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) represent a paradigmatic case of such technologies. On the one hand, they are widely promoted for their potential to enhance food security, increase agricultural productivity, and reduce economic dependency. On the other hand, they raise persistent concerns regarding human health, environmental risks, and broader social and cultural implications. The so-called deficit model assumes that public resistance to emerging technologies primarily stems from ignorance or lack of scientific knowledge. However many surveys in science and technology studies show that public attitudes toward technologies such as GMOs are shaped not merely by factual beliefs but by a complex constellation of values, trust in institutions, perceptions of justice, cultural meanings, and moral emotions. Consequently, opposition to GMOs should not automatically be interpreted as irrational or anti-scientific. Rather, it often reflects deeper normative concerns that, if dismissed, can exacerbate social conflict and undermine the legitimacy of policy decisions. Policymaking in this domain faces a fundamental dilemma: ethical principles such as safety and precaution cannot be ignored, yet suspending or prohibiting technological development altogether may entail significant scientific, economic, and societal costs. This dilemma calls for a policy approach capable of systematically integrating ethical considerations without leading to technological stagnation. Materials & Methods This article seeks to answer the following question: How can ethical considerations be meaningfully incorporated into technology policy in a way that both respects normative concerns and enables responsible technological development. To this end, the article proposes an analytical–normative framework that combines John Rawls’s concept of Wide Reflective Equilibrium (WRE) with the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and its notion of policy-oriented learning. We address the problem of ethically informed policymaking for risky and controversial technologies by focusing on the case of genetically modified crops in Iran. The unit of analysis in this case is organizations, individuals, and events affecting the process of developing genetic modification technology, which are analyzed and examined within the framework of the advocacy coalition. To collect data, evidence was obtained from common sources in advocacy coalition framework research, namely public documents, which include government approvals, published reports of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the National Management and Planning Organization and related institutions, archives of official newspapers, and news sites. The period of these documents is from 2001 to 2022, and data analysis is carried out based on time sequence. Discussion & Result Rawls’s notion of wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) is a promising philosophical resource for addressing ethical disagreement in technology good governance. According to Rawls, normative justification does not rely on the application of fixed moral principles but emerges from an iterative process of mutual adjustment between considered moral judgments, general principles, and relevant background theories. This process allows for rational deliberation among agents who hold divergent moral commitments, making it particularly suitable for pluralistic societies. In the context of emerging technologies, wide reflective equilibrium offers a way to negotiate ethical disagreements without presupposing consensus on foundational values. This philosophical idea can be operationalized at the level of public policy. To this end, Rawls’s framework is combined with the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), which conceptualizes policymaking as a dynamic process involving competing coalitions of actors who share belief systems and seek to influence policy outcomes over time. Within the ACF, policy change occurs primarily through policy-oriented learning, defined as enduring changes in beliefs or preferences resulting from experience, new information, or interaction with rival coalitions. The conditions required for policy-oriented learning closely mirror the conditions necessary for achieving wide reflective equilibrium in practice. Drawing on Sabatier’s work, two key conditions are emphasized. First, there must be a moderate level of informed conflict between advocacy coalitions. Ethical and policy debates must be substantive enough to engage core normative concerns, yet not so polarized that they devolve into identity-based or ideological confrontation. Second, there must exist a relatively autonomous forum—characterized by professional norms and procedural fairness—where experts and stakeholders from different coalitions can engage in sustained, evidence-based dialogue. Such forums function as institutional analogues of reflective equilibrium, enabling actors to revise their beliefs through deliberation rather than coercion or political dominance. Considering two decades of policymaking on genetically modified crops in Iran (2000–2020) using the Advocacy Coalition Framework, it identifies competing coalitions advocating for and against GMO development. The analysis shows that while both coalitions possess scientific and technical expertise, ethical disagreements have often been framed in ways that hinder policy learning. In particular, characterizations of GMOs as a “foreign conspiracy” or as “interference with divine creation” function as deep core beliefs that resist empirical scrutiny and compromise the possibility of rational deliberation. When ethical concerns are articulated in absolutist or metaphysical terms, they obstruct the iterative adjustment of beliefs that reflective equilibrium requires. Furthermore, this case study reveals institutional deficiencies that undermine the second condition for policy-oriented learning. Although bodies such as the National Biosafety Council were established in Iran to manage ethical and safety concerns, they have struggled to operate as genuinely neutral and deliberative forums. Political pressures, shifting governmental priorities, and limited stakeholder inclusion have prevented these institutions from facilitating sustained ethical dialogue. As a result, GMO policymaking in Iran has been characterized by policy instability, regulatory delays, and cyclical reversals coinciding with changes in political leadership. Conclusion To overcome policy deadlock in the governance of risky and controversial technologies it requires more than improved risk assessment or public communication strategies. What is needed are institutional arrangements that enable wide reflective equilibrium at the policy level. Such arrangements must support informed ethical disagreement, foster trust among stakeholders, and provide stable forums for deliberation insulated from short-term political pressures. By integrating Rawlsian moral reasoning with the Advocacy Coalition Framework, we offer a novel approach to ethically grounded technology policy—one that acknowledges value pluralism while remaining oriented toward practical decision-making and learning over time.

Abstract The central claim of this article is that the philosophy of medicine emerged through a critical confrontation with classical philosophy of science, a confrontation that coincided with the very possibility of articulating the contemporary medical crisis. This simultaneity is not accidental; rather, it discloses the inability of classical philosophy of science to grasp the practical, clinical, and social character of medicine. The rise of the philosophy of medicine is thus presented as internally connected both to the limits of classical philosophy of science and to the formulation of the modern medical crisis. The paper first reconstructs the conceptual framework of classical philosophy of science and identifies its shortcomings in accounting for the nature of medicine. It then examines the idea of medical crisis, arguing that excessive scientification and technologization have dehumanized the clinical encounter and prompted critical reflection. The Kaplan–Pellegrino debate is analyzed as a key historical moment. Drawing on Wieland, Fleck, and Sadeghzadeh, the article develops a positive account of medicine as a distinct kind of knowledge and considers its implications. The implications of this shift include a critique of contemporary medicine and a rethinking of the relationship between science, practice, and the modern human sciences. Keywords: classical philosophy of science; philosophy of medicine; medical crisis; classification of the sciences; practice. Introduction Medicine has long occupied a problematic epistemic position within the modern classification of the sciences. Unlike the natural sciences, whose theoretical foundations appear comparatively stable, medicine has persistently stood at the intersection of scientific knowledge, practical intervention, ethical judgment, and social institution. While it relies heavily on biomedical research and empirical methodologies, its core activity—clinical practice—unfolds within the physician–patient relationship and involves value judgments, uncertainty, and responsibility. This dual character has made medicine difficult to situate within the traditional tripartite division of the sciences into natural, human, and social domains. The central claim of this article is that the philosophy of medicine emerged through a critical confrontation with classical philosophy of science, and that this confrontation coincided with the very possibility of articulating what has come to be described as the modern medical crisis. This simultaneity is not accidental. Rather, it reveals the conceptual inadequacy of classical philosophy of science in grasping the practical, clinical, and social character of medicine. The rise of the philosophy of medicine must therefore be understood as internally connected both to the limits of classical philosophy of science and to the formulation of the contemporary crisis in medicine. Materials and Methods This study adopts a conceptual–historical and analytical methodology. It reconstructs the conceptual framework of classical philosophy of science as it developed in logical positivism, critical rationalism, and law-centered models of scientific explanation. These traditions, despite internal differences, share a commitment to understanding science primarily as theoretical, proposition-based, and truth-oriented knowledge. The analysis then examines how medicine was interpreted within this framework, either as a branch of natural science reducible to biology and ultimately physics–chemistry, or as an applied science whose philosophical problems could be resolved within the general philosophy of science. To evaluate these assumptions, the article engages with major figures in twentieth-century philosophy of medicine and science, including Wieland, Fleck, Pellegrino, Caplan, and Sadeghzadeh. Wieland’s distinction between theoretical and practical sciences provides a systematic critique of the reduction of practical domains to theoretical models. Fleck’s notion of thought style and the rejection of the “Euclidean ideal” illuminates the historically situated and practice-embedded character of medical knowledge. Pellegrino’s emphasis on phronesis and the telos of healing clarifies the normative and relational dimensions of clinical medicine. Sadeghzadeh’s analytic distinction between biomedical science and clinical medicine sharpens the conceptual differentiation between theoretical research and practical judgment. The study also incorporates an analysis of the 1970s Kaplan–Pellegrino controversy as a historical moment in which the autonomy of philosophy of medicine was explicitly debated. Discussion and Results The analysis demonstrates that classical philosophy of science lacks the conceptual tools necessary to account for the distinctive rationality of medicine. Its focus on truth, explanation, and theoretical structure marginalizes domains whose primary orientation is toward action, decision, and responsibility. The medical crisis of the late twentieth century—often described in terms of declining quality of care, dehumanization, and excessive technologization—exposed the limits of an exclusively scientific model of medicine. Excessive scientification and technological mediation contributed to the objectification of the patient and the reduction of illness to measurable pathology. Yet the crisis did not represent a failure of science as such. Rather, it revealed the insufficiency of a framework that treated theoretical science as the exclusive model of rationality. The Kaplan–Pellegrino debate crystallized this issue. Caplan defended the view that philosophy of medicine lacked independent foundations and should remain subordinate to philosophy of science and bioethics. Pellegrino countered that medicine is fundamentally a moral and practical enterprise centered on the physician–patient encounter. This disagreement reflected two divergent conceptions of medicine: one as applied science, the other as a practice structured by its telos—healing—and guided by practical wisdom (phronesis). Drawing on Wieland, the article argues that medicine belongs to the domain of practical sciences. Theoretical sciences aim at describing and explaining what is; practical sciences guide action within concrete and uncertain situations. Clinical medicine is paradigmatic in this regard: it integrates scientific knowledge, contextual judgment, and normative evaluation in order to reach decisions concerning a particular patient. Fleck’s critique of the “Euclidean ideal” further undermines the expectation that medicine should conform to a deductively structured, context-independent theoretical model. Medical knowledge develops within historically situated thought styles and institutional practices. Its variability and context-dependence are structural features rather than epistemic defects. Sadeghzadeh’s distinction between biomedical research and clinical medicine reinforces this conclusion. While biomedical sciences generate theoretical knowledge, clinical medicine organizes conditional rules of action oriented toward therapeutic goals. The criterion of validity shifts from propositional truth alone to the responsible guidance of action in singular situations. The result of these analyses is a positive reconfiguration of medicine as a distinct kind of knowledge—practical, normative, institutional, and relational. This reconfiguration opens broader implications beyond medicine itself. It challenges the monopoly of theoretical science as the universal model of rationality and invites reconsideration of the relationship between science, practice, and the modern human sciences. Conclusion The emergence of the philosophy of medicine cannot be understood as a mere specialization within philosophy of science. It arose from a critical recognition that the dominant theoretical model of science was incapable of adequately accounting for the nature of medicine. This recognition coincided with the articulation of the medical crisis and enabled its philosophical formulation. By relocating the center of analysis from abstract scientific knowledge to the clinical encounter, philosophy of medicine has made possible an immanent critique of contemporary medicine—one that does not reject science or technology, but resists their unqualified dominance. It restores attention to practical judgment, normative responsibility, and the physician–patient relationship. More broadly, the distinction between theoretical and practical sciences, clarified through the case of medicine, invites a reconsideration of modern rationality itself. Medicine becomes a field in which knowledge and action, science and institution, and fact and value are inseparably intertwined. In this sense, philosophy of medicine serves not only as a response to the internal tensions of modern medicine, but also as a critical site for rethinking the relationship between science, practice, and the human sciences in the modern world.

Abstract This article offers an exposition of McTaggart’s paradox and examines several influential interpretations of it. Its principal aim is to reconsider the argument of John Ellis McTaggart, the prominent early twentieth-century metaphysician, for the unreality of time as articulated through a fundamental opposition between two ideas: “absolute reality” and “tensed reality,” and to draw from this opposition a number of conclusions relevant to contemporary philosophical debates concerning the nature of time. To this end, it reconstructs, with close attention to McTaggart’s own formulation, the structure of his argument—an argument intended to demonstrate that time involves a contradiction and therefore cannot be real. It then analyzes and assesses several alternative interpretations of the paradox: Heather Dyke’s account of the contradiction of tense, Huw Price’s view regarding the tension between inclusivity and exclusivity, and, most notably, Michael Dummett’s interpretation. Dummett maintains that the success of McTaggart’s paradox depends upon the acceptance of a substantive philosophical presupposition, namely, that a complete description of reality is, in principle, possible. Finally, the article argues that understanding McTaggart’s paradox within this framework has significant implications for assessing the legitimacy of the philosophical dispute between the A-theory and the B-theory of time. In particular, appeals to naturalistic arguments—that is, those invoking physical theories—in support of the B-theory rely upon a specific philosophical presupposition concerning the possibility of an absolute description of reality and are therefore vulnerable to the charge of begging the question.
Keywords: McTaggart’s paradox, A-theory, B-theory, tensed reality, absolute reality, physical theories, metametaphysics
Introduction
The philosophical debate over the nature of time has been profoundly influenced by “McTaggart’s Paradox,” proposed by J. M. E. McTaggart in his 1908 article “The Unreality of Time” and later published, with some modifications, in his posthumous work The Nature of Existence. McTaggart sought to demonstrate that the notion of time contains inherent contradictions when subjected to metaphysical scrutiny. His radical conclusion—that time is unreal—stems from his Hegelian idealist background. Although many contemporary philosophers reject McTaggart’s argument, his conceptual and metaphysical framework, particularly the distinction between the A-series and the B-series, remains foundational to contemporary metaphysics of time.
This article aims to reconstruct the paradox as a fundamental conflict between two competing metaphysical notions: Absolute Reality (reality as a complete, objective, and observer-independent whole) and Tensed Reality (reality insofar as it involves A-theoretic change). It then introduces several influential interpretations of the paradox (including those of Heather Dyke, Huw Price, Michael Dummett, and E. J. Lowe) in order to further illuminate the conflict between these two notions. It subsequently argues that this understanding of the paradox has significant implications for the legitimacy of the modern metaphysical and naturalistic debate between A-theory and B-theory, insofar as both positions may rest on unexamined presuppositions that beg the question against one another.
Materials & Methods
This study employs a methodology based on the logical reconstruction and comparative analysis of McTaggart’s original texts in relation to major twentieth- and twenty-first-century interpretations of the paradox. The primary materials examined include:
i. McTaggart’s Original Formulation: Focusing on the 1927 formulation of the paradox, particularly his distinction between the A-series (past, present, and future), the B-series (earlier than and later than), and the C-series (a non-temporal ordering), as well as the articulation of his overall account of time.
ii. Modern Interpretations: An analysis of several contemporary interpretations of the paradox, including Dyke’s “paradox of tense,” Price’s account of the tension between “inclusivity” and “exclusivity,” Dummett’s account of the paradox through the notion of a “complete description” of reality, and Lowe’s critique based on the “indexical fallacy.”
iii. Metaphysical Evaluation: The article examines the metametaphysical implications of these philosophical interpretations for the A-theory/B-theory debate itself, as well as for naturalistic arguments derived from modern physics.
Discussion & Result
a) The Structure of McTaggart’s Argument:
McTaggart’s argument proceeds through five logical steps: (1) time requires change; (2) change requires the A-series; (3) the A-series is contradictory; (4) therefore, change is contradictory; and (5) consequently, time is unreal. He argues that the B-series, which is constituted by static temporal relations, cannot adequately account for change, since the events themselves must be the subjects of change. An event such as the “death of Queen Anne” changes only with respect to its A-determinations: it moves from being in the distant future, to the near future, to the present, and subsequently further into the past.
The contradiction arises because the A-determinations (past, present, and future) are mutually exclusive, yet every event must possess all three in order to belong to a temporal series. When one attempts to resolve this difficulty by claiming that an event is present at one moment and past at another, McTaggart argues that this generates a vicious infinite regress.
b) Absolute vs. Tensed:
Heather Dyke reformulates the paradox by emphasizing the tension between absolute A-theoretic distinctions and the reality of temporal passage. According to her interpretation, if genuine passage is admitted, the distinctions between past, present, and future can no longer remain absolute, since every event successively occupies each of these temporal positions. In a similar vein, Huw Price highlights a conflict between “exclusivity” (the claim that only one moment is objectively now) and “inclusivity” (the claim that every moment may equally be regarded as now). This conflict can be interpreted as reflecting the difficulty of reconciling subjective temporal experience with an objective account of reality.
Michael Dummett advances one of the most influential readings of the paradox by connecting it to the possibility of a complete description of reality. He contends that if time is genuinely real, then reality must be irreducibly tensed, making a fully observer-independent view (from nowhere) unattainable. On this interpretation, anyone who maintains that reality must ultimately admit of a complete and objective description is driven, in a manner similar to McTaggart, toward the conclusion that time is unreal.
c) Results for the Metametaphysics of Time:
A central result of this analysis is the identification of question-begging reasoning within the contemporary debate between A-theory and B-theory. The B-theory, which conceives of time as a static “block,” frequently maintains that the A-theory is logically contradictory on the basis of McTaggart’s paradox. However, this alleged contradiction arises only if one already accepts the B-theoretic metaphysical assumption that reality must ultimately be describable within a complete and non-perspectival framework.
Furthermore, the appeal to Special Theory of Relativity as a “naturalistic” justification for B-theory proves to be equally problematic. Physics, by its very methodology, aims at a complete and objective description of the world and therefore operates within a framework that quantifies over all events—past, present, and future—treating them as equally real. However, because A-theory denies the possibility of such an absolute and static description of a fundamentally tensed reality, the use of a physical framework that already presupposes a B-theoretic ontology in order to refute A-theory appears to involve a form of question-begging reasoning.
Conclusion
The analysis demonstrates that the paradox does not conclusively establish the unreality of time; rather, it forces a choice between two competing metaphysical commitments. If one requires reality to admit of a complete and objective description, then the reality of tense must be abandoned. Conversely, if one maintains that time and change are genuinely real, one must reject the idea that reality can be fully captured as a complete and absolute whole. On this interpretation, the debate between A-theory and B-theory rests upon fundamentally different metaphysical starting points, and the legitimacy of the dispute itself depends upon whether priority is given to the ideal of the Absolute or to the reality of temporal becoming.

Abstract This study aims to present an adapted methodology based on critical realism for the investigation of social phenomena in Iran. According to the critical realist approach, social reality is multi-layered, encompassing the empirical level, underlying structures, and causal mechanisms, and understanding it requires moving beyond surface-level observations to deeper layers. By reviewing and comparing existing realist methodological models, this article highlights the necessity of localizing and redesigning research methods for the Iranian context. The proposed model comprises eight stages: description, analytical decomposition, retroductive prediction, retroduction, comparison and refinement, objectification and contextualization, triangulation, and correction. Each stage is designed to enable researchers to identify the constituent elements and generative mechanisms of social reality, produce multi-layered and valid explanations, and align their analysis with Iran’s historical, cultural, and institutional context. Emphasizing reflexivity, continuous critique, and flexibility, this methodology facilitates the discovery of unseen causal mechanisms and the provision of realistic, context-sensitive explanations of complex social phenomena in Iran. The findings provide both practical and theoretical guidance for social science researchers in Iran, enabling them to employ critical realism to generate deep, valid, and locally grounded analyses. Keywords: Critical realism, adapted methodology, causal mechanisms, contextualization, social research in Iran. Introduction One of the enduring challenges in social sciences is explaining complex social realities beyond surface-level observations. Dominant approaches often either reduce social phenomena to observable regularities or limit analysis to subjective interpretations. Critical realism offers an alternative by emphasizing a stratified ontology consisting of empirical, actual, and real domains, where underlying mechanisms generate observable events. Despite its theoretical richness, critical realism suffers from methodological ambiguity. Existing methodological models remain either overly abstract or insufficiently operationalized. This limitation becomes more pronounced in non-Western contexts such as Iran, where socio-cultural and institutional specificities require methodological adaptation rather than direct importation. Therefore, this study seeks to critically examine existing models and propose a context-sensitive methodological framework. Materials & Methods This research adopts a qualitative, analytical-comparative design. Seven influential critical realist methodological models were selected as units of analysis. Data consisted of key theoretical texts and scholarly works in which these models are articulated. The analysis was guided by four criteria: 1. Internal methodological structure 2. Engagement with stratified ontology 3. Approach to identifying causal mechanisms 4. Practical applicability in empirical research Through systematic comparison, strengths and limitations of each model were identified. The study then synthesizes these findings to construct an alternative methodological framework. Discussion & Results The comparative analysis reveals three major patterns: First, models such as Bhaskar’s remain highly abstract, offering strong philosophical foundations but limited empirical guidance. Second, approaches like those of Danermark and Bygstad provide more structured and applicable frameworks, enabling interaction between theory and data. Third, simplified models (e.g., Tapa or Ho) enhance usability but reduce analytical depth. Across all models, the identification of causal mechanisms through retroduction remains central. However, differences emerge in how this process is operationalized. Models with iterative and flexible structures demonstrate greater capacity to address complex social realities. Based on these findings, the study proposes an eight-stage methodology: 1. Description 2. Analytical decomposition 3. Theoretical redescription 4. Retroduction 5. Retrodiction 6. Comparative evaluation 7. Contextualization 8. Triangulation and iterative correction This framework integrates theoretical rigor with empirical applicability while emphasizing contextual sensitivity. Conclusion Critical realism provides a powerful lens for understanding social reality, but its methodological underdevelopment limits its practical use. This study demonstrates that existing models, while valuable, require adaptation for context-specific research. The proposed methodology offers a systematic yet flexible framework for analyzing social phenomena in Iran. By combining layered analysis, causal explanation, and contextual awareness, it enhances both explanatory depth and empirical applicability. This approach can contribute to revitalizing social research by enabling more realistic, non-reductionist, and contextually grounded analyses.

Abstract Objectivityhave long stood as a grand ideal and claim within the sphere of contemporary human thought and existence. Proponents of objectivity, by calling upon scholars and obliging them to eliminate subjective characteristics in their engagement with natural and social phenomena, have promised the attainment of "true" theories that correspond and align with "reality". Numerous philosophers and scholars of science have critiqued this claim and rejected the possibility of its realization.With the emergence of artificial intelligence systems, and owing to their remarkable and unprecedented capabilities, the question of the feasibility of achieving objectivity is once again raised. This article examines the concept of objectivity by reflecting on prominent conceptions of artificial intelligence, particularly its applications in the field of urban planning—systems which, according to Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig's classification, fall under the category of those that "act rationally”. It appears that in supervised forms of AI systems, the realization of objectivity is impossible for several reasons, including the problem of aligning values. In unsupervised forms, the influence of subjective or intersubjective factors will be deeper and more complex. Technological efforts to approach this goal in more advanced AI systems are not only improbable but would also approximate a dangerous condition.
Keywords:
artificial intelligence, objectivity, subjectivity, urban planning,value alignment problem

Introduction
There is no scholarly consensus on a unified definition of artificial intelligence. Specialists from diverse fields operate with divergent assumptions about what AI is and how it should be evaluated. This conceptual plurality has not diminished AI's profound impact on both theory and practice. While some emphasize AI's transformative potential, others warn of algorithmic bias, opacity, and loss of human agency. Amidst these polarized views, a recurring question concerns the future role of human agency alongside AI. This article focuses on a specific epistemological dimension: the re-emergence of objectivity as a central aspiration in AI-assisted practices. Objectivism holds that knowledge of reality can and should be independent of subjective biases. Historically, this ideal has been challenged by epistemologies emphasizing the situatedness of all knowledge. However, big data and advanced machine learning have reinvigorated objectivist aspirations, appearing to offer a pathway toward genuinely data-driven knowledge. The article pursues two inquiries: a conceptual investigation into how AI systems operationalize objectivity, and an empirical exploration of AI applications in urban planning. The main research question is: Can rationally acting AI systems achieve scientific objectivity and eliminate subjective elements from specialized practices?

Materials and Methods
This study employs a qualitative, analytical approach combining theoretical examination and case-based analysis. The theoretical framework draws on Daston and Galison's historical-epistemological account of objectivity, distinguishing between methodological objectivity and procedural fairness. It also utilizes Russell and Norvig's fourfold classification of AI systems, focusing specifically on rationally acting systems—those that claim mathematically grounded, objective decision-making through utility functions and optimization. The empirical component comprises two case studies. The first is Sidewalk Labs' Quayside project in Toronto (2015-2020), a large-scale AI-driven urban development initiative by Google. The second examines two concurrent AI projects in Los Angeles (2020) using aerial photographs—one commissioned by the city council for green space expansion, another by the police for crime prediction—which produced contradictory recommendations from similar data. Analysis focused on identifying points of human intervention at each AI pipeline stage: problem definition, utility function design, data curation, model selection, result interpretation, and implementation.

Discussion and Results
The analysis reveals that rationally acting AI systems cannot achieve objectivity in the strong epistemological sense. First, the utility function—central to rational action—is always designed by human agents. Four current methods for defining utility functions all depend on human value judgments. AI systems are "value calculators," not "value creators." Second, human intervention persists at multiple critical stages. In problem definition, humans determine what questions to ask—witnessing how the Los Angeles projects produced contradictory recommendations due to different commission mandates. In data preparation, all data are collected with specific purposes, never neutral—exemplified by the absence of residents' historical memories of green spaces from the AI's dataset. In model design, choices of algorithms embed subjective judgments. In result interpretation, AI cannot distinguish correlation from causation—as in Los Angeles where it mistakenly equated tree density with crime rates. Third, even unsupervised or self-correcting systems merely shift human intervention to deeper levels—similarity criteria, cluster interpretation, and error definitions all require human judgment. Fourth, the claim that AI offers "satisfactory" outcomes is relativistic; satisfaction is a phenomenological category AI does not experience. Fifth, the Toronto case reveals that AI's promise of enhanced participation failed because public engagement resisted computational modeling. Citizens' concerns over privacy could not be algorithmically optimized. The Los Angeles cases show that even when AI processes data "objectively," human institutions appropriate results according to their own goals—police cut trees without further study.

Conclusion
The article concludes that AI systems—even those designed to act rationally—cannot achieve scientific objectivity in the sense of producing knowledge entirely independent of human subjects. While they demonstrate remarkable capacities for processing data and optimizing decisions, they remain epistemologically dependent on human agency at multiple critical stages. For supervised systems, both technical and theoretical reasons prevent objectivity. For unsupervised or self-correcting systems, the issue reappears through the Value Alignment Problem—which becomes more urgent, not less, as systems advance. The persistent failure of AI to produce unified theories about any single phenomenon mirrors the historical failure of objectivist philosophers; multiple interpretations persist because knowledge production inevitably involves human judgment and situated perspectives. Urban planning serves as an exemplary arena for observing this condition. The Toronto project's failure demonstrated that cities remain strongholds of democracy and privacy. The Los Angeles projects showed that human institutions appropriate AI results according to their own values. Ultimately, the future of objectivity in AI-assisted practices depends less on technological advancement and more on institutional and ethical infrastructures. The article recommends caution against techno-solutionist narratives and advocates for reflexive, democratically accountable governance of AI. The objectivist ideal is neither wholly illusory nor automatically realized; it is an ongoing practical achievement requiring human judgment and continuous ethical deliberation.

Abstract In the history of modern psychology, Freud appears as a thinker who stands at the point of rupture between philosophy and Kantian science, a point at which the Cartesian conscious subject could no longer be the bearer of the whole truth. This article argues that Freud’s turn from consciousness to the unconscious, rather than being a mere shift of focus from the conscious to the unconscious, is a response to the internal crisis of a psychology of consciousness and to the critique of the doctrine that identifies consciousness with the mental. This turn is deeply intertwined with Freud’s engagement with the German tradition (from Leibniz to Nietzsche) and with the physiological concepts of the Helmholtzian school. Using a historical-philosophical method and drawing on Freud’s primary texts and related sources, the paper shows that the Freudian unconscious is neither a return to a metaphysical “soul” nor a reduction of the psyche to biological mechanisms but is instead conceived through the gaps and dysfunctions of consciousness, thereby transforming the very object of psychological science. It concludes that Freudian psychoanalysis should be understood as a radical alternative to a psychology of consciousness—one that is situated between philosophy and physiology, grounded in clinical experience and the analysis of the failures of consciousness, and that thereby makes possible a science of the unconscious. Keywords: Freud, psychoanalysis, unconscious, science of psychology Introduction In the second half of the nineteenth century, psychology tried to become an empirical science rather than a subsidiary of philosophy. A dominant strategy was to install consciousness as the discipline’s proper object, because only what reaches awareness seemed observable and therefore testable. Yet this move generated an internal crisis: consciousness is also the condition of possibility of experience, so it resists being treated as a straightforward empirical object. Psychology was therefore suspended between scientific empiricism and philosophical reflection, and between the demand for observation and the problem of self-observation.
Freud emerges within this tension. He shares the ambition for a science of the psyche, but he denies that consciousness can exhaust psychic reality. He introduces the unconscious as a domain that is constitutively opaque, and he insists that it can nevertheless become an object of inquiry. The article argues that this turn is not a mere continuation of earlier philosophical talk about the unconscious. It is a response to the crisis of consciousness-centered psychology and a critique of the identity thesis that equates the psychic with the conscious. The central claim is that Freud’s turn becomes possible through a non-reductionist appropriation of nineteenth-century physiological concepts, and that it culminates in an alternative conception of psychological science grounded in clinical experience and interpretation. Materials & Methods The study uses an analytic-historical method with a genealogical orientation. Its materials are historical and conceptual texts: Freud’s major writings on theory and method, nineteenth-century debates about psychology’s object, and philosophical and scientific sources that situate Freud between modern epistemology and contemporary physiology. The analysis reconstructs a trajectory in which psychology moves from a metaphysical “soul” to “consciousness” as its scientific object, and then encounters a conceptual impasse. Freud’s key concepts, including the unconscious, psychic energy, and the pleasure principle, are interpreted in relation to the institutional setting of late nineteenth-century medicine and psychology and to the epistemic demand, associated with Kantian and Newtonian models, that genuine science be measurable, experimentally testable, and ideally mathematized. Discussion & Result First, the article distinguishes Freud’s unconscious from earlier invocations of what lies beyond awareness. Freud does not present a laboratory discovery secured by controlled experiment. He proposes an inference driven by clinical and conceptual pressure: conscious life exhibits gaps, distortions, and breakdowns, and these demand an account of processes that do not enter consciousness. Earlier modern thought had opened space for such determinants, especially once Cartesian criteria of clarity and distinctness excluded large domains of ordinary psychic life from the sphere of “truth.” Freud’s novelty lies in recasting these determinants as objects of a disciplined inquiry that aims at scientific description rather than metaphysical speculation. Second, the article reconstructs the nineteenth-century crisis of psychology’s object. The movement toward “psychology without soul” sought to eliminate the metaphysical hypothesis of a persisting substance behind experience. Yet in replacing soul with “the mental,” many accounts remained within a Cartesian horizon that identified the mental with inner awareness. This replacement intensified the problem of objectivity: if consciousness is the object, psychology must observe what is simultaneously the subject of experience and the object to be captured in experience. The Freudian turn is presented as a rupture rather than a supplement. The unconscious is not introduced to complete consciousness, but to show why consciousness cannot serve as the sole foundation of psychological science.
Third, the article analyzes Freud’s methodological “middle position” between philosophy and physiology. Freud’s scientific ambition is anchored in his medical and neurological training, and he borrows from energetic and physiological vocabularies associated with Helmholtz and with Fechner’s principle of constancy. Concepts such as excitation, constancy, and psychic energy let him describe lawful processes that are not directly observable. At the same time, Freud departs from strict reductionism and from a purely laboratory model. His early attempt to translate psychology into neurophysiology in the 1895 Project is read as evidence of this ambivalence, as is his later abandonment of strict neural mapping while retaining energetic language as a theoretical heuristic. Freud’s science is thus portrayed as neither metaphysics in disguise nor physiology extended to the psyche, but an intermediate project that uses physiological concepts without reducing psychic phenomena to the brain. Fourth, the article redefines what counts as experience in a science of the psyche. Freud’s evidence is not primarily conscious self-report under controlled experimental conditions. It is clinical experience: symptoms, dreams, slips, and bodily failures that appear as breakdowns of conscious mastery. These formations are treated as data with both causal and interpretive dimensions, and inquiry proceeds by reconstructing the logic of such failures in the analytic setting. The unconscious is therefore not a missing piece that completes a transparent picture of the psyche. It marks the limit of objectification and makes failure, symptom, and conflict central to scientific description. Finally, the article interprets Freud’s claim to scientificity as a deliberate risk. Psychoanalysis, like the natural sciences, operates with theoretical primitives that are not directly observable and that remain initially indeterminate. Freud compares notions such as drive and psychic energy to physics’ use of concepts like force or gravity: their legitimacy lies in explanatory work and in revisability in light of further experience. On this reading, Freud proposes that psychology can be scientific without copying a strictly mathematized, laboratory template. Conclusion Freud is presented as a thinker working on a fault line between Kantian conceptions of science and older metaphysics. Nineteenth-century psychology sought legitimacy by abandoning the soul and enthroning consciousness, but this move produced a conceptual dead end. Freud’s response was to introduce the unconscious as an object that both explains the failures of consciousness and limits the project of making the psyche fully transparent. Psychoanalysis, as reconstructed here, retains a commitment to systematic explanation, but it replaces experimental testability with a disciplined use of clinical experience and interpretive reconstruction. The Freudian turn, on this account, redefines both the object of psychology and the meaning of scientificity in the human sciences.

Abstract The transformation of reading tools and text medium —from printed paper books to e-readers and digital screens— is not merely a technological shift; it brings about a profound change in the perceptual and cognitive experience of the human reader. This article, drawing on contemporary phenomenological approaches in cognitive science, introduces and analyzes the concept of “embodied reading.” This concept highlights how the act of reading, depending on its material substrate, engages the reader’s mind and body in different ways. In traditional reading, not only vision but all human senses are activated in encountering the book, serving as material anchors for memorizing and decoding information. This sensory engagement creates a spatial and temporal sense of presence for the text, functioning as a scaffold for imagination and mental imagery. Language, too, is saturated with orientational and embedded metaphors. We learn and understand language through our bodily interaction with the world, and we recall our perceptual and emotional experience through recollection of our bodily situation in the environment. In contrast, digital texts, by reducing materiality and physicality, diminish this sensory involvement and challenge the cognitive and memory structures associated with it. Moreover, the weakening of the book’s integrity and coherence as a unified entity affects the reader’s sense of familiarity and control. Thus, different reading technologies and media are not mere carriers of information; they have specific affordances for the practice of reading and lead to different user experiences. Keywords: Perception, Phenomenology, Embodiment, Embodied Cognition, Reading Studies, Digital Reading Introduction This article explores the transformation of the reading experience in the shift from printed books to digital texts, focusing on the embodied relationship between the reader, the medium, and cognitive processes. It addresses the central question of whether contemporary concerns about reduced concentration, shallow comprehension, weakened memory, and emotional detachment in digital reading are merely nostalgic responses to technological change or whether they stem from fundamental embodied differences between print and digital reading. Situated within the interdisciplinary field of Reading Studies and informed by phenomenology, embodied cognition theory, and cognitive science, the article conceptualizes reading as a multisensory, embodied, spatially and temporally situated practice rather than a purely mental or visual activity. From this perspective, the book is not simply a container of meaning but a material object whose mode of existence shapes how readers interact with texts. The transition from the printed book to the digital text represents not only a technological shift but also a reconfiguration of the embodied conditions under which reading takes place. The article seeks to uncover the cognitive and experiential implications of this transformation. Materials & Methods The methodology of this study is conceptual and analytical, based on contemporary research, discussions and debates in reading’s studies that reflected in experimental and theoretical texts and practices. Discussion& Results The main discussion centers on the embodied nature of reading. The article first examines the role of the senses in traditional print reading. Printed books engage multiple senses simultaneously, including vision, touch, smell, and even hearing. Vision supports not only decoding but also aesthetic appreciation and spatial navigation, while touch—through holding, page-turning, and sensing weight and thickness—provides readers with a sense of control, continuity, and presence. These bodily interactions contribute to deeper comprehension and stronger memory formation. Digital reading, by contrast, largely reduces reading to visual perception. The loss or attenuation of non-visual sensory input limits bodily participation in reading. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, the article emphasizes that the body is the primary site of perception and meaning-making. Cognitive science further supports this view, showing that cognition arises from the integration of sensory input, bodily states, and embodied simulations grounded in lived experience. The article argues that digital reading weakens these integrative processes by diminishing sensory engagement. The concept of “embodied reading” is then articulated through two dimensions: spatio-temporal and imaginary. The spatio-temporal dimension highlights how the physical stability of printed books—fixed pagination, consistent layout, weight, and volume—allows readers to orient themselves intuitively within a text. Digital texts, characterized by fluidity and spatial indeterminacy, often lack such cues, leading to disorientation. The imaginary dimension refers to the embodied mental imagery involved in reading. Both narrative and expository texts require sensorimotor simulations rooted in bodily experience, which may be less effectively supported in digital environments. The article further examines the embodied nature of mind and language through memory and metaphor. Human memory encodes experiences as multimodal configurations that integrate sensory, spatial, emotional, and conceptual elements. Printed books function as stable external anchors for such encoding, facilitating recall. Additionally, drawing on Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphor, the article demonstrates that human thought and language are fundamentally embodied and structured through spatial metaphors that influence textual understanding and evaluation. The discussion concludes with an analysis of the book as an object. Printed books possess physical unity, permanence, and personal ownership, enabling emotional attachment and a sense of wholeness. Digital books, by contrast, are fluid, access-based, and lack material integrity. Paper, as a reading tool, is also shown to support analytical practices such as annotation, comparison, and deep learning more effectively. Conclusion In conclusion, the article acknowledges that digital reading is unavoidable and offers practical advantages, yet it cautions that the loss of materiality and embodied engagement may result in shallower comprehension and more fragile memory. Rather than advocating a complete replacement of print with digital media, the article proposes a complementary and context-sensitive approach that recognizes the cognitive importance of embodied interaction. Such an approach is especially crucial in educational contexts and for early readers, where the embodied foundations of reading and learning play a decisive role.

Abstract This article explores the role of the concept of "moral sensibility" in the relationship between mind and reality within the framework of the idea of liberation as articulated by Theodor Adorno. This exploration is situated in relation to the question of how a philosophical theory of ethics can become a material force in society, meaning a force that not only guides agents' actions at the epistemic level but also motivates them materially at the level of will. The article compares Kant’s concept of Categorical Imperative, which emphasizes the universality and unconditionality of moral obligations, with alternative philosophical perspectives that assert the conditioned nature of ethics and emphasize its rootedness in human desires and emotions. Through this comparison, it underscores the importance of formulating the question of moral requirements, including moral sensibility, in terms of the "problem of normativity" and positions liberation as a fundamental element of ethical life in modern society. Utilizing Fabian Freyenhagen’s thesis of "negative Aristotelianism," the article emphasizes the necessity of recognizing the "bad" as the starting point for ethical critique while simultaneously challenging the limitations of overly simplistic frameworks that focus solely on basic human needs through a critique of Freyenhagen’s reading of Adorno. By incorporating insights regarding the unconscious and the socio-historical context, it demonstrates how moral sensibility is shaped not only by rational reflection but also by deeper psychological and social forces. Ultimately, the argument advocates for a more nuanced understanding of moral agency that emphasizes the interplay between individual experiences and social structures, thereby offering an account of moral sensibility that acknowledges both the subjective conditions of possibility for ethics and the real conditions of possibility for ethics. Keywords: Theodor Adorno, Moral Sensibility, Normativity, Critical Theory, Liberation, Freyenhagen, McDowell Introduction: The persistent tension between social theory and practice remains a cornerstone of critical inquiry, particularly within the Frankfurt School tradition. The central problem identified by this research concerns the mechanism by which a philosophical theory can motivate agents at the level of the "will" toward the goal of liberation. In the contemporary era of late capitalism, Adorno observes a profound crisis: the mechanisms of rationalization have integrated individuals into an abstract social totality. In this state, empirical reality is increasingly filtered through administrative and scientific standards, stripping the human subject of spontaneous, unmediated experience. This systemic integration leads to what Adorno describes as the "fossilization" of moral norms. Morality ceases to be a living, reflective process and instead becomes a set of rigid, externalized dictates. Consequently, "moral sensibility"—defined as the subjective capacity to perceive suffering and injustice—remains an unrealized potential. Actions are dictated by market logic and social structures rather than by ethical reflection. The introduction of this article establishes that for theory to become a "material force," it must address this atrophy of sensibility and provide a path for the subject to re-engage with the "damaged life" of modernity. Materials & Methods: The study employs a comparative and qualitative philosophical methodology, situating Adorno’s thought within a broader dialogue of diverse ethical traditions to clarify his unique materialist position. The "materials" for this analysis include several key frameworks: · Kantian Ethics: The research contrasts Adorno’s materialist ethics with the Kantian Categorical Imperative. While Kant emphasizes universality, Adorno argues this formalist approach lacks the critical power to challenge structural dominance and risks becoming complicit with the status quo. · Analytic Traditions (Philippa Foot): The article examines Foot’s hypothetical imperatives, which condition morality on human desires. Adorno finds this insufficient as it ignores how the social totality distorts those very desires. · Perceptual Models (John McDowell): The "Space of Reasons" is analyzed as a model where moral sensibility is a capacity to "see" ethical requirements. Adorno critiques this by insisting that such sensibility is a socio-historical phenomenon, not a natural capacity. · Freyenhagen’s Reconstruction: A primary methodological focus is the critical evaluation of Fabian Freyenhagen’s thesis of "Negative Aristotelianism". This reconstruction attempts to ground Adorno’s normativity in "epistemic negativism"—the idea that while we cannot define the "good life," we can ground ethics in the identification of the "bad" or "malfunctioning" aspects of social life. Discussion & Result: The core of the discussion centers on a rigorous critique of Freyenhagen’s "pure functionality". Freyenhagen suggests that agents can recognize systemic defects by observing what hinders basic human functions like survival and health. However, this research finds such a biological and minimalist framework to be overly reductionist. By drawing on Jonathan Lear’s reading of Freud, the article demonstrates that human drives cannot be reduced to animal instincts. Unlike rigid animal instincts, human drives are imaginative and historically conditioned. Freyenhagen’s biological minimalism risks overlooking what Adorno calls the "promise of happiness"—the qualitative dimensions of freedom that transcend mere survival. By limiting ethics to the prevention of the "worst" (pain or death), Freyenhagen sidelines higher-order goods like aesthetic experience and intellectual freedom, which are essential sites of resistance against social totality. Furthermore, the discussion highlights that any robust reading of Adorno must account for the unconscious. Adorno rejects the simple belief-desire model of action, pointing out that ideology and social power are inscribed deep within the subject’s psyche. This "internal colonization" often makes suffering invisible or normalized, even when it impairs functionality. Therefore, relying solely on a conscious identification of "the bad" is insufficient. The result of this analysis points toward "micrology"—a self-reflective focus on the "particular" and "trivial" as a means to restore true experience. By immersing oneself in concrete objects in a non-dominating way, the subject can decode the historical forces that have suppressed human potential. This "self-reflection of reason" allows moral sensibility to act as a shield against the "ideology of abstractions" that dominates late capitalism. Conclusion: In conclusion, the article asserts that the gap between moral ideals and social outcomes in contemporary society has led to a widespread atrophy of ethical sensitivity. Adorno views the task of the theorist not as a detached academic exercise but as a vital social action aimed at bridging this gap. Moral sensibility is defined as the critical-mental capacity to perceive hidden suffering and systemic injustices within an apparently "normal" social order. While critical theory does not offer "one-size-fits-all" solutions, it is obligated to strengthen this sensibility as a prerequisite for change. By facilitating a deeper understanding of suffering and the forces producing it, social theory serves as a catalyst for genuine liberation. Ultimately, any reconstruction of Adorno must move beyond minimalist functionalism to embrace the complex interplay between the somatic, the unconscious, and the social.

Abstract The proof paradoxes refer to situations where the foundational claim supporting a verdict relies solely on naked statistical evidence. These examples are constructed so that the decision-maker’s degree of belief, derived solely from this statistical data, exceeds the probabilistic thresholds set by relevant standards of proof, thus leading to a verdict. However, despite the high probability, many people intuitively feel that this alone is insufficient to justify a conviction. A closer examination of other types of evidence typically considered in court reveals that such evidence is often just as susceptible to error as naked statistical evidence (Di Bello, 2019). This raises the question: what explains this intuitive preference for other forms of evidence? Two main approaches address this issue. The first is the “revisionary” approach. According to this perspective, because the probability of guilt based on other evidence—such as eyewitness testimony or DNA matches—is generally comparable to, or even less than, the probabilistic values derived from statistical evidence in these paradoxical cases, our intuition that such evidence is more convincing is unwarranted. Therefore, this intuition warrants reconsideration. The second approach is the “non-revisionary” stance. This perspective seeks to justify why convictions based solely on naked statistical evidence seem unjustified and aims to clarify the features that distinguish valid evidentiary proof from naked statistical evidence. Many philosophers and legal scholars have endeavored to elucidate this distinction. For example, Williams (Williams) argues that valid evidence must be dependent on and tied to the defendant, whereas naked statistical evidence does not satisfy this requirement. Similarly, Moss and Duff rely on the notion of knowledge to differentiate between statistical evidence and eyewitness testimony (Moss, 2018; Duff, 2007). One of the latest attempts to articulate this distinction is Smith’s (Smith, 2018) “normic support” approach, which has been further refined by Di Bello (Di Bello, 2020). Smith argues that the relevant difference is that an explanation would be expected if a conviction based on eyewitness testimony turned out to be mistaken, while no such explanation would be expected if a conviction based on naked statistical evidence were mistaken. In contrast, Di Bello contends that Smith's proposal would lead to overgeneralization and sees the problem with naked statistical evidence as the lack of access to an undercutting defeater in the cross-examination process. This article proceeds by analyzing the views of Thomson and the criticisms raised by Redmayne. Thomson employs the blue bus example—one of the paradigmatic illustrations of proof paradoxes—to demonstrate his criterion for distinguishing valid evidence. In this scenario, an individual is involved in a collision with a bus. In the city where the incident occurred, only two bus companies operate: Blue and Red. The Blue company owns 70% of the buses, and the Red company owns 30%. The buses are colored accordingly. No other evidence is available to determine which company’s bus was involved in the collision. Based on ownership data, the probability that the bus involved belonged to the Blue company is 70%, exceeding the standard of preponderance of evidence (Hamer, 2004). This standard is commonly used in civil cases. Thomson argues that the absence of a causal relationship between ownership rates and the liability of the company indicates an intuitive inconsistency in convicting the Blue company based solely on naked statistical evidence. According to Thomson, valid proof must be causally connected to the defendant’s liability—that is, there must be a causal link between the evidence and the facts of the case (Thomson, 1986). Redmayne, however, criticizes Thomson’s conception of causality as ambiguous, arguing that his criteria do not clearly differentiate naked statistical evidence from other types of evidence. Specifically, Redmayne (2008) contends that, when considering Thomson’s definition of causality, it remains possible to establish a causal link between ownership rates and the incident, thereby undermining Thomson’s criterion. The primary aim of this research is to demonstrate that Thomson’s proposed criterion can be refined to address Redmayne’s objections. To do so, we first clarify Thomson’s argument and Redmayne’s critiques. A detailed analysis reveals that Redmayne’s critique relies on two main assumptions: first, that it is justified to infer the rate of accidents from ownership rates; and second, that a causal relationship exists between ownership rates and the probability of liability. To challenge the first assumption, we employ Pollock’s (Pollock, 1990) nomic probability framework, arguing that an objective probability value is epistemically justified only if it satisfies the criteria of nomic probability. This demonstrates that inferring accident rates solely from ownership data in proof paradox examples cannot constitute a justified probabilistic inference. Regarding the second assumption, Redmayne’s critique—that Thomson’s definition of causality lacks sufficient precision—is well-founded. This paper adopts Woodward’s (Woodward, 2005) causal model, particularly its reproducibility criterion, to establish a clear and meaningful distinction between naked statistical evidence and epistemologically valid evidence. Consequently, the absence of a causal link—according to Woodward’s model—explains why conviction based on other valid evidentiary grounds is intuitively superior to one based solely on naked statistical evidence.

Abstract For classical philosophers, the Euclidean axiomatic model represented the ideal framework for constructing deductive scientific systems. Avicenna adopted this model in developing a structured propositional system for metaphysics. Yet several scholars have denied the possibility of such a system, arguing that applying an axiomatic structure to metaphysics is fundamentally misguided. This article addresses the central question of how, and under what conditions of possibility, Avicenna was able to construct a deductive propositional system for metaphysics. The issue is significant because it concerns the very grounds upon which the first systematic and deductive formulation of metaphysics could emerge. Using a descriptive–analytical approach, the study first examines the architecture of Avicenna’s metaphysical system—its components and its internal order—and then explores the conditions that enable its realization. According to Avicenna’s scientology, a metaphysics grounded in the lemma (a priori) method should rely solely on common principles, while a metaphysics proceeding through posterior reasoning (Inni) may draw upon additional axioms. Although Avicenna considers the lemma-based approach possible in itself, its practical difficulty and pedagogical considerations lead him to integrate the posterior method as well. Consequently, metaphysics assumes an “axiom–postulate” hybrid structure. The findings show that Avicenna’s metaphysical system becomes possible only through this combined methodological framework, supported by his ontology of emanation and his epistemology of intellection. Keywords: Avicenna, Metaphysics, Axiomatic Structure, Propositional System, Burhan-e-Limmi, Burhan-e-Inni, Ontology. Introduction In the classical tradition, the deductive rigor found in Euclidean geometry and Archimedean statics was considered the gold standard for scientific knowledge. Aristotle laid the logical foundations for this axiomatic method in his Posterior Analytics, but it was Avicenna who, through his innovative synthesis, founded the first comprehensive propositional system for metaphysics. Avicenna sought to transform metaphysics from a collection of scattered insights into a “Demonstrative Science” (Al-Ilm al-Burhani) that follows a strict hierarchical order.However, the validity of such a system has been challenged by modern thinkers. Paul Foulquié argued that a purely a priori metaphysics is impossible because it relies on the unproven assumption of the identity between thought and being. Similarly, Nicolai Hartmann claimed that ancient ontology failed because it attempted to deduce the “scaffold of existence” from a few abstract concepts, leading to a circular logic. This article investigates the tension between Avicenna’s systematic ambition and these critiques. It aims to clarify the internal logic that allowed Avicenna to believe that metaphysics—the science of the “First Principles”—could be structured as a deductive system comparable to geometry. Materials & Methods The methodology of this research is descriptive-analytical, focusing on the internal logic of Avicenna’s seminal works, primarily the Kitab al-Shifa (The Book of Healing), specifically the sections on Burhan (Demonstration) and Ilahiyyat (Metaphysics). The analytical framework is based on two primary pillars: -Structural Components: Analyzing the “Mabadi” (Principles) and “Masa’il” (Issues/Problems) that constitute a demonstrative science. -Structural Order: Investigating the “Arrangement” of propositions, distinguishing between the a priori path (from cause to effect) and the a posteriori path (from effect to cause). The study also employs a comparative approach by juxtaposing Avicenna’s methodology with the critiques of Paul Foulquié and Nicolai Hartmann to identify the specific ontological and epistemological “conditions of possibility” that sustain the Sinavin system. Discussion & Result: 1. The Components: Principles and Issues In Avicenna’s “Scientology,” every demonstrative science consists of Mabadi (starting points) and Masa’il (propositions to be proven). The Mabadi are further divided into: Axioms (Common Notions): Self-evident truths requiring no proof in any science. Postulates: Propositions that are not self-evident but are proven in a higher or lower science. A significant problem arises: Metaphysics is the “Highest Science” (Al-Ilm al-A’la). If it is the highest, it cannot borrow postulates from a “higher” science. This implies that a pure metaphysics should rely solely on axioms. However, Avicenna’s Ilahiyyat clearly utilizes findings from physics (such as the existence of motion or the first mover) and mathematics. 2. The Hybrid Solution: Limmi vs. Inni: The article finds that Avicenna distinguishes between two modes of the science: The Limmi Path (A Priori): This is metaphysics “in itself.” It moves from the cause (The First Principle) to the effects (creation). While logically possible, Avicenna admits this is extremely difficult for the human intellect. The Inni Path (A Posteriori/Instructional): For “educational purposes” and due to human intellectual limitations, we must begin with what is “better known to us” (sensible effects) to reach what is “better known by nature” (the First Cause). Thus, Avicenna’s actual system is an “Axiomatic-Postulate” hybrid. He uses results from natural sciences (Inni) as postulates to build the metaphysical structure, while maintaining that in essence, the science remains deductive. 3. Addressing the Critics:The results indicate that Avicenna provides a robust response to modern skepticism. Against Foulquié: While Foulquié rejects the union of thought and being as an “idealist” trap, Avicenna’s realism is based on “Essential Union.” The Active Intellect (Aql al-Fa’al) provides the same “Forms” to both the external world and the human mind. Therefore, the deductive order of the mind is not an imposition but a reflection of reality. Against Hartmann: Hartmann’s critique of “apriorism” is answered by Avicenna’s distinction between the “Order of Existence” and the “Order of Instruction.” Avicenna acknowledges that we start from “secondary data” (the Inni method), but he insists that the goal of the scientist is to eventually reorganize that knowledge into a Limmi (causal) structure. 4. The Ontological Condition: The Theory of Emanation:The ultimate condition of possibility for this system is the Theory of Emanation (Sudur). Because existence itself flows in a strictly ordered, hierarchical descent from the One to the many, a propositional system that mirrors this descent is not only possible but necessary. The “Order” of the system is the “Order” of Being. Conclusion: Avicenna successfully constructed a deductive propositional system for metaphysics by navigating the tension between pure logic and human pedagogical needs. The research concludes that the Sinavin system is not a “pure” axiomatic system in the modern mathematical sense, but a sophisticated hybrid. It functions through the integration of Limmi and Inni methods.This construction is made possible by two specific philosophical doctrines: - Ontologically: The hierarchical nature of reality (Emanation) provides the blueprint for the propositional hierarchy. - Epistemologically: The mind’s ability to “re-trace” the path of existence—moving from effects back to causes and then re-deducing the effects from those causes—allows for a system that is both grounded in reality and strictly deductive. Avicenna’s metaphysics is, therefore, a “parallelism” between the structure of the mind and the structure of the cosmos.

Abstract This paper analyzes the pivotal role of Nicholas of Cusa in the intellectual transition from medieval cosmology to modern science. The main argument is that Cusanus’s philosophical and scientific concepts—while deeply rooted in theology—provided the metaphysical framework necessary for subsequent scientific revolutions. In cosmology in particular, building on his central idea of the whole and the part and through theories such as learned ignorance and the homogeneity of the universe, Cusanus undermined the absolute distinctions of the Aristotelian‑Ptolemaic worldview, including those between center/periphery and rest/motion. This conceptual and historical analysis demonstrates how his ideas prepared the ground for later cosmological models. Ultimately, the paper presents Cusanus not merely as a religious thinker faithful to tradition, nor simply as a speculative scientist with bold and modern ideas, but as a philosopher of transition—a threshold figure whose thought embodies the very passage that enabled participation in this cosmological transformation. Keywords: Individual, Universals, Whole, Transition, Epoch, Cosmos Introduction: Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464) occupies an uncertain place in the history of thought: some view him as the last great medieval philosopher, while others see him as an early modern thinker. His ideas seem to reach beyond his time, influencing figures like Copernicus, Kepler, Bruno, and even, indirectly, Descartes and Spinoza, yet he remains deeply rooted in medieval traditions. Hans Blumenberg argues that trying to decide whether Cusanus belongs to the Middle Ages or to modernity misses the point. Instead, he suggests that historical change becomes understandable when we look at the deep and lasting questions humans ask about themselves and the world—questions that stay the same even as answers shift from one era to another. This article approaches Cusanus as a thinker living at a turning point in history. By briefly comparing his careful approach to cosmology with Bruno’s later, more radical views—which pushed some of Cusanus’s ideas far beyond his intentions—the article sets the stage for a closer examination of how Cusanus responded to the fundamental questions of his time. Materials & Methods: This study adopts a conceptual and historical–philosophical approach to analyze Nicholas of Cusa’s role in the transformation of cosmological thought at the threshold between the medieval and modern periods. The analysis is based primarily on close textual examination of Cusanus’s major philosophical works, especially De Docta Ignorantia (On Learned Ignorance) and De Coniecturis (On Conjectures). These primary texts are interpreted alongside selected secondary sources, including modern philosophical interpretations of Cusanus—particularly the works of Hans Blumenberg—as well as relevant historical studies of medieval cosmology and the transition to early modern science. Methodologically, the article combines conceptual reconstruction with comparative analysis. First, key metaphysical concepts in Cusanus’s philosophy—such as the relation between whole and part, contraction (contractio), and the conjectural character of knowledge—are reconstructed in order to clarify their internal coherence. Second, these philosophical ideas are examined in relation to two central cosmological principles attributed to Cusanus: the homogeneity of the universe and the principle of imprecision in finite reality. Third, these principles are compared with the dominant Aristotelian–Ptolemaic cosmology in order to highlight the conceptual rupture introduced by Cusanus. Through this interpretive framework, the study seeks to show how Cusanus’s metaphysical reflections created new conceptual conditions for questioning traditional cosmology and for rethinking the structure of the universe in ways that later became significant for early modern scientific developments. Discussion & Result: The analysis shows that Cusanus’s cosmological reflections represent a decisive conceptual shift away from the hierarchical and geocentric structure of medieval cosmology. By grounding his cosmology in the metaphysical relation between whole and part, Cusanus challenges the fundamental assumptions of the Aristotelian–Ptolemaic worldview. His principle of the homogeneity of the universe undermines the traditional division between the sublunary and supralunary realms and rejects the idea that the Earth occupies a privileged ontological position within the cosmos. In this framework, celestial and terrestrial bodies belong to the same order of reality, and motion becomes relative rather than absolute. A second major result of this analysis concerns the principle of imprecision. Cusanus argues that finite beings cannot possess perfect precision because only the absolute divine reality is fully identical with itself. Consequently, the physical world is characterized by approximation and plurality rather than exact symmetry or perfect order. This idea weakens the possibility of defining an exact center or fixed boundary of the universe, thereby opening the conceptual space for imagining an unbounded cosmos. Taken together, these principles reveal that Cusanus’s cosmology was not merely a speculative theological system but a philosophical framework that destabilized inherited cosmological certainties. In this sense, Cusanus can be understood as a transitional thinker whose metaphysical insights contributed to the intellectual conditions that later enabled the emergence of modern cosmology. Conclusion: This article analyzes the transition from medieval cosmology to modern scientific thought through the philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa, emphasizing his innovative reformulation of the relationship between whole and part. Rather than categorizing Cusa as either the last medieval thinker or the first modern one, the study—following Blumenberg—presents him as a transitional figure whose conceptual interventions enabled new modes of questioning that later shaped scientific developments. Cusa’s central contribution lies in rejecting both extreme realism and strict nominalism. He argues that each finite entity possesses a unique mode of existence while simultaneously reflecting the whole in a limited manner. This metaphysical framework grounds two key principles of his cosmology: the homogeneity of the universe and the inherent imprecision of finite reality. The former eliminates the hierarchical division between celestial and terrestrial realms and undermines Earth’s privileged status, thereby introducing the relativity of motion. The latter asserts that no finite being can fully embody the whole, yielding a world without exact center, boundary, or perfect symmetry. Together, these principles destabilize the assumptions of medieval cosmology and help establish conceptual preconditions for the emergence of modern cosmological thought.