نوع مقاله : پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری گروه فلسفه، دانشکدۀ ادبیّات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران

2 استادیار، گروه فلسفه، دانشکدۀ ادبیّات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران

چکیده

مقالۀ پیشِ رو مطالعه‌ای انتقادی و مقایسه‌ای بر دو روایت از ساختارگرایی علمی است. پس از مقدّمه‌ای کوتاه، در بخش 2 مقدّماتِ مفهومیِ جدالِ کهنۀ واقع‌گرایی-ناواقع‌گرایی در فلسفۀ علم را به‌اجمال فراهم می‌آوریم؛ واقع‌گراییِ علمی رویکرد معرفتیِ مثبت و خوش‌بینانه‌ای به نتایج نظریه‌های علمی (به‌ویژه دربارۀ هویّات مشاهده‌ناپذیر) است. دو استدلال مهم پیرامون جدال یادشده در بخش 3 معرّفی و بررسی خواهند شد؛ اختلاف واقع‌گرا و ناواقع‌گرا نهایتاً بدین بازمی‌گردد که بایستی (به‌معنایِ خاصّی) به دنبال تبیینِ موفّقیّت‌های علم باشیم یا خیر. در بخش 4، با تکیه بر مقاله‌ای جریان‌ساز از جان وُرال، خواهیم دید که واقع‌گرایی ساختاری با نظرداشت همان دو استدلال مهم پیرامون (نا)واقع‌گرایی علمی، و به‌عنوان موضعی میانی و روایتی تعدیل‌شده از واقع‌گرایی پیشنهاد شده است: شناختِ فراتجربیِ علمی تنها متوجّه ساختار جهان (مشاهده‌ناپذیر) است. هرچند وُرال در این باره صراحت ندارد، تلاش می‌کنیم فهمی اوّلیه از معنای ساختار نزد وی فراهم آوریم. صورت‌بندی دقیق‌ترِ وُرال از واقع‌گراییِ ساختاری بر پایۀ رمزی‌سازی در بخش 5 معرّفی و ارزیابی خواهد شد. شاید مشهور‌ترین تهدید برای واقع‌گرایی ساختاری اشکالِ نیومن باشد: ساختارگرایی مستلزم صدقِ بدیهیِ نتایج غیرِمشاهده‌ایِ نظریه‌های علمی است. در بخش 6، مفصّلاً بدین اشکال پرداخته و استدلال می‌کنیم که واقع‌گرایی ساختاری می‌تواند از آن رهایی یابد. از سوی دیگر، باس ون فراسن از روایتی ناواقع‌گرا از ساختارگرایی علمی دفاع می‌کند، ساختارگرایی تجربه‌گرا، که خاستگاهش وابستگیِ بازنمایی علمی به مدل‌ها یا ساختارهای ریاضی است. پس از معرّفی این دیدگاه در بخش 7، تفاوت‌های آن با واقع‌گرایی ساختاری را تحلیل خواهیم کرد. پیش از جمع‌بندی و پایان سخن، در بخش 8 خواهیم دید که ساختارگراییِ تجربه‌گرا نیز از مشابهِ اشکال نیومن و تهدید بدیهی‌شدگی در امان نیست. از جمله چنین تهدیدی است که ون فراسن را به سویه‌ای غیرِساختاری از بازنماییِ علمی متوجّه می‌سازد: سویۀ نظرگاهی/اشاری. در واپسین استدلال، برآنیم نشان دهیم که به‌رسمیّت‌شناختنِ این سویه از بازنمایی علمی تنها در صورتی برای دفعِ اشکالِ بدیهی‌شدگی کافی‌ست که ون فراسن از تعهّد جداگانه‌اش به تعبیرِ تحت‌اللّفظی زبان علم عقب بنشیند.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Structural Realism and Empiricist Structuralism

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mahmood Vahidnia 1
  • Seyed Mohammadhassan Ayatollahzadeh Shirazi 2

1 PhD student, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran

2 Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran

چکیده [English]

This paper provides a critical and comparative study of two versions of scientific structuralism. After a brief introduction, in section 2, we review the key concepts in the long-lasting debate between realism and antirealism in the general philosophy of science; scientific realism is a positive and optimistic epistemic attitude towards scientific theories (and especially the non-observational aspects thereof). Two influential arguments around the above debate are introduced and briefly examined in section 3; the main disagreement between the realist and the antirealist will turn on whether or not the novel predictive success of scientific theories is in need of any explanation (especially through truth). In section 4, focusing on a classic paper by John Worrall, we will see that structural realism has been introduced as a middle and more balanced position in the realism-antirealism dispute: (theoretical) scientific knowledge only concerns the structure of the (unobservable) world. Although Worrall himself was not explicit in this regard, we try to provide a preliminary understanding of his notion of structure. The more elaborate and detailed formulation of Worrall’s structural realism based on Ramseyfication is presented and briefly examined in section 5. Possibly the most well-known threat to structural realism is an objection originally attributed to Max Newman: structuralism trivializes the theoretical (or non-observational) implications of scientific theories. In section 6, we provide an extensive treatment of Newman’s objection, before arguing that structural realism can successfully circumvent it. Bas van Fraassen, who seems to consider Newman’s objection somewhat detrimental to Worrall’s project, advocates an antirealist view called empiricist structuralism. The latter mainly originates from the fact that the vehicles of scientific representation are mathematical models and structures. The motivations for this view along with its differences from scientific realism are reviewed in section 7. In the penultimate section 8, we will note that empiricist structuralism too is not totally immune from trivialization objections of the kind raised by Newman and also Putnam. It is, among other things, these kinds of threats that lead van Fraassen to a nonstructural aspect of scientific representation: perspectivity/indexicality. In our final argument, we intend to show that recognizing such an aspect, though revealing in itself, is NOT sufficient for repelling trivialization threats, unless van Fraassen is willing to sacrifice his long-standing commitment to the literal construal of the language of science. We will end with a brief conclusion.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • scientific realism/antirealism
  • structural realism
  • Ramseyfication
  • Newman’s objection
  • empiricist structuralism
  • perspectivity/indexicality
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