نوع مقاله : پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 کارشناسی ارشد فلسفه دانشگاه مفید

2 دانشیار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه مفید

10.30465/ps.2021.35140.1500

چکیده

بنابر دیدگاه طبیعت‌گرایی روش‌شناسانه، استفاده از روش‌ها، قوانین و نیروهای طبیعی برای توضیح پدیده‌ها کافی است و عوامل ماورای طبیعت و الهی در این میان نقشی ندارند. طبیعت‌گرایی فلسفی نیز، دیدگاهی هستی-شناسانه است که بنابرآن، غیر از عوامل طبیعی و هویات فیزیکی، علت و هویت دیگری در عالم وجود ندارد. معمولاً طبیعت‌گرایان با تمسک به نظریه‌ی فرگشت داروین در توضیح چگونگی پیدایش ارگانیسم‌های پیچیده و تعمیم آن به کل موجودات و رخ‌دادهای عالم، تلاش می‌کنند دیدگاه خود را توجیه کنند. در این مقاله، ضمن توضیح دیدگاه دنیل دنت به‌عنوان نماینده‌‌ی شاخص دیدگاه طبیعت‌گرایی فلسفی، استدلال‌های او جهت توجیه طبیعت‌گرایی فلسفی صورت‌بندی و نقد می‌شوند. سپس نقد آلوین پلانتینگا علیه باور به طبیعت‌گرایی و فرگشت توضیح، و نشان داده می‌شود این دو باور با یک‌دیگر ناسازگارند و جمع آن دو، خودشکن است. نتیجۀ مقاله نیز این است که طبیعت‌گرایی هستی‌شناسانه دیدگاهی درست و قابل اعتماد نیست.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Critical Evaluation of Daniel Dennett's Arguments Concerning Philosophical Naturalism

نویسندگان [English]

  • mohsen khayatkashani 1
  • Mirsaeid Mousavi Karimi 2

1 Master of Philosophy of Mofid University.

2 Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy

چکیده [English]

According to methodological naturalism, in scientific explanation we can only appeal to natural laws, forces and entities, without assuming any role for supernatural entities and parameters. Philosophical naturalism is an ontological view according to which there is nothing but natural elements, principles, and physical entities. To justify their views, naturalists usually use Darwin's theory of evolution and extend its domain over all phenomena. In this paper, we will explain Daniel Dennett's views on these issues and critically evaluate his arguments. Then, Alvin Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism will be discussed. The conclusion of the paper is that ontological naturalism is not a correct and tenable opinion.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Naturalism
  • Evolution
  • Darwin
  • Dennett
  • Plantinga
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