Scientific naturalism is a doctrine that consists of two ontological and methodological components. On the basis of the methodological component, the scientific method is the only source for validation (about nature), and based on the ontological component, all that exists (causation) can be investigated by science. Some naturalist philosophers believe that the ontological component, that is, ontological (or metaphysical) natureism, is an essential or structural philosophy for science, in the sense that if science is eliminated from metaphysics, then what is obtained will no longer be science.
In contrast, many naturalist critics believe that ontological naturalism is a lesson outside metaphysics of science, and only methodological naturalism (not a metaphysical principle) is a disciplining or methodological principle for science. In this sense, naturalism is used only as a pragmatic predicate for scientific action of scientists. In this paper, we will show that none of the two approaches are correct in relation to the relation between naturalism and science; and we are not allowed to block the flow of Hwites and supernatural causes into the realm of science, based on a metaphysical or pragmatic default, and the metaphysics of the universe We presuppose nature to science, which is free from such an echo and causation from the beginning.