نوع مقاله : پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه، دانشکدگان فارابی، دانشگاه تهران
2 دانشیار گروه فلسفه، دانشکده الهیات، دانشکدگان فارابی دانشگاه تهران
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله English
نویسندگان English
One of the fundamental questions in the philosophy of society is whether institutional facts can be reduced to physical facts. Despite the prevailing accounts in social ontology, the relationship between institutional facts and phenomenal consciousness has remained relatively under-explored. By reconstructing and supplementing John Searle’s social ontology based on the foundations of David Chalmers’ philosophy of mind, this paper defends the irreducibility of institutional facts. The primary argument is that institutional facts are grounded in collective intentionality, and intentionality itself cannot be realized without phenomenal consciousness—namely, the subjective quality of experience. Since phenomenal consciousness, according to anti-physicalist arguments, does not logically supervene on physical facts and defies reductive explanation, institutional facts, given their dependence on it, are similarly irreducible to physical facts. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that anti-physicalist arguments, such as the Conceivability argument and the Chinese Room thought experiment, can, with appropriate reconstruction, be employed to defend this claim.
کلیدواژهها English
