Seyed Saied Mirahmadi
Abstract
Newton considered the dynamical effects exerted upon accelerating bodies (such as the concavity of the surface of the water in Newton’s bucket experiment, etc.) to be caused by their acceleration relative to absolute space. Following Mach’s ideas, Einstein, based on the thought that all motion ...
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Newton considered the dynamical effects exerted upon accelerating bodies (such as the concavity of the surface of the water in Newton’s bucket experiment, etc.) to be caused by their acceleration relative to absolute space. Following Mach’s ideas, Einstein, based on the thought that all motion is relative, knew very well that if he could show that the inertial effects are actually due to the acceleration relative to distant matter instead of absolute space, then he would be able to dispose of the Newtonian concepts of absolute space and motion. There is a widespread belief that the general theory of relativity get rid of the preferred (inertial) frames corresponding to Newtonian absolute space and time. In this article, by examining Einstein’s thought process in creating the general theory of relativity, the claim: despite Einstein’s efforts and contrary to the name of the theory, Mach’s principle in the sense of “relativity of all motion” or “inertial forces are exerted by matter, not by absolute spacetime” is neither included in the principles of the general theory of relativity nor results from it, is confirmed. Therefore, the absolute elements such as “absolute rest and motion”, “absolute acceleration”, “absolute inertial forces” and “absolute spacetime” are yet essentially retained in the general theory of relativity. Due to the epistemological importance of Mach’s principle, the effort to provide an efficient physical theory based on this principle continues.
Emad Tayebi; Alireza Mansouri
Abstract
The ontological problem of technical artifacts is: what makes an object count as a technical artifact? Most theories have investigated the ontology of artifacts in terms of ‘function’. A group of these theories has highlighted the physical structure of the artifact because of its causal role ...
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The ontological problem of technical artifacts is: what makes an object count as a technical artifact? Most theories have investigated the ontology of artifacts in terms of ‘function’. A group of these theories has highlighted the physical structure of the artifact because of its causal role in realizing the function; Others, taking ‘function’ and ‘intention’ the same, have emphasized agents’ intention in the design and use of artifacts. Some have considered the evolution of artifacts, their history of selection and reproduction, to be effective in the constitution of their ontology. Due to the shortcomings of causal, intentional, and evolutionary theories, attempts have been made to present hybrid theories. This paper, along with an overview and evaluation of the most important theories of the ontology of technical artifacts, aims to spell out the problems which any adequate ontology of artifacts needs to answer.
Parisa Saatchi Fard; Keyvan Alasti
Abstract
In all periods of history, human has been trying to "understand". In order to understanding the natural world, scientists first observe samples and then classify them based on similarity. To figure out the actions of people, the matter seems different. To achieve this, we need to understand the intentions ...
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In all periods of history, human has been trying to "understand". In order to understanding the natural world, scientists first observe samples and then classify them based on similarity. To figure out the actions of people, the matter seems different. To achieve this, we need to understand the intentions of people. Because intention has psychological nature, there is always a concern from empiricists that it may not be perceptible by third-person people. To some extent, many human actions are perceptible from a third-person point of view, and this causes them to be the subject of scientific investigations (with common scientific methods). However, there are cases that show the understanding of human activities from the third person of view has limitations.Stephen Grimm introduces a type of understanding and believes that by realising the specific goals of the person being understood as a desired action, we will achieve a deeper understanding. In this article, an attempt has been made to clarify the discussed issue first by proposing and interpreting Stephen Grimm's point of view, and then by proposing the problems and explaining the ambiguities of Grimm's idea, as an alternative formulation, we will show that the agent's decision for understanding or not understanding the actions of others, plays an important role. Empathy is known as a psychological capacity that can be understood in a different way by simulating the structure.Investigating and looking deeper into this issue will help us to judge it better as a method or an idea in social and human sciences.
Javad Akbari Takhtameshlou; Seyed Mehdi Hosseini Nasab
Abstract
Since the beginning of the 20th century, philosophers of science—both realist and anti-realist—have shown a special tendency toward the concept of ‘structure’, mainly to address certain problems in the process of understanding science (particularly some serious problems arising ...
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Since the beginning of the 20th century, philosophers of science—both realist and anti-realist—have shown a special tendency toward the concept of ‘structure’, mainly to address certain problems in the process of understanding science (particularly some serious problems arising from successive and deep changes in scientific theories over time). In this regard, different forms of ‘structuralism’ have been developed thus far around the belief that science is only capable of revealing the structure of the world (and not the ontological characteristics of its objects). However, all structuralisms have been subjected to a very serious criticism known as ‘Newman's objection’, which states that if structure is supposed to be the most we know about the world, then the only thing we will actually know about the world is cardinality, i.e., the number of related objects.Given the importance of structuralism in the philosophy of science as well as the seriousness of Newman's objection, the goal of this paper is to introduce both realist and anti-realist scientific structuralism and examine and evaluate how successfully they respond to this criticism. The findings of this examination suggest that both of these structuralisms are incapable or at least substantially problematic in answering Newman's objection, mostly due to their structuralist nature and underlying ideas.
Mesbah Khandan; Morteza Nouri
Abstract
Husserl presents a scheme of his philosophy of physics in paragraphs 40 to 52 of treatise Ideas1, relying on the foundations of the idea of transcendental phenomenology. The main pillar of his theory is the discussion of the nature and existence of unobservable and theoretical entities in mathematical ...
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Husserl presents a scheme of his philosophy of physics in paragraphs 40 to 52 of treatise Ideas1, relying on the foundations of the idea of transcendental phenomenology. The main pillar of his theory is the discussion of the nature and existence of unobservable and theoretical entities in mathematical physics. He expands his opinion while rejecting and violating two theories of primary-secondary qualities and critical realism and tries to propose an alternative model. In this article, I will first reread the clear and explicit aspect of Husserl's theory about unobservable entities by referring to the text of Ideas1, then by proposing an epistemological framework based on transcendental phenomenology, I will try to complete and reconstruct the ambiguous and controversial aspects of Husserl's theory. In this regard, I will argue that theoretical entities in physics have a "Universal" status, and therefore the discussion of what they are should be done using the doctrine of categorial intuition. In the following, while paying attention to the two ways of realizing universals in Husserl's view (Platonic and Kantian) and emphasizing the role of a ‘primary imaginary given’ in the constitution of universals, I will consider theoretical entities as universals in the Kantian sense and I will give evaluate the advantages and limitations of this interpretation.