Introduction

Alexandre Koyré transformed the historiography of science by emphasizing the inseparable relationship between scientific developments, philosophy, religion, and metaphysics. Against positivist interpretations that attributed the emergence of modern science primarily to experimental methods, he argued that fundamental scientific transformations were rooted in changes in the underlying metaphysical worldview. His approach subsequently influenced historians and philosophers of science, including Thomas Kuhn. This article reassesses Koyré’s interpretation of the Scientific Revolution, particularly his account of the Copernican transformation. It argues that although his concepts of the destruction of the cosmos and the geometrization of space offer valuable explanations of the emergence of modern physics, they do not adequately account for the intellectual foundations of Copernican heliocentrism. The article proposes that metaphysical metaphors provide an important missing link between inherited astronomical principles and their transformation into a new cosmological system.

Materials & Methods

The research employs a historical and interpretive methodology based primarily on a critical examination of Koyré’s writings, especially The Astronomical Revolution: Copernicus, Kepler, Borelli (1961), alongside relevant passages from Copernicus’s On the Revolutions and Rheticus’s Narratio Prima.  It also engages with contemporary critiques of Koyré’s historiography, particularly studies by David Drozdova, Yves Gingras, Stephen Shapin, Lorraine Daston, and Sophie Roux. Research on medieval Islamic astronomy and the relationship between mathematical and natural philosophy, especially the contributions of Hossein Masoumi Hamedani and studies of Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī, provides an additional historical framework. The analysis compares the metaphysical assumptions of medieval Ptolemaic astronomy with those underlying Copernican heliocentrism, examining how metaphors transformed the meanings of established astronomical principles.

Discussion & Results

Koyré identified two fundamental characteristics of the Scientific Revolution: the destruction of the traditional hierarchical cosmos and the geometrization of physical space. These concepts explain the transition from an Aristotelian universe of qualitatively distinct regions to a homogeneous mathematical universe governed by universal laws. However, subsequent scholarship has demonstrated that mathematization was neither sudden nor uniform. Medieval traditions of mixed mathematical sciences, social practices, instruments, and changing standards of explanation all contributed to this transformation. The article argues that these concepts cannot adequately explain Copernicus’s achievement. Unlike Galileo, Copernicus did not abandon the Aristotelian conception of place or establish a homogeneous and infinite universe. His heliocentric system retained a hierarchical cosmology, although it fundamentally rearranged its values. The first important transformation concerned the metaphorical significance of the center and the Sun. In medieval Aristotelian-Neoplatonic cosmology, the center of the universe was the lowest and least perfect region, associated with the imperfect Earth, whereas the celestial spheres occupied superior positions. Copernicus reversed this hierarchy by presenting the Sun as a sovereign ruler seated at the center of the universe. The metaphor of the Sun as king transformed centrality from a symbol of inferiority into one of dignity and authority.

The second transformation concerned the metaphysical status of mathematics. Medieval Islamic and Christian astronomers employed mathematics to describe celestial phenomena, but generally regarded mathematical demonstrations as subordinate to natural philosophy. Copernicus, by contrast, approached mathematical order as an expression of the intrinsic structure of reality, reflecting the work of a divine mathematical creator. The universe was not merely describable through mathematics; its fundamental organization was itself mathematical. The third transformation involved the metaphors of God as mathematician, engineer, and clockmaker. Although simplicity and economy were already established methodological principles in Ptolemaic astronomy, Copernicus and Rheticus gave them a stronger metaphysical and engineering significance. Rheticus compared divine creation with the work of skilled clockmakers, who avoid unnecessary gears when the same function can be achieved through a simpler mechanism. This metaphor suggested that the most appropriate astronomical system should reflect the optimal design of a divine engineer. The argument also acquired social significance because mechanical clocks were increasingly familiar features of contemporary urban and religious life.

An important example of the transformation of inherited astronomical principles concerns the annual periods connecting planetary motions with the Sun. In Ptolemaic astronomy, these periods were already incorporated into the models of the planetary spheres. However, they were treated as computational arrangements rather than evidence of Earth's annual revolution. Copernicus reinterpreted these existing mathematical relationships as consequences of the Earth's motion around the Sun. Thus, a feature already present in traditional astronomy acquired a fundamentally different cosmological meaning.

The article consequently argues that Copernicus’s achievement cannot be explained simply through the introduction of mathematical astronomy, the principle of simplicity, or the recognition of celestial divinity. These elements already existed in medieval astronomy. What distinguished Copernicus was his reinterpretation of them through new metaphysical metaphors, which connected mathematical simplicity, divine design, celestial hierarchy, and solar sovereignty within a coherent heliocentric system.

Conclusion

This study demonstrates that Koyré’s historiography, despite its fundamental contribution to understanding the metaphysical foundations of the Scientific Revolution, requires further development to explain the specific emergence of Copernican heliocentrism. The transition from Ptolemaic astronomy was not simply a complete rupture with inherited astronomical principles. Rather, it involved a transformation in their meaning and function through metaphysical metaphors. The central contribution of this research is to identify these metaphors as a missing link in the historiography of the Copernican Revolution. By examining the Sun as sovereign, the center as a seat of authority, God as mathematician, and God as engineer or clockmaker, the article offers a more comprehensive explanation of how traditional astronomical elements were reorganized into a heliocentric worldview. It also highlights the importance of social and technological contexts, particularly the culture of mechanical clockmaking, which Koyré largely neglected.