Philosophy of Science

Abstract Contrary to popular belief, the history of modern nationalism in Iran and the interest of Iranians in the modern concept of nationality goes back to the end of the Nasrid era and the Mozafari era; Three decades before the First World War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which is usually mistakenly referred to as the beginning of nationalism in Iran. It is a fact that the doctrine of nationalism in the era of Naseri and Mozafari, with a focus on "language" as a national unifying element, was taught long before the second half of Ahmad Shahi's era in three high schools: Dar al-Funun, Sepahsalar, and Political. It was from the intellectual atmosphere of these three schools and many foreign schools in the country that, in the company of "scientists" and "introducers", they put the two discourses of "one word" and "public education" as the foundation for political and social developments. And it was precisely from those discourses that the constitutional movement and the conquest of Tehran were objectified so that values ​​such as national authority, national law, a single language, justice and public education were promoted to the center of attention of Iranians. This article tries to show the contribution of the three high schools of Dar al-Funun, Sepahsalar and Political schools at the end of the Nasrid era and the Mozaffari era in introducing and promoting the idea of ​​Iranian nationalism and the rise of the modern concept of nation and nationality, so that based on it, another type of Iranian constitution influenced by modern European nationalism can be revealed.

Abstract Object-oriented ontology, by moving beyond the centrality of the human subject, stresses the ontological autonomy of objects and the notion that their being forever withdraws from all relations. Graham Harman—its leading proponent—while drawing on Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory, nevertheless subjects it to criticism in multiple works. Harman argues that Latour reduces objects to networks of relations and further claims that Latour wrongly presumes that relations are reciprocal. He also maintains that actor-network theory, and more broadly any philosophy of “becoming,” cannot adequately address issues of identity and stability within change.

This article examines object-oriented ontology and evaluates Harman’s objections to actor-network theory. I contend that Harman’s account of actor-network theory in the critiques under discussion is not sufficiently accurate and that, in several places, he conflates distinct concepts. The article concludes that the core divergence between the two approaches lies less in their views on the existence and interrelatedness of objects than in their methodological commitments.