Philosophy of Science

Abstract Since the publication of Scientific Image, van Fraassen has criticized scientific realism and, instead, introduced constructive empiricism as an appropriate alternative. Adhering to the tenet of empiricism that ‘experience is our only source of information about the world’, he considered acquiring any knowledge of the unobservable level of the world as impossible. According to van Fraassen, the realistic belief in the (approximate) truth of scientific theories has no epistemic basis; and, in this case, he only allowed belief in the empirical adequacy of these theories. The present assay explains and examines the key elements of constructive empiricism and contrasts it with scientific realism. We will indicate that van Fraassen’s argumentation in rejecting realism and defending his position is not able to provide the necessary and sufficient justifications for the replacement of scientific realism with constructive empiricism

Abstract Since the publication of Scientific Image, van Fraassen has criticized scientific realism and, instead, introduced constructive empiricism as an appropriate alternative. Adhering to the tenet of empiricism that ‘experience is our only source of information about the world’, he considered acquiring any knowledge of the unobservable level of the world as impossible. According to van Fraassen, the realistic belief in the (approximate) truth of scientific theories has no epistemic basis; and, in this case, he only allowed belief in the empirical adequacy of these theories. The present assay explains and examines the key elements of constructive empiricism and contrasts it with scientific realism. We will indicate that van Fraassen’s argumentation in rejecting realism and defending his position is not able to provide the necessary and sufficient justifications for the replacement of scientific realism with constructive empiricism

Abstract At the time that whistle of trains, the ringtones of phones and the lighting of lamps leave no room for nineteenth century people to doubt modern science and its technological benefits, Nietzsche challenged it. He criticized the main foundation of modern science that the natural world corresponds with our scientific ‘rules’ or ‘laws’. He also criticized the principle of causality that is very necessary to understand the scientific world. However there are important and subtle differences between his early and middle works and his final works concerning his critics of the concepts of ‘law’ and ‘causality’. In the deeper layers of his critics, Nietzsche was attempting to discover the deep link between science and metaphysics. Therefore, he depicts the emerging of the ‘true world’ fable as weakening the entire edifice of modern science. Hence, Nietzsche considers science as a nihilistic adventure, and comparing science and theology he introduces science as the highest form of ascetic ideal and its best collaborator. It should be noted that the final purpose of Nietzsche will not to discard science and willingness to truth as its main drive, but rebuild it on pillars of new values that say yes to life.

Abstract According to the traditional definition of knowledge, it seems that the epistemological analysis of error can be conducted through considering any defect in knowledge components: fault belief, false belief, and unjustified belief. However, the arising question is this: Which error is attributable to the believer? When is a believer blamed for possessing a fault or false belief? It seems that he is blameless if he has good reasons for believing that p, even though p is false. The aim of this article is to present an analysis of epistemic error in justification, in externalist reliabilism framework. Firstly, the capacity of chief theories in the general reliabilism is assessed for epistemic error analysis. These are the process reliabilism of Alvin Goldman and truth tracking theory of Robert Nozick. Afterward, the virtue perspectivism of Ernest Sosa is surveyed. This paper will argue that the safety principle, which is introduced as a necessary condition of knowledge by Sosa, is a defendable base for error analysis.

Abstract Rereading scientific discourse and methodology of Islamic civilization in the past period, especially during the renaissance, in connection with Islamic civilization recognition, has a strategic importance. In general, because of exposure to Greek thought and books translated from other civilizations, the Islamic renaissance intellectually has a collective structure. Accordingly, in this study, comparing methodologies of Razi and Farabi, the two exemplars of Islamic renaissance, we have tried to recognize the coordinates of scientific discourse renaissance of Islamic civilization (third and fourth centuries). The findings indicate that Razi has a realist epistemology and a positivist methodology similar to the twenty century positivism’s methodology. Farabi, on the other hand, has an idealistic epistemology and a combined methodology with an emphasis on transcendental rationality and rationality alongside experience. Finally, based on the findings of this study it can be concluded that a pluralistic methodology has been dominant on scientific discourse of Islamic-Iranian civilization.

Abstract Van Fraassen as an empiricist believes that ‘observation’ is perception of something without instruments. On the other hand, as a constructive empiricist, he adds a constraint based on which if something is observable does not automatically imply that its observing conditions are ready now. Considering moons of Jupiter as observable entities and electron as an unobservable entity, he believes that we do not see the ‘electrons’ atomic theory shows us by microscope. Realist critics of van Fraassen without considering mentioned restriction and based on different reasons give examples such as extra solar planets and claim if we count these entities as observable entities we have to count electron as an observable entity as well. However, in this paper, based on the criterion of ‘existence or non-existence of observable reference by naked eye in suitable conditions’, which meet for all of the critic's examples, but does not meet for electron, we will argue, as van Fraassen has claimed, for counting electron as an unobservable entity