Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

• Javad Akbari ¹
• Mehdi Golshani ²

¹ faculty member of Sharif University, department of philosophy of science

² professor of physics and philosophy of science, Sharif University

Abstract

Since the publication of Scientific Image, van Fraassen has criticized scientific realism and, instead, introduced constructive empiricism as an appropriate alternative. Adhering to the tenet of empiricism that ‘experience is our only source of information about the world’, he considered acquiring any knowledge of the unobservable level of the world as impossible. According to van Fraassen, the realistic belief in the (approximate) truth of scientific theories has no epistemic basis; and, in this case, he only allowed belief in the empirical adequacy of these theories. The present assay explains and examines the key elements of constructive empiricism and contrasts it with scientific realism. We will indicate that van Fraassen’s argumentation in rejecting realism and defending his position is not able to provide the necessary and sufficient justifications for the replacement of scientific realism with constructive empiricism

Keywords

• van Fraassen
• constructive empiricism
• Scientific realism
• Inference to the Best Explanation
• directly observable
• scientific instruments