Philosophy of Science

Abstract Contrary to popular belief, the history of modern nationalism in Iran and the interest of Iranians in the modern concept of nationality goes back to the end of the Nasrid era and the Mozafari era; Three decades before the First World War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which is usually mistakenly referred to as the beginning of nationalism in Iran. It is a fact that the doctrine of nationalism in the era of Naseri and Mozafari, with a focus on "language" as a national unifying element, was taught long before the second half of Ahmad Shahi's era in three high schools: Dar al-Funun, Sepahsalar, and Political. It was from the intellectual atmosphere of these three schools and many foreign schools in the country that, in the company of "scientists" and "introducers", they put the two discourses of "one word" and "public education" as the foundation for political and social developments. And it was precisely from those discourses that the constitutional movement and the conquest of Tehran were objectified so that values ​​such as national authority, national law, a single language, justice and public education were promoted to the center of attention of Iranians. This article tries to show the contribution of the three high schools of Dar al-Funun, Sepahsalar and Political schools at the end of the Nasrid era and the Mozaffari era in introducing and promoting the idea of ​​Iranian nationalism and the rise of the modern concept of nation and nationality, so that based on it, another type of Iranian constitution influenced by modern European nationalism can be revealed.

Abstract The notion of “form of life” in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, despite its occurrence in diverse contexts, has become a focus of interpretive debate. The central question is whether a unified identity and general role can be extracted from the notion’s multiple uses, or whether such unity results from imposing an interpretive framework on the text. The article first examines its historical background, showing that “form of life” was used before Wittgenstein within different frameworks. It then examines five of Wittgenstein’s uses: imagining a language, the connection between language and activity, agreement in judgments, psychological phenomena, and 'what is given'. The analysis shows that contextual differences do not justify positing a single identity; in these uses, form of life is part of the description itself, rather than a metaphysical foundation or an independent means of accessing what is described. The article then examines Anna Boncompagni’s methodological interpretation, which assigns form of life a general identity as a 'philosophical tool'. It argues that the presence of an expression within a philosophical movement does not establish that it is a tool; its role must instead be understood from the descriptive movement itself and from the way in which a problematic picture is dissolved.

Abstract Bas van Fraassen, the distinguished philosopher of science, was awarded the Rolf Schock Prize in 2026 for developing a compelling empiricist stance toward science that has decisively moved beyond logical empiricism and shaped the debate on scientific realism. The Rolf Schock Prize stands as one of the most prestigious academic awards in fields lacking a Nobel Prize—including logic and philosophy—and is bestowed biennially by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. This article aims to trace the intellectual trajectory of van Fraassen within his overarching project of "purifying science from metaphysics" by reviewing his seminal works from formal logic to the philosophy of physics. The core of this project is constructive empiricism, which reduces the aim of science to "empirical adequacy" and limits the acceptance of theories to belief in this adequacy, without committing to the literal truth of unobservable entities. In the next step, van Fraassen criticizes the concept of laws of nature as a metaphysical heritage from the seventeenth century and proposes symmetry as a methodological guide free from ontological commitments. The modal interpretation of quantum mechanics, the voluntarist epistemology in The Empirical Stance, and the pragmatic theory of representation in Scientific Representation constitute subsequent links in this intellectual chain. Finally, it is argued that van Fraassen's de-metaphysicization of science stems not from skepticism, but from a deliberate strategy to safeguard the domain of faith and to open space for religious experience alongside scientific rationality. By focusing on van Fraassen's most influential works, this article offers a coherent picture of one of the most significant anti-realist alternatives in contemporary philosophy of science.

Abstract This article critically examines the demarcation problem between science and non-science, challenging essentialist traditions in the philosophy of science by arguing that science possesses no fixed, universal essence, substance, or nature. Drawing on Popper, the positivists, and post-positivist critics, the author demonstrates that demarcation criteria such as falsifiability are conventional. From the author's perspective, science is a human construct—historically situated, culturally embedded, and shaped by complex networks of attachments and indigenous interpretations. Within this framework, Javadi Amoli's essentialist approach is criticized for offering either frozen, mummified definitions of science or imaginary conceptions bearing no relation to historically actualized science. The article ultimately concludes that science emerges from human efforts to understand phenomena within their lived contexts, making any definitive, trans historical boundary between science and non-science impossible.

Abstract The resurgence of “essence” in contemporary analytic metaphysics is frequently construed as a unified movement reviving the final cause against Humean metaphysics. This paper demonstrates that such a view is inaccurate, as contemporary essentialism comprises two distinct branches: Brian Ellis’s scientific essentialism, which reduces essences to physical-chemical dispositional properties while denying final causes; and David Oderberg’s real essentialism, which draws upon hylomorphic substantial form to defend both organic and inorganic teleology. Comparing these approaches yields three core conclusions. First, Ellis’s principal contribution lies in dismantling “passivism” and securing the metaphysical necessity of laws, rather than demonstrating teleology. Second, Ellis’s own ontology entails intrinsic directedness; thus, his rejection targets merely an extrinsic, intentionalist reading of teleology. Third, bridging physical directedness and authentic teleology requires three components: distinguishing end from consequence, self-directedness, and normativity—criteria satisfied exclusively within Oderberg’s system. Consequently, this paper articulates an asymmetric division of labour model with its legitimating conditions. The convergence of a secular and a neo-Thomist philosopher reveals that banishing the final cause is not an empirical discovery but an unexamined metaphysical dogma, thereby providing a robust ground for natural theology.

Abstract Object-oriented ontology, by moving beyond the centrality of the human subject, stresses the ontological autonomy of objects and the notion that their being forever withdraws from all relations. Graham Harman—its leading proponent—while drawing on Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory, nevertheless subjects it to criticism in multiple works. Harman argues that Latour reduces objects to networks of relations and further claims that Latour wrongly presumes that relations are reciprocal. He also maintains that actor-network theory, and more broadly any philosophy of “becoming,” cannot adequately address issues of identity and stability within change.

This article examines object-oriented ontology and evaluates Harman’s objections to actor-network theory. I contend that Harman’s account of actor-network theory in the critiques under discussion is not sufficiently accurate and that, in several places, he conflates distinct concepts. The article concludes that the core divergence between the two approaches lies less in their views on the existence and interrelatedness of objects than in their methodological commitments.