Philosophy of Science

Abstract Object-oriented ontology, by moving beyond the centrality of the human subject, stresses the ontological autonomy of objects and the notion that their being forever withdraws from all relations. Graham Harman—its leading proponent—while drawing on Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory, nevertheless subjects it to criticism in multiple works. Harman argues that Latour reduces objects to networks of relations and further claims that Latour wrongly presumes that relations are reciprocal. He also maintains that actor-network theory, and more broadly any philosophy of “becoming,” cannot adequately address issues of identity and stability within change.

This article examines object-oriented ontology and evaluates Harman’s objections to actor-network theory. I contend that Harman’s account of actor-network theory in the critiques under discussion is not sufficiently accurate and that, in several places, he conflates distinct concepts. The article concludes that the core divergence between the two approaches lies less in their views on the existence and interrelatedness of objects than in their methodological commitments.