Philosophy of Science

Abstract There are notable similarities between the later thought of Wittgenstein on language games and grammar, and Kuhn's idea of the incommensurability of scientific paradigms, which have led to comparative studies between the two. One of the issues both philosophical perspectives confront is relativism, and there are numerous problems that relativism raises for a philosophical idea. A common aspect of the ideas of these two philosophers is the centrality of conceptual and linguistic frameworks concerning issues such as meaning, understanding, and truth. This aspect has drawn attention from certain interpretations that consider Wittgenstein and Kuhn as proponents of relativism. Here, I will examine the issue of relativism, focusing on its challenges for understanding and truth, centering on the works of two interpreters of Wittgenstein and Kuhn: Hans Glock and Moyal-Sharrock. There are similarities and differences in the interpretations of Wittgenstein and Kuhn between these two interpreters. From the author's perspective: (1) Neither Kuhn's incommensurability nor Wittgenstein's idea of grammar prevents understanding between two paradigms or linguistic frameworks. (2) There is a disagreement between Wittgenstein and Kuhn regarding the precedence of language on one hand, and mental classifications on the other. (3) Wittgenstein's idea of common behavior of mankind does not lead to relativism in truth. Based on these three positions, the interpretations of Wittgenstein and Kuhn by Glock and Moyal-Sharrock have been criticized.

Abstract Objectivity is a crucial property (norm) in modern science, ensuring that scientific ideas are accessible, measurable, and truth-valued due to their focus on objective matters. However, achieving objectivity in the social sciences is more challenging than in the natural sciences, given the complexity of the phenomena they aim to explain, such as meaningful human actions. Approximately a century ago, Max Weber endeavored to demonstrate how social sciences could attain objectivity. According to Weber, "All knowledge of cultural reality, as may be seen, is always knowledge from particular points of view." In the social sciences, objectivity becomes meaningful when connected to specific perspectives chosen prior to scientific activities. Values, often not considered within the realm of scientific activity, address the issue of selecting the appropriate perspective. This article describes, analyzes, and compares Max Weber's two interpretations of objectivity. Although both interpretations regard Weber's objectivity as a norm, each considers a different and opposing type of norm. This article aims to illustrate how Weber's conception of objectivity can provide valuable insights into later debates concerning the relationship between the social and rational levels of science, by highlighting the differences between these two attitudes and interpretations.

Abstract Symmetry is one of the most fundamental and widely used concepts in modern physics, playing a pivotal role in the development of new theories, particularly in areas such as general relativity, quantum field theory, and the unification of physical forces. In modern physics, the concept of symmetry extends beyond geometric and observable symmetries. In its contemporary sense, symmetry is defined as invariance under specific transformations and is more concerned with the laws of physics and theoretical structures than with physical objects. In other words, in the realm of theoretical physics, symmetry functions as a meta-law, imposing constraints on physical laws and shaping the overall structure of theories. The central role of this concept in modern physics has given rise to diverse philosophical discussions. This article provides an overview of the concept of symmetry, examines its historical introduction into modern physics, and explores how physicists have utilized this concept. Finally, it addresses the philosophical implications and issues associated with symmetry.

Abstract The nature and essence of scientific models have been the focus of attention and study by philosophers of science in the last three decades. The reason for this is the central and prominent role of models in scientific activity. What we consider models to be has a direct impact on our realist or anti-realist attitude towards science, the explanation of scientific representation, the understanding of the relevance and relationship of models and theories, and the answers to philosophical questions raised regarding the ontology of scientific entities and scientific epistemology. In this conceptual paper, a plan for the nature of scientific models is proposed, based on the approach and teachings of critical rationality and the philosophy of artifacts. In this plan, models are assumed to be objective products of the human mind that are designed, constructed, and used as artifacts for a specific purpose, and this intentionality is an important part of their nature.

Abstract Emile Durkheim's positivist sociology can be understood within the framework of Kant's transcendental idealism, contrary to the common misconception in our scientific community that Durkheim's positivism is merely an extension of empiricism. Durkheim critiques empiricism and the narratives of British positivism, while simultaneously formulating the subject of sociology—social reality—under the concept of "collective representation." The notion of "representation" is rooted in the Copernican revolution and Kant's transcendental idealism. Influenced by the 19th-century French neo-Kantian philosopher Renouvier, Durkheim considers the concept of representation as foundational to sociological knowledge. Thus, Durkheim's positivism emphasizes not just the empirical approach, but also the experiential context within the Kantian framework. The objectivity of Durkheim's sociology is realized through the process of positioning in the Kantian sense.

Abstract Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM), as the current account of medicine, considers the latest evidence published in medical journal as the basis for medical interventions. In this case, articles that report the result of Randomized Controlled Trials (RCT), have a special place. But in recent years, it has been found that the result of many RCTs aren’t repeated in an effort for replication. This phenomenon, known as the replication crisis, has created some problem for EBM. In this article, reasons are presented that the consensus of the medical community in two process, reduce this conflict to the extent that it should still be accepted that EBM has a higher position than its competitors. The first process in which the consensus of experts is present includes the process of conducting RCTs, the process publication, and the process of entering them into medical interventions. Among other things, it is pointed out that in cases where there are more general conflicts between RCTs, meta-analyses cannot provide a partical solution, and there is no other way to choose between conflicting RCTs than to appeal to the consensus of the medical community. The second process, which is the process of comparing EBM, includes legal issues at a higher level, which are mentioned in the summary section only in the from of a hypothetical situation.

Abstract In humoral medicine, the symptoms of many diseases were localized, but from the pathological point of view, the disease was not localized. In the 18th and 19th centuries, by using the anatomo-clinical method, the disease was localized both in terms of clinical manifestations - symptoms and signs - and in terms of pathology. In other words, the relationship between a disease and its pathological cause (anatomical or physiological) was the most important work that clinical medicine did in the late 19th century. In this article, we first examine the philosophical foundations of this method - sensualism and the philosophy of observation - in the atmosphere of those centuries. Then we describe the characteristics of its two main components, i.e., clinical examination and pathological analysis. Although dissection of the human body was common during the Renaissance period, it was not done for the purpose of etiology of diseases. From the 18th century onwards, under the influence of the philosophy of observation, this doctrine was formed that the cause of the disease corresponds to a lesion under the external organs of the body. Therefore, the dissection was a fundamental step towards the pathology of diseases. In this way, the data obtained from detailed clinical examination and pathological analysis formed two important parts of case reports, which are one of the pillars of research and new achievements of clinical medicine. In the last part of the article, we examine the structure and characteristics of these types of reports.

Abstract Science seeks to explain reality, while technology aims to alter or intervene in reality based on intentional goals. This raises critical questions about the relationship between science and technology and their respective roles in advancing one another. Building upon David Miller’s article, Putting Science to Work, and adopting the framework of critical rationalism, this study argues that science is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for technological advancement. Science is conjectural and can serve as a source of critique, inspiration, or, at times, misdirection for technology. In complementing Miller’s perspective, we further contend that technology is neither sufficient nor logically necessary for scientific progress. Technology can play a critical role in advancing science, with certain technologies acting as sources of inspiration for scientific inquiry. Conversely, technological advancements can, in certain cases, impede the progress of science. This nuanced perspective offers a deeper understanding of the interplay between these two domains.

Abstract The question about the problem of consciousness has a long-standing approach in philosophy. Today, with the advancement of artificial intelligence, questions such as the possibility of artificial intelligence being aware have been raised. Although consciousness is an unsolved problem in science and philosophy, the claim of its existence in the future of artificial intelligence has been raised by scientists and futurists. Ray Kurzweil is one of the people who predicts artificial intelligence in the not-too-distant future like the human brain. On the other hand, Hubert Dreyfus, with a phenomenological and philosophical approach, rejects the possibility of realizing artificial intelligence in a conscious and human-like way in the future and considers it unrealizable. Kurzweil's approach to artificial intelligence is computational and scientific, and Dreyfus' approach is philosophical and phenomenological. Each of them defends their claim by referring to some reasons.

Abstract Predictive processing explains perception centered on prediction. Hierarchical perceptual system creates top-down predication about the external world. The approach is a strong computational theory that links perception with action and attention. The paper studies the relationship between predictive processing and direct perception. Perception is direct if the object of perception is a mind-independent object in the external world. There are various viewpoints concerning the relationship. But three general interpretations could be discriminated. According to the first interpretation, the object of perception is the best prediction. The second interpretation declares perception as causal inference, in which the external object is a hidden cause and there is always a possibility of error in the perceptual causal chain. The third interpretation indicates that predictive processing provides openness of the world for the subject. The paper argues that the first interpretation is erroneous and the second could not lead to indirectness. By confirming the third interpretation, it could be uttered that perception via predictive processing directs toward the world, not that the theory constitutes a barrier for the encounter.

Abstract This article offers a critical reassessment of the dominant narrative in architectural historiography, challenging the myth of the “heroic architect” as the sole originator of structural innovation. Through a three-phase framework—from intuitive imitation to analytical abstraction and finally mutual interplay—it argues that modern structural breakthroughs were not products of isolated genius but the result of a sustained intellectual, philosophical, and experimental tradition. Nature, in this context, functioned not merely as aesthetic inspiration but as an epistemological and procedural partner in design thinking. The widespread use of small-scale models in the twentieth century architecture is examined as a pivotal tool for generating architectural knowledge. By revisiting the works of prominent figures of tectonic architecture, the study demonstrates how architectural form emerged from interdisciplinary discourse and cultural continuity rather than rupture. Ultimately, innovation is recast as a collective and cumulative process, embedded within a deeper heritage of dialogue between human reason and natural order.

Abstract The relationship between science and religion remains one of the most significant epistemological challenges in contemporary discourse. This research presents a novel approach to categorizing science-religion relations based on their degree of consonance and dissonance. The methodology involves case study analysis of concrete examples gathered over seven years (2016-2024) through interdisciplinary discussions with graduate students in basic sciences and philosophy. We demonstrate that science-religion relations can be classified into three main categories: ‘consonance’ (exemplified by evidence for cosmic beginning and fine-tuning), ‘indifference’ (comprising the majority of cases), and ‘dissonance,’ which further divides into two subcategories: resolvable dissonance (such as certain evolutionary interpretations) and crisis-inducing dissonance (as in extreme physicalist-neo-Darwinian interpretations). Employing a musical metaphor, we illustrate how each type of relationship serves a distinct function, with even dissonant cases potentially catalyzing scientific progress and epistemological reconsideration. We argue for replacing traditional binary logic (true/false) with a fuzzy logic approach that recognizes a broad spectrum from consonance to dissonance in analyzing science-religion relations.