Document Type : Research Paper
Author
Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies
Abstract
There are notable similarities between the later thought of Wittgenstein on language games and grammar, and Kuhn's idea of the incommensurability of scientific paradigms, which have led to comparative studies between the two. One of the issues both philosophical perspectives confront is relativism, and there are numerous problems that relativism raises for a philosophical idea. A common aspect of the ideas of these two philosophers is the centrality of conceptual and linguistic frameworks concerning issues such as meaning, understanding, and truth. This aspect has drawn attention from certain interpretations that consider Wittgenstein and Kuhn as proponents of relativism. Here, I will examine the issue of relativism, focusing on its challenges for understanding and truth, centering on the works of two interpreters of Wittgenstein and Kuhn: Hans Glock and Moyal-Sharrock. There are similarities and differences in the interpretations of Wittgenstein and Kuhn between these two interpreters. From the author's perspective: (1) Neither Kuhn's incommensurability nor Wittgenstein's idea of grammar prevents understanding between two paradigms or linguistic frameworks. (2) There is a disagreement between Wittgenstein and Kuhn regarding the precedence of language on one hand, and mental classifications on the other. (3) Wittgenstein's idea of common behavior of mankind does not lead to relativism in truth. Based on these three positions, the interpretations of Wittgenstein and Kuhn by Glock and Moyal-Sharrock have been criticized.
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