Philosophy of Science

Abstract Proponents of objectivity, by calling upon scholars and obliging them to eliminate subjective characteristics in their engagement with natural and social phenomena, have promised the attainment of "true" theories that correspond and align with "reality." Numerous philosophers and scholars of science have critiqued this claim and rejected the possibility of its realization. With the emergence of artificial intelligence systems, and owing to their remarkable and unprecedented capabilities, the question of the feasibility of achieving objectivity is once again raised. This article examines the concept of objectivity by reflecting on prominent conceptions of artificial intelligence, particularly its applications in the field of urban planning—systems which, according to Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig's classification, fall under the category of those that "act rationally." It appears that in supervised forms of AI systems, the realization of objectivity is impossible for several reasons, including the value alignment problem. In unsupervised forms, the influence of subjective or intersubjective factors becomes deeper and more complex. Technological efforts to approach this goal in more advanced AI systems are not only improbable but would also approximate a dangerous condition.

Abstract The question of the reality of social kinds—such as money, nationality, and gender—is a central issue in social ontology. This paper defends a framework we call gradational realism, according to which the reality of social kinds is neither absolute nor binary but varies according to the degree to which four operational criteria are satisfied. These criteria are: (1) explanatory–predictive role, meaning that removing the social kind would reduce our ability to explain or predict social phenomena; (2) intersubjective and institutional stability, meaning that agents and institutions consistently reproduce the kind; (3) structural adequacy, whereby institutional rules and material or documentary anchors support its stabilization; and (4) empirical tractability, meaning that the kind can be systematically assessed and investigated. Three case studies—money, group type II, and the state—show that social kinds possess different degrees of reality: money and the state exhibit strong reality, whereas group type II has a moderate and conditional reality. The proposed framework enables a shift from absolutist judgments to gradational and structure-sensitive evaluations of social kinds.

Abstract In the development of risky technologies, such as genetic modification organisms, the issue is that the value of safety cannot be ethically ignored and the users/consumers of risky technological artifacts should not be exposed to a risk beyond a certain threshold. On the other hand, technology policymakers generally view ethical considerations as abstract claims and as obstacles to economic and technological growth. All together considering ethical considerations and the perspectives of all stakeholders in policymaking on risky technologies, without leading to the halt of these projects, requires a multilateral, multi-layered and well-ballanced approach. To this end, this article proposes a policy approach corresponding to John Rawls' philosophical theory, and finally, within this framework, the process of developing genetic modification organisms in Iran and its challenges are examined.

Abstract This article explores the role of the concept of "moral sensibility" in the relationship between mind and reality within the framework of the idea of liberation as articulated by Theodor Adorno. This exploration is situated in relation to the question of how a philosophical theory of ethics can become a material force in society, meaning a force that not only guides agents' actions at the epistemic level but also motivates them materially at the level of will. The article compares Kant’s concept of Categorical Imperative, which emphasizes the universality and unconditionality of moral obligations, with alternative philosophical perspectives that assert the conditioned nature of ethics and emphasize its rootedness in human desires and emotions. Through this comparison, it underscores the importance of formulating the question of moral requirements, including moral sensibility, in terms of the "problem of normativity" and positions liberation as a fundamental element of ethical life in modern society. Utilizing Fabian Freyenhagen’s thesis of "negative Aristotelianism," the article emphasizes the necessity of recognizing the "bad" as the starting point for ethical critique while simultaneously challenging the limitations of overly simplistic frameworks that focus solely on basic human needs through a critique of Freyenhagen’s reading of Adorno. By incorporating insights regarding the unconscious and the socio-historical context, it demonstrates how moral sensibility is shaped not only by rational reflection but also by deeper psychological and social forces. Ultimately, the argument advocates for a more nuanced understanding of moral agency that emphasizes the interplay between individual experiences and social structures, thereby offering an account of moral sensibility that acknowledges both the subjective conditions of possibility for ethics and the real conditions of possibility for ethics.

Abstract The transformation of reading tools and text medium —from printed paper books to e-readers and digital screens— is not merely a technological shift; it brings about a profound change in the perceptual and cognitive experience of the human reader. This article, drawing on contemporary phenomenological approaches in cognitive science, introduces and analyzes the concept of “embodied reading.” This concept highlights how the act of reading, depending on its material substrate, engages the reader’s mind and body in different ways and shapes their semantic experience. In traditional reading, not only vision but all human senses are activated in encountering the book, serving as material anchors for memorizing and decoding information. This sensory engagement creates a spatial and temporal sense of presence for the text, functioning as a scaffold for imagination and mental imagery. Language, too, is saturated with orientational and embedded metaphors. We learn and understand language through our bodily interaction with the world, and we recall our perceptual and emotional experience through recollection of our bodily situation in the environment. In contrast, digital texts, by reducing materiality and physicality, diminish this sensory involvement and challenge the cognitive and memory structures associated with it. Moreover, the weakening of the book’s integrity and coherence as a unified entity affects the reader’s sense of familiarity and control. Thus, different reading technologies and media are not mere carriers of information; they have specific affordances for the practice of reading and lead to different user experiences.

Abstract In the history of modern psychology, Freud appears as a thinker who stands at the point of rupture between philosophy and Kantian science, a point at which the Cartesian conscious subject could no longer be the bearer of the whole truth. This article argues that Freud’s turn from consciousness to the unconscious, rather than being a mere shift of focus from the conscious to the unconscious, is a response to the internal crisis of a psychology of consciousness and to the critique of the doctrine that identifies consciousness with the mental. This turn is deeply intertwined with Freud’s engagement with the German tradition (from Leibniz to Nietzsche) and with the physiological concepts of the Helmholtzian school.
Using a historical-philosophical method and drawing on Freud’s primary texts and related sources, the paper shows that the Freudian unconscious is neither a return to a metaphysical “soul” nor a reduction of the psyche to biological mechanisms but is instead conceived through the gaps and dysfunctions of consciousness, thereby transforming the very object of psychological science. It concludes that Freudian psychoanalysis should be understood as a radical alternative to a psychology of consciousness—one that is situated between philosophy and physiology, grounded in clinical experience and the analysis of the failures of consciousness, and that thereby makes possible a science of the unconscious.

Abstract For the ancients, the Euclidean axiom system was a desirable model for deductive system building. Avicenna used this model to construct a metaphysical propositional system. However, some have ruled out the possibility of constructing such a system for metaphysics and have considered the attempt to construct such a system to be a mistake. The issue that this article has tackled is posed in the form of the question of how and under what possibility did Avicenna construct a deductive propositional system for metaphysics? This issue is of great importance and necessity in that it questions the conditions of possibility of the first deductive propositional system of metaphysics. In order to answer this question, the present article first examines the structure of the propositional system of Avicenna's metaphysics with regard to its "components" and "order" in a descriptive-analytical manner, and then searches for the possible conditions for its realization. According to Avicenna's scientology, metaphysics based on the lemma method should only use conventional principles. However, metaphysics based on the immediate method also has the possibility of using axioms. According to Avicenna, metaphysics using the lemma method is possible in itself, but difficult in practice. This difficulty, on the one hand, and educational purposes, on the other hand, have caused Avicenna to resort to the immediate method in addition to the lemma method; and thus, to form a "conventional principle-subjective principle" structure. The results of the article show that the structuring of Avicenna's propositional system of metaphysics is possible only within the combined framework of these two methods. And this combination is also possible based on the theory of issuance in ontology and the theory of knowledge in Ibn Sina's epistemology.