amir haji zade
Abstract
Kyle Stanford poses a new challenge to scientific realism, known as the new pessimistic induction. According to him, for every scientific theory, there are "unconceived alternative theories" that go beyond the understanding of scientists; Therefore, one can never be realistic about the unobservable entities ...
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Kyle Stanford poses a new challenge to scientific realism, known as the new pessimistic induction. According to him, for every scientific theory, there are "unconceived alternative theories" that go beyond the understanding of scientists; Therefore, one can never be realistic about the unobservable entities of theories. This article tries to defend scientific realism against Stanford's argument by emphasizing the convergence of successful theories in the history of science. This article emphasizes that under the new pessimistic induction, given the unlimited number of unconceived alternative theories to any successful theory, the possibility of "matching" and "unifying" independent theories will be very unlikely. Whereas in the history of science, we see frequent examples of successful theories being linked. We also try to defend the idea of convergence against critiques.
maryam ansari bonab; Ali Reza Mansouri
Abstract
Mathematical entities, in physics, are used to represent the ontology of theories. But there is a distinction between mathematical entities and physical entities which mathematics refers to, and ignoring this distinction leads to strange and false conclusions. This paper aims to realize, in a realistic ...
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Mathematical entities, in physics, are used to represent the ontology of theories. But there is a distinction between mathematical entities and physical entities which mathematics refers to, and ignoring this distinction leads to strange and false conclusions. This paper aims to realize, in a realistic interpretation, what the wavefunction, as a mathematical entity, refers to.. It is emphasized that the confusion of the wave function as a mathematical element with the physical state leads to a strange conclusion that the dimensions of the physical space are in direct correspondence with the mathematical dimensions, or the configuration space is a real physical space. Moreover,It is suggested, that determination of the ontological status of the wave function needs a theory to connect and explain the relation between local beables and quantum state.
saeid masoumi
Volume 7, Issue 14 , April 2018, , Pages 133-156
Abstract
The most important argument against scientific realism is pessimistic meta –induction. One of the main task of scientific realists is to make an effective rebuttal to this argument. In this paper we formulate a form of the argument, then consider the most important rebuttal that make against it, ...
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The most important argument against scientific realism is pessimistic meta –induction. One of the main task of scientific realists is to make an effective rebuttal to this argument. In this paper we formulate a form of the argument, then consider the most important rebuttal that make against it, concisely. Our claim is that the structural realism rebuttal is the most acceptable one, but its thesis, which is that what is preserve in the theory change is structure and science just represent the structural relations in the world, must be evaluated by considering scientific theories case by case in all scientific domain, such as physics , biology, chemistry, etc
saeid masoumi
Volume 6, Issue 2 , April 2017, , Pages 125-155
Abstract
Having considered those positions in which it seems quantum mechanics conflicts with scientific realism, we will show that through taking the stance most philosophers of science currently have on the concept of realism, and if one takes this realistic stance about scientific theory, one can have a realistic ...
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Having considered those positions in which it seems quantum mechanics conflicts with scientific realism, we will show that through taking the stance most philosophers of science currently have on the concept of realism, and if one takes this realistic stance about scientific theory, one can have a realistic view about quantum mechanics. Regarding to the scientific and the philosophical literature on quantum mechanics we may distinguish three kinds of scientific realism of which just two kinds conflict with quantum mechanics. So in one sense quantum mechanics is compatible with scientific realism
Javad Akbari; Mehdi Golshani
Volume 6, Issue 11 , September 2016, , Pages 1-36
Abstract
Since the publication of Scientific Image, van Fraassen has criticized scientific realism and, instead, introduced constructive empiricism as an appropriate alternative. Adhering to the tenet of empiricism that ‘experience is our only source of information about the world’, he considered ...
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Since the publication of Scientific Image, van Fraassen has criticized scientific realism and, instead, introduced constructive empiricism as an appropriate alternative. Adhering to the tenet of empiricism that ‘experience is our only source of information about the world’, he considered acquiring any knowledge of the unobservable level of the world as impossible. According to van Fraassen, the realistic belief in the (approximate) truth of scientific theories has no epistemic basis; and, in this case, he only allowed belief in the empirical adequacy of these theories. The present assay explains and examines the key elements of constructive empiricism and contrasts it with scientific realism. We will indicate that van Fraassen’s argumentation in rejecting realism and defending his position is not able to provide the necessary and sufficient justifications for the replacement of scientific realism with constructive empiricism
Mirsaeid Mousavi Karimi; Jahangir Moazenzade
Volume 6, Issue 11 , September 2016, , Pages 127-148
Abstract
Van Fraassen as an empiricist believes that ‘observation’ is perception of something without instruments. On the other hand, as a constructive empiricist, he adds a constraint based on which if something is observable does not automatically imply that its observing conditions are ready now. ...
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Van Fraassen as an empiricist believes that ‘observation’ is perception of something without instruments. On the other hand, as a constructive empiricist, he adds a constraint based on which if something is observable does not automatically imply that its observing conditions are ready now. Considering moons of Jupiter as observable entities and electron as an unobservable entity, he believes that we do not see the ‘electrons’ atomic theory shows us by microscope. Realist critics of van Fraassen without considering mentioned restriction and based on different reasons give examples such as extra solar planets and claim if we count these entities as observable entities we have to count electron as an observable entity as well. However, in this paper, based on the criterion of ‘existence or non-existence of observable reference by naked eye in suitable conditions’, which meet for all of the critic's examples, but does not meet for electron, we will argue, as van Fraassen has claimed, for counting electron as an unobservable entity
Mahdi Ghiasvand
Volume 1, Issue 2 , February 2012, , Pages 117-142
Abstract
Hempel's Dilemma is among several arguments posed against physicalism. Physicalists can respond to this dilemma in several ways. The present article aims to analyze Andrew Melnyk and Janice Dowell's responses based on their specific accounts about the conception of the term "physical". Melnyk's account ...
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Hempel's Dilemma is among several arguments posed against physicalism. Physicalists can respond to this dilemma in several ways. The present article aims to analyze Andrew Melnyk and Janice Dowell's responses based on their specific accounts about the conception of the term "physical". Melnyk's account is based upon a scientific realist's approach to natural sciences. We will focus on and discuss about that weather we can adopt such an approach to the present science and in particular the present physics or not. Dowell, however, defends an account according to witch ideal future physics should be replaced by an ideal science that has hallmarks of a scientific theory and differs in its subject matter. The author wants to show that these accounts, each one in respect to particular aspects, cannot play the given role in formulation of the physicalism thesis.
