In Defense of the Causal mechanical model

Esmaili, Mehdi

doi:10.30465/ps.2023.43464.1637

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Mehdi Esmaili

Master’s degree, Department of Philosophy of science, Department of Management, Science and Technology, Amirkabir university,

https://doi.org/10.30465/ps.2023.43464.1637

Abstract

Abstract: Hitchcock's counter-examples showed that Salmon's revised account of scientific explanation
cannot resolve the problem of explanatory relevance. In this model, interactions of causal processes
introduce different marks or conserved quantities. According to Hitchcock, Salmon's account fails to
distinguish marks or conserved quantities which are explanatorily relevant to the explanandum. The aim of
this paper is to examine Hitchcock's objection within Lipton's contrastive analysis and resolve explanatory relevance problem of salmon's account of scientific explanation. It is argued that by
selecting the appropriate foil and determining the difference between fact and foil, we can distinguish the
explanatory relevant marks or conserved quantities.

Keywords

References

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In Defense of the Causal mechanical model

References

References

Volume 12, Issue 2 - Serial Number 2February 2023Pages 1-22

Volume 12, Issue 2 - Serial Number 2
February 2023
Pages 1-22