Philosophy of Science

Searching for the Rationality of Richard Foley’s Views

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Mehdi Moinzadeh

Assistant professor of Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies

Abstract
Richard Foley is among the well-known theorists in epistemology and rationality. His theory of epistemology is known as ‘Subjective Foundationalism’. Studying his works, one finds out that the adoption of such a position in epistemology was due to the development of a rationality theory compatible with it. ‘Foundationalism’ is the distinctive feature of Foley’s epistemology which distinguishes it from views like coherentism. ‘Subjectivism’ is in opposition to ‘objectivist’ views like reliabilism. On the basis of this epistemological position, Foley puts forward an elaborate theory of rationality that being epistemic and, more importantly, being goal-oriented are among its main characteristics. He also replaces ‘reasonable belief’ with ‘rational belief’ in the theory of rationality. Involving concepts like ‘perspective’, ‘uncontroversial argument’, ‘deep reflection’, and ‘deepest epistemic standards’, Foley's theory of reasonableness associates a kind of subjectivism and relativism, but actually it is neither subjectivist nor relativist. This paper while investigates and reconstructs Foley's theory of rationality, attempts to disclose the rationality of the theory itself pursuing its implications. To do so, each of the elements of Foley's theory of rationality is referred to its existential foundation. The claim of the article on the rationale behind Foley's theory of reasonableness is that this rationality is not based on the validity of logical criteria but on the human existential states and elements

Keywords

Foley
subjectivist foundationalism
rationality
Theory of epistemic rationality
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Philosophy of Science
Volume 8, Issue 15 - Serial Number 15
September 2018
Pages 109-126

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