Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Ph.D. Student in Philosophy of Science, Institute for Research in Philosophy

2 Seid Mahmood Taheri, Professor of Mathematical Statistics, Faculty of Engineering, University of Tehran

Abstract

Recent works in the philosophy of science have generated an apparent conflict among theories attempting to explicate the nature of scientific representation. On one side, there are what one might call ‘mapping’ accounts, which emphasize objective relations (such as similarity, isomorphism, and homomorphism) among representations (theories, models, simulations, diagrams, etc.) and their target systems. On the other side, there are what one might call ‘inferential’ views, which emphasize agent’s roles in connection with these targets, such as interpretation and inference. In this paper we will examine the role of the principles of statistical inference in statistical modeling such as agent’s activities. There are three paradigms in statistical inference. The question is whether the representation of statistical models is sensitive to agent’s paradigm-choosing or not?

Keywords

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