Philosophy of Science

Rejection of the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction in Quine’s Viewpoint

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

ghasem purhasan 1
Mojtaba Etemadinia 2

1 Assistant Professor of Philosophy Department, Allameh Tabataba'i University

2 Ph.D Student in Comparative Philosophy, Allameh Tabataba'i University

Abstract
 
Quine’s article in 1951 entitled ‘Tow Dogmas of Empiricism’, based on an unexpected critique of analytic-synthetic distinction, rules against using ‘analyticity’ to explain the necessity and the a priori. Quine refused any attempt to display any distinction between analytic and synthetic statements without a vicious circle among them. According to his viewpoint, concepts as ‘synonymy’, ‘contradiction’ and ‘meaning’ which were used in the definition of the analytic statements, aren’t clear enough and there is a vicious circle between them. Quine argues that a holistic attitude toward any ‘individual statement’ entails that all propositions can be in touch, in some way, with the empirical boundary of our belief web. It implies the possibility of revision all statements and consequently the destruction of familiar distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. In this article we first review Quinen’s viewpoint on the rejection of analytic-synthetic distinction and then will examine the main challenges of his critique

Keywords

analytic statements
synthetic statements
synonymy
Necessity
a priori
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