Philosophy of Science

The Role of Moral Sensibility in Analyzing the Relationship Between Social Theory and Practice in Adorno’s Perspective: A Critique of Freyenhagen’s Reconstruction of Adorno

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

behrad moosavi ramezan zadeh

Ph.D. Candidate.in Philosophy of Science and Technology, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, Tehran, Iran

https://doi.org/10.30465/ps.2025.51740.1782
Abstract
This article explores the role of the concept of "moral sensibility" in the relationship between mind and reality within the framework of the idea of liberation as articulated by Theodor Adorno. This exploration is situated in relation to the question of how a philosophical theory of ethics can become a material force in society, meaning a force that not only guides agents' actions at the epistemic level but also motivates them materially at the level of will. The article compares Kant’s concept of Categorical Imperative, which emphasizes the universality and unconditionality of moral obligations, with alternative philosophical perspectives that assert the conditioned nature of ethics and emphasize its rootedness in human desires and emotions. Through this comparison, it underscores the importance of formulating the question of moral requirements, including moral sensibility, in terms of the "problem of normativity" and positions liberation as a fundamental element of ethical life in modern society. Utilizing Fabian Freyenhagen’s thesis of "negative Aristotelianism," the article emphasizes the necessity of recognizing the "bad" as the starting point for ethical critique while simultaneously challenging the limitations of overly simplistic frameworks that focus solely on basic human needs through a critique of Freyenhagen’s reading of Adorno. By incorporating insights regarding the unconscious and the socio-historical context, it demonstrates how moral sensibility is shaped not only by rational reflection but also by deeper psychological and social forces. Ultimately, the argument advocates for a more nuanced understanding of moral agency that emphasizes the interplay between individual experiences and social structures, thereby offering an account of moral sensibility that acknowledges both the subjective conditions of possibility for ethics and the real conditions of possibility for ethics.

Keywords: Theodor Adorno, Moral Sensibility, Normativity, Critical Theory, Liberation, Freyenhagen, McDowell



Introduction:
The persistent tension between social theory and practice remains a cornerstone of critical inquiry, particularly within the Frankfurt School tradition. The central problem identified by this research concerns the mechanism by which a philosophical theory can motivate agents at the level of the "will" toward the goal of liberation. In the contemporary era of late capitalism, Adorno observes a profound crisis: the mechanisms of rationalization have integrated individuals into an abstract social totality. In this state, empirical reality is increasingly filtered through administrative and scientific standards, stripping the human subject of spontaneous, unmediated experience.
This systemic integration leads to what Adorno describes as the "fossilization" of moral norms. Morality ceases to be a living, reflective process and instead becomes a set of rigid, externalized dictates. Consequently, "moral sensibility"—defined as the subjective capacity to perceive suffering and injustice—remains an unrealized potential. Actions are dictated by market logic and social structures rather than by ethical reflection. The introduction of this article establishes that for theory to become a "material force," it must address this atrophy of sensibility and provide a path for the subject to re-engage with the "damaged life" of modernity.

Materials & Methods:
The study employs a comparative and qualitative philosophical methodology, situating Adorno’s thought within a broader dialogue of diverse ethical traditions to clarify his unique materialist position. The "materials" for this analysis include several key frameworks:
· Kantian Ethics: The research contrasts Adorno’s materialist ethics with the Kantian Categorical Imperative. While Kant emphasizes universality, Adorno argues this formalist approach lacks the critical power to challenge structural dominance and risks becoming complicit with the status quo.
· Analytic Traditions (Philippa Foot): The article examines Foot’s hypothetical imperatives, which condition morality on human desires. Adorno finds this insufficient as it ignores how the social totality distorts those very desires.
· Perceptual Models (John McDowell): The "Space of Reasons" is analyzed as a model where moral sensibility is a capacity to "see" ethical requirements. Adorno critiques this by insisting that such sensibility is a socio-historical phenomenon, not a natural capacity.
· Freyenhagen’s Reconstruction: A primary methodological focus is the critical evaluation of Fabian Freyenhagen’s thesis of "Negative Aristotelianism". This reconstruction attempts to ground Adorno’s normativity in "epistemic negativism"—the idea that while we cannot define the "good life," we can ground ethics in the identification of the "bad" or "malfunctioning" aspects of social life.

Discussion & Result:
The core of the discussion centers on a rigorous critique of Freyenhagen’s "pure functionality". Freyenhagen suggests that agents can recognize systemic defects by observing what hinders basic human functions like survival and health. However, this research finds such a biological and minimalist framework to be overly reductionist.
By drawing on Jonathan Lear’s reading of Freud, the article demonstrates that human drives cannot be reduced to animal instincts. Unlike rigid animal instincts, human drives are imaginative and historically conditioned. Freyenhagen’s biological minimalism risks overlooking what Adorno calls the "promise of happiness"—the qualitative dimensions of freedom that transcend mere survival. By limiting ethics to the prevention of the "worst" (pain or death), Freyenhagen sidelines higher-order goods like aesthetic experience and intellectual freedom, which are essential sites of resistance against social totality.
Furthermore, the discussion highlights that any robust reading of Adorno must account for the unconscious. Adorno rejects the simple belief-desire model of action, pointing out that ideology and social power are inscribed deep within the subject’s psyche. This "internal colonization" often makes suffering invisible or normalized, even when it impairs functionality. Therefore, relying solely on a conscious identification of "the bad" is insufficient.
The result of this analysis points toward "micrology"—a self-reflective focus on the "particular" and "trivial" as a means to restore true experience. By immersing oneself in concrete objects in a non-dominating way, the subject can decode the historical forces that have suppressed human potential. This "self-reflection of reason" allows moral sensibility to act as a shield against the "ideology of abstractions" that dominates late capitalism.

Conclusion:
In conclusion, the article asserts that the gap between moral ideals and social outcomes in contemporary society has led to a widespread atrophy of ethical sensitivity. Adorno views the task of the theorist not as a detached academic exercise but as a vital social action aimed at bridging this gap.
Moral sensibility is defined as the critical-mental capacity to perceive hidden suffering and systemic injustices within an apparently "normal" social order. While critical theory does not offer "one-size-fits-all" solutions, it is obligated to strengthen this sensibility as a prerequisite for change. By facilitating a deeper understanding of suffering and the forces producing it, social theory serves as a catalyst for genuine liberation. Ultimately, any reconstruction of Adorno must move beyond minimalist functionalism to embrace the complex interplay between the somatic, the unconscious, and the social.

Keywords

Theodor Adorno
Moral Sensibility
Normativity
Critical Theory
Liberation
Freyenhagen
McDowell
Subjects
Adorno, T. W. (1973). Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton.
Adorno, T. W. (1977). ‘The Actuality of Philosophy’, Telos 10, 1: 120–33.
Adorno, T. W. (2005). Minima Moralia: Reflections on a damaged life. Verso.
Adorno, T. W. (2006). History and Freedom: Lectures 1964-1965. Polity Press.
Allison H. E. (2020). Kant's Conception of Freedom: A Developmental and Critical Analysis. Cambridge University Press.
Foot, P. (1972). Morality As a System of Hypothetical Imperatives. The Philosophical Review, 81(3), 305- 316.
Freyenhagen, F. (2013). Adorno’s Practical Philosophy: Living Less Wrongly. Cambridge University Press.
Geuss, R. (2005) Outside Ethics. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
Lear, J. (2005). Freud. Routledge.
McDowell, J. &. (1978). Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 52(1), 13–42.
McDowell, J. H. (1996). Mind and World: With a new introduction. Harvard University Press.
 

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