Philosophy of Science

Abstract In many cases, pseudosciences are developed by people who have scientific credit. Therefore, the importance of recognizing pseudoscience from proto-science and bad science is acknowledged in the recent literature about the Demarcation problem. By emphasizing this point, this paper focuses on what makes difference between pseudoscience and legitimate or fruitful scientific dissents. To suggest an answer, I appeal to Solomon’s social empiricism and her decision vector model. She defines a decision vector as everything that affects the output of a decision. Decision vectors include social, political, theoretical, or empirical factors that in a social level facilitate or hinder the development of a theory in a scientific society. Solomon employs this concept to suggest a normative framework for distribution of research efforts. According to this framework, a scientific dissent is useful for scientific progress, if the distribution of research efforts is proportional to the empirical success of all rival theories. By applying this framework to the case of Lysenkoism, I explore the implications of Solomon’s model for the problem of differentiating usual scientific dissents from pseudoscience. Then, I discuss the advantages of this analysis over the other theories of pseudoscience.

Abstract Max Weber's methodology, influenced by the Southwest Neo-Kantian school, emphasizes the distinction between natural sciences (Naturwissenschaft) and cultural sciences (Kulturwissenschaft). This distinction also relates to the general approach of interpretivists, who differentiate between the human sciences by understanding the meaning of human actions and the natural sciences by explaining them through causal laws. However, Weber used the words "causality" and "causal analysis" for his sociological analysis, and since explanation (in the most common definition) means the expression of cause, the idea has been created that Weber's method in cultural sciences has become more similar to the natural sciences through his focus on causal analysis.
In this article, we argue that Weber’s form of causal analysis remains committed to the Neo-Kantian distinction between the cultural sciences and the natural sciences. To support this, after describing Weber's methodology and causal approach, and comparing Weber's account with other philosophers who have offered interpretations of singular causation (e.g., David Lewis), we will demonstrate that the analysis of singular causation has features that can still uphold Weber’s distinction between the natural sciences and the cultural sciences. Finally, we aim to provide a criterion for differentiating these two types of science based on Weber's perspective.

Abstract In descriptive terms, metaphors are widely used in scientific discourse, including scientific explanations. However, the fact that metaphorical explanations are justified explanations needs to be analyzed. According to the dominant approach, a justified scientific explanation must be both understanding-enhancing and true. The fundamental challenge regarding the truth of metaphorical explanations is that metaphorical propositions are considered false because they do not correspond to reality, while scientific explanations are expected to be true. In this study, we first show how metaphorical explanations enhance understanding using Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphors. Then, we argue how, in addition to understanding-enhancing, metaphorical explanations can be accepted as true according to this theory. The latter argument relies on the fact that understanding takes primacy over truth and often relies on metaphor. Finally, we attempt to refine and strengthen the position of the truth of metaphorical explanations through four paths that we have called argument from dead metaphors, argument from partial versus complete correspondence, argument from epistemic cost, and argument from curve fitting.

Abstract Any modeling of technology transfer is based on a concept of technology. The idea that considers technology merely the physical structures of technical artifacts seeks the physical transfer of these artifacts in technology transfer. In this article, we show that although the evolution of technology transfer models shows their attention to the context and some cultural and social dimensions, they still suffer from some vague or incorrect assumptions. This is due to a conceptual confusion about technology and the lack of an integrated philosophical theory. To address this lack, we propose a philosophical theory of technology using the literature on the philosophy of technology. According to this theory, technology is a plan or solution to technical problems that is used by intentional agents to achieve goals and in which the causal power of physical or social reality is used. Hence, technology transfer involves creating similar intentions, employing similar plan, and transferring or creating similar artifacts to apply its causal power in the destination situation. This approach focuses our attention on the intentions, values, and norms of the destination society, creating social artifacts such as appropriate institutions or laws, the need for related technologies in the destination society, the need to reconstruct the technical plan proper to the destination situation, and other matters. These aspects remind us that before facilitating technology transfer, one must pay attention to the criticism of technology transfer.

Abstract Throughout intellectual history, the concept of “time” has always been regarded as one of the most fundamental ontological notions, inviting philosophical, religious, and scientific inquiry. Each intellectual tradition offers a unique narrative of time. If time is studied as a multidimensional phenomenon (not as an abstract concept), its traces become evident in Western philosophical thought, Islamic philosophical texts, and the laws of classical physics. This article employs a descriptive-analytical method to study the characteristics of the concept of time in Western philosophers’ (Plato, Aristotle), Islamic philosophers’ views (Ibn Bājja, Ibn Rushd), and Newtonian physics to elucidate their similarities and distinctions. A comparative analysis of the concept of time in these three frameworks—Western philosophy, Islamic wisdom, and Newtonian physics—reveals both shared and divergent dimensions, yielding a deeper understanding of time’s complex nature. Thus, this paper seeks to address the following question: How have philosophical definitions of time and the derived concepts paved the way for Newton to describe time based on mathematical choices? The findings of this research lead to a comparative framework that juxtaposes the aforementioned philosophers’ views with Newton’s and demonstrates their direct and indirect influences on Newtonian physics.