Abstract
Objectivity is a crucial property (norm) in modern science, ensuring that scientific ideas are accessible, measurable, and truth-valued due to their focus on objective matters. However, achieving objectivity in the social sciences is more challenging than in the natural sciences, given the complexity ...
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Objectivity is a crucial property (norm) in modern science, ensuring that scientific ideas are accessible, measurable, and truth-valued due to their focus on objective matters. However, achieving objectivity in the social sciences is more challenging than in the natural sciences, given the complexity of the phenomena they aim to explain, such as meaningful human actions. Approximately a century ago, Max Weber endeavored to demonstrate how social sciences could attain objectivity. According to Weber, "All knowledge of cultural reality, as may be seen, is always knowledge from particular points of view." In the social sciences, objectivity becomes meaningful when connected to specific perspectives chosen prior to scientific activities. Values, often not considered within the realm of scientific activity, address the issue of selecting the appropriate perspective. This article describes, analyzes, and compares Max Weber's two interpretations of objectivity. Although both interpretations regard Weber's objectivity as a norm, each considers a different and opposing type of norm. This article aims to illustrate how Weber's conception of objectivity can provide valuable insights into later debates concerning the relationship between the social and rational levels of science, by highlighting the differences between these two attitudes and interpretations.
Abstract
Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM), as the current account of medicine, considers the latest evidence published in medical journal as the basis for medical interventions. In this case, articles that report the result of Randomized Controlled Trials (RCT), have a special place. But in recent years, it has ...
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Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM), as the current account of medicine, considers the latest evidence published in medical journal as the basis for medical interventions. In this case, articles that report the result of Randomized Controlled Trials (RCT), have a special place. But in recent years, it has been found that the result of many RCTs aren’t repeated in an effort for replication. This phenomenon, known as the replication crisis, has created some problem for EBM. In this article, reasons are presented that the consensus of the medical community in two process, reduce this conflict to the extent that it should still be accepted that EBM has a higher position than its competitors. The first process in which the consensus of experts is present includes the process of conducting RCTs, the process publication, and the process of entering them into medical interventions. Among other things, it is pointed out that in cases where there are more general conflicts between RCTs, meta-analyses cannot provide a partical solution, and there is no other way to choose between conflicting RCTs than to appeal to the consensus of the medical community. The second process, which is the process of comparing EBM, includes legal issues at a higher level, which are mentioned in the summary section only in the from of a hypothetical situation.
Abstract
Emile Durkheim's positivist sociology can be understood within the framework of Kant's transcendental idealism, contrary to the common misconception in our scientific community that Durkheim's positivism is merely an extension of empiricism. Durkheim critiques empiricism and the narratives of British ...
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Emile Durkheim's positivist sociology can be understood within the framework of Kant's transcendental idealism, contrary to the common misconception in our scientific community that Durkheim's positivism is merely an extension of empiricism. Durkheim critiques empiricism and the narratives of British positivism, while simultaneously formulating the subject of sociology—social reality—under the concept of "collective representation." The notion of "representation" is rooted in the Copernican revolution and Kant's transcendental idealism. Influenced by the 19th-century French neo-Kantian philosopher Renouvier, Durkheim considers the concept of representation as foundational to sociological knowledge. Thus, Durkheim's positivism emphasizes not just the empirical approach, but also the experiential context within the Kantian framework. The objectivity of Durkheim's sociology is realized through the process of positioning in the Kantian sense.
Abstract
Science seeks to explain reality, while technology aims to alter or intervene in reality based on intentional goals. This raises critical questions about the relationship between science and technology and their respective roles in advancing one another. Building upon David Miller’s article, Putting ...
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Science seeks to explain reality, while technology aims to alter or intervene in reality based on intentional goals. This raises critical questions about the relationship between science and technology and their respective roles in advancing one another. Building upon David Miller’s article, Putting Science to Work, and adopting the framework of critical rationalism, this study argues that science is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for technological advancement. Science is conjectural and can serve as a source of critique, inspiration, or, at times, misdirection for technology. In complementing Miller’s perspective, we further contend that technology is neither sufficient nor logically necessary for scientific progress. Technology can play a critical role in advancing science, with certain technologies acting as sources of inspiration for scientific inquiry. Conversely, technological advancements can, in certain cases, impede the progress of science. This nuanced perspective offers a deeper understanding of the interplay between these two domains.
Abstract
In many cases, pseudosciences are developed by people who have scientific credit. Therefore, the importance of recognizing pseudoscience from proto-science and bad science is acknowledged in the recent literature about the Demarcation problem. By emphasizing this point, this paper focuses on what makes ...
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In many cases, pseudosciences are developed by people who have scientific credit. Therefore, the importance of recognizing pseudoscience from proto-science and bad science is acknowledged in the recent literature about the Demarcation problem. By emphasizing this point, this paper focuses on what makes difference between pseudoscience and legitimate or fruitful scientific dissents. To suggest an answer, I appeal to Solomon’s social empiricism and her decision vector model. She defines a decision vector as everything that affects the output of a decision. Decision vectors include social, political, theoretical, or empirical factors that in a social level facilitate or hinder the development of a theory in a scientific society. Solomon employs this concept to suggest a normative framework for distribution of research efforts. According to this framework, a scientific dissent is useful for scientific progress, if the distribution of research efforts is proportional to the empirical success of all rival theories. By applying this framework to the case of Lysenkoism, I explore the implications of Solomon’s model for the problem of differentiating usual scientific dissents from pseudoscience. Then, I discuss the advantages of this analysis over the other theories of pseudoscience.
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