Zahra Zargar
Abstract
In many cases, pseudosciences are developed by people who have scientific credit. Therefore, the importance of recognizing pseudoscience from proto-science and bad science is acknowledged in the recent literature about the Demarcation problem. By emphasizing this point, this paper focuses on what makes ...
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In many cases, pseudosciences are developed by people who have scientific credit. Therefore, the importance of recognizing pseudoscience from proto-science and bad science is acknowledged in the recent literature about the Demarcation problem. By emphasizing this point, this paper focuses on what makes difference between pseudoscience and legitimate or fruitful scientific dissents. To suggest an answer, I appeal to Solomon’s social empiricism and her decision vector model. She defines a decision vector as everything that affects the output of a decision. Decision vectors include social, political, theoretical, or empirical factors that in a social level facilitate or hinder the development of a theory in a scientific society. Solomon employs this concept to suggest a normative framework for distribution of research efforts. According to this framework, a scientific dissent is useful for scientific progress, if the distribution of research efforts is proportional to the empirical success of all rival theories. By applying this framework to the case of Lysenkoism, I explore the implications of Solomon’s model for the problem of differentiating usual scientific dissents from pseudoscience. Then, I discuss the advantages of this analysis over the other theories of pseudoscience.
Ghasem Khabbazian; Seyed Mohammad Mahdi Etemadoleslami
Abstract
In descriptive terms, metaphors are widely used in scientific discourse, including scientific explanations. However, the fact that metaphorical explanations are justified explanations needs to be analyzed. According to the dominant approach, a justified scientific explanation must be both understanding-enhancing ...
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In descriptive terms, metaphors are widely used in scientific discourse, including scientific explanations. However, the fact that metaphorical explanations are justified explanations needs to be analyzed. According to the dominant approach, a justified scientific explanation must be both understanding-enhancing and true. The fundamental challenge regarding the truth of metaphorical explanations is that metaphorical propositions are considered false because they do not correspond to reality, while scientific explanations are expected to be true. In this study, we first show how metaphorical explanations enhance understanding using Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphors. Then, we argue how, in addition to understanding-enhancing, metaphorical explanations can be accepted as true according to this theory. The latter argument relies on the fact that understanding takes primacy over truth and often relies on metaphor. Finally, we attempt to refine and strengthen the position of the truth of metaphorical explanations through four paths that we have called argument from dead metaphors, argument from partial versus complete correspondence, argument from epistemic cost, and argument from curve fitting.
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