فرا استقرای بدبینانه و واقع گرایی ساختاری

نوع مقاله: علمی-پژوهشی

نویسنده

استادیار پژوهشکده مطالعات بنیادین علم و فناوری دانشگاه شهید بهشتی

چکیده

فرا استقرای بدبینانه مهمترین استدلال علیه واقع گرایی علمی  است، به همین دلیل از وظایف اصلی واقع گرایان( احتمالا مهمترین وظیفه آنها ) پاسخ دادن به این برهان است. در این مقاله صورت بندی ای از این برهان ارائه می گردد و پاسخ های مختلف واقع گرایان در مورد آن اجمالاً بیان می شود. در میان این پاسخ ها پاسخ واقع گرایان ساختاری به عنوان پاسخ قابل قبول تر پذیرفته می شود. نکته مهم در مورد پاسخ واقع گرایان به استدلال فرا استقرای بدبینانه این است که واقع گرایان ساختاری باید با مطالعه مورد به مورد نظریه های علمی نشان دهند که ادعای آنها مبنی بر حفظ ساختارها محقق شده است.  

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Pessimistic meta- induction and structural realism

نویسنده [English]

  • saeid masoumi
چکیده [English]

The most important argument against scientific realism is pessimistic meta –induction. One of the main task of scientific realists is to make an effective rebuttal to this argument. In this paper we formulate a form of the argument, then consider the most important rebuttal that make against it, concisely. Our claim is that the structural realism rebuttal is the most acceptable one, but its thesis, which is that what is preserve in the theory change is structure and science just represent the structural relations in the world, must be evaluated by considering scientific theories case by case in all scientific domain, such as physics , biology, chemistry, etc

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Pessimistic meta-induction
  • Scientific realism
  • structural realism
  • special relativity
  • Newtonian mechanics
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