توطئة سکوت بررسی نقش ناظر ارجح در ناسازگاری نظریة نسبیت خاص و متافیزیک پویانگرانه

نوع مقاله: علمی-پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 موسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران

2 استادیار گروه مطالعات علم موسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفة ایران

چکیده

پس از انتشار مقالة پرنفوذ هیلاری پاتنم در سال 1967 با عنوان «زمان و هندسة فیزیکی»، بحث از نظریة نسبیت خاص در مناقشة میان دیدگاه ایستانگرانه و دیدگاه پویانگرانه به شکلی جدی در فلسفة زمان معاصر مطرح شد. پاتنم در این مقاله با استفاده از این نظریه استدلالی به سود دیدگاه ایستانگرانه طرح می‎کند. او در استدلال خویش مبتنی بر نظریة نسبیت خاص رابطة همزمانی را رابطه‌ای نامتعدی در نظر می‎گیرد. از این رو، برخی فلاسفه (برای نمونه بورن Bourn 2006 و کریک Craig 2008) تلاش کرده‏اند که از طریق دفاع از فرض وجود چهارچوبی به عنوان چهارچوب ارجح، و بنابراین وجود رابطة همزمانی هم‏ارزی، از دیدگاه پویانگرانه دفاع کنند. در این مقاله تلاش می‎شود پس از بررسی استدلال پاتنم و نیز استدلالات به سود فرض وجود چنین چهارچوبی، از طریق تمایز میان دیدگاه ایستانگرانة ضعیف و دیدگاه ایستانگرانة قوی، استدلال شود که فرض وجود چنین چهارچوبی هیچ سودی برای دیدگاه پویانگرانه ندارد.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

The Conspiracy of Silence: the role of assuming a privileged frame of reference in theincompatibility of the special theory of relativity and the dynamic model of reality

نویسندگان [English]

  • Hassan Amiriara 1
  • Amirehsan Karbasizadeh 2
1 PhD Student of Philosophy of Science Iranian Institute of Philosophy
2 Assistant Professor Department of Science Studies, Iranian Institute of Philosophy
چکیده [English]

1967, “time and physical” geometry, discussion about implications of the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) for the debate between Static vs. Dynamic models of temporal reality became serious in contemporary philosophy of time. In this article, Putnam provided an argument in favor of Static model by assuming the STR. By virtue of the STR, he assumed that the relation of simultaneity between events is a non-transitive relation. For this reason, some philosophers (e.g. Bourn 2006 and Craig 2008) have tried to defend the Dynamic model through defending a privilege frame of reference (and so, a transitive relation of simultaneity) in relativistic setting. In this paper, by distinguishing between weak static model and strong static model I will try to argue that why assuming a privileged frame of reference, even if exists, could not have any advantage for advocates of the dynamic m

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • : Simultaneity
  • Privileged frame of reference
  • Special Theory of Relativity
  • Dynamic Model
  • Static Model
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