Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Assistant Professor, Department of Science Studies, Hikmat and Philosophy Research Institute of Iran,

10.30465/ps.2024.48552.1719

Abstract

One aspect of naturalists' critique of contemporary analytic metaphysics is its reliance on philosophical and metaphysical intuitions. Many naturalists argue that, first, analytic metaphysics appeals to intuition as evidence, and second, there are many reasons why intuition cannot be a reliable source of knowledge. Defenders of analytic metaphysics have attempted to address this objection raised by naturalists in some ways. One response is to show that intuitions have a similar evidential role in physical sciences, just as they do in metaphysics. Jonathan Tallant has followed this approach. In this article, we will first outline the naturalist critique of metaphysics through an attack on intuition. Then we will look at some of the related responses to these critiques, with a specific focus on Tallant's approach. Finally, we will offer a critique of his argument. It is contended that Tallant's approach fails to provide a decisive answer to the objections of radical naturalists.

Keywords

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