Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Assistant Professor in Theology, Payamenoor University

Abstract

The classical problem of induction is one of the very known forms of Skepticism, which many philosophers have tried to solve or resolve it. Some epistemologists believe that Externalism could be used as a good approach to resolve the problem. They claim that ‘Process reliabilism’, the most important externalist theory, is less vulnerable to Skepticism than other theories, because of its epistemological fallibilism, and also taking modest and weak criteria to acquire knowledge. In this paper we will argue that externalist theories, including Process reliabilism, presuppose induction, so such theories don’t have considerable capabilities to solve or resolve the problem.

Keywords

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