Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.

Abstract

Carnap’s view on ontology had not yet rallied that Quine attacked it; and this has caused a dispute between two philosophers for more than half a century. The question remains: which one was/is right? In this article after reviewing Carnap’s view, I have recounted Quine’s critiques, here and there, to his stands under three titles. It is shown how Carnap’s view can be justified from these three critiques. Then, after considering that Quine has identified the position of the difference incorrectly, but not the different position, I have explained, In the midst of arbitration between two philosophers, although Carnap and Quine, both, do maintain ontological relativity, the former believes in ‘general relativity’, and the latter in ‘special relativity’. From another point of view, although two philosopher do maintain ontological skepticism, the former is ‘second level skeptic’, and the latter is ‘first level skeptic’. In the other words. I have shown how in ontological approach of two philosophers “the reason for the agreement is the same for disagreement”. Among these complexities the conclusion is taken that any unilateral arbitration, on strict agreement or disagreement, will be wrong.

Keywords

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