Explaining the two-dimensional semantics role in the Zombie conceivability argument

Delfani, Yasser; Hemmatimoghaddam, Ahmadreza

doi:10.30465/ps.2020.4626

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

¹ PhD student of Philosophy of Mind, Institute of Cognitive Sciences, Tehran, Campus.

² Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy of Mind, Institute of Cognitive Sciences, Tehran, Campus

https://doi.org/10.30465/ps.2020.4626

Abstract

Physicalism is a view that holds everything is physical and considers phenomenal consciousness as a physical phenomenon. The Zombie conceivability argument that has been raised by David Chalmers shows that phenomenal consciousness cannot be a physical phenomenon. As a result, the claim of physicalism is false. Two-dimensional semantics is one of the components of this argument that plays an important role in constructing the first and second premisses of this argument so that without it this argument would not be formed. It establishes primary conceivability in the first premise and primary and secondary possibility in the second premise so that provides the inference of secondary possibility from primary possibility. Our purpose in this article is to explain and clarify two-dimensional semantics and its role in this argument.

Keywords

References

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Philosophy of Science

Explaining the two-dimensional semantics role in the Zombie conceivability argument

References

References

Volume 9, Issue 18 - Serial Number 18
February 2020
Pages 49-68

Explaining the two-dimensional semantics role in the Zombie conceivability argument

References

References

Volume 9, Issue 18 - Serial Number 18February 2020Pages 49-68

Volume 9, Issue 18 - Serial Number 18
February 2020
Pages 49-68