Means-Ends Rationality, a Framework for Rationality of Science; a Review of Laudan's Theories of Scientific Rationality

Rabinia, Amin

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Amin Rabinia

M.A in philosophy of science, Amir Kabir University, Amin

Abstract

The problem of the rationality of science needs a framework to outline what rationality is and how it can be placed in scientific adventure. In this paper, I will try to show how we can provide such a (meta-level) framework using the notion of means-ends rationality. For doing so, we have to see science as a process in which there are given aims, and the rationality of achieving such aims could be justified in the light of the notion of means-ends rationality. This notion also is divided into two forms: instrumental rationality and holistic rationality. Here it will become clear that choosing a holistic notion of rationality is essential for having a sustainable account of scientific rationality. In the meantime, to propose a concrete example of the implementation of this framework, I do reconstruct Laudan’s models of scientific rationality using the conceptual frameworks of instrumental and holistic rationality. This will illustrate how his models grow through these two notions of rationality, and also how much the conceptual framework of means-ends rationality is capable to explain it.

Keywords

References

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Means-Ends Rationality, a Framework for Rationality of Science; a Review of Laudan's Theories of Scientific Rationality

References

References

Volume 5, Issue 10 - Serial Number 10March 2016Pages 21-37

Volume 5, Issue 10 - Serial Number 10
March 2016
Pages 21-37