Stephens’ Model inability to Limiting ‘Better Safe than Sorry’ Argument

Eatemad Al-Eslami Bakhtiari, Seyyed Mohammad Mahdi; Mousavi Karimi, Mirsaeid

Stephens’ Model inability to Limiting ‘Better Safe than Sorry’ Argument

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

Seyyed Mohammad Mahdi Eatemad al-Eslami Bakhtiari ¹

Mirsaeid Mousavi Karimi ²

¹ PhD student in Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology

² Associated Professor of Mofid University, Philosophy Department, mmkarimi@sharif.edu

Abstract

Some philosophers believe that natural selection guarantees the reliability of belief formation processes. From their point of view, belief formation processes that lead to true beliefs more than false ones are useful for organism reproduction and survival, and so are saved by natural selection. However, Stephen Stich’s argument, called “better safe than sorry”, shows that natural selection is not sufficient for the reliability of belief formation processes. Criticizing this argument, Cristopher L. Stephen has proposed a model that identifies situations in which natural selection supports true beliefs. He claims that the model limits Stich’s argument scope. In this article we argue that Stephens’ model is unable to limit Stich’s argument scope and has no essential determining role in the challenge of evolutionary based explanation between opponents and proponents for the reliability of belief formation processes.

Keywords

Stephens’ model

Evolution

Natural Selection

Better Safe than Sorry

Reliability

Belief Formation Processes

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