Introduction

The problem of demarcation — distinguishing science from non-science or pseudo-science — has long been a central concern in the philosophy of science. This article critically examines this problem by challenging the essentialist traditions that dominate both Western philosophy of science and certain Islamic philosophical discourses. The author argues that science possesses no fixed, universal essence, substance, or nature. Drawing on Popper, the positivists, and post-positivist critics, the article demonstrates that demarcation criteria such as falsifiability are conventional rather than discovered. From the author's perspective, science is a historically-conditioned, contingent human construct, culturally-embedded, and constituted by a complex network of contingent beliefs and values. Within this framework, Javadi Amoli's essentialist approach is criticized for offering either a frozen, mummified definition of science or imaginary conceptions bearing no relation to historically-actualized science.

The introduction critiques the widespread belief that epistemic dynamism and scientific flourishing require distinguishing "science" from "pseudo-science" or "non-science". The author fundamentally disagrees, arguing that no clear understanding exists of how knowledge or science could possess "dynamism" or "flourishing" in any well-defined sense. These concepts lack established positions in the literature of any of the three branches of science studies: history of science, sociology of scientific knowledge, and philosophy of science. The article notes that while some Enlightenment philosophers sought to identify a "core" or "essence" for science, Popper explicitly acknowledged that what is called "science" and who is called a "scientist" must always remain conventional or subject to decision. This insight stands in stark contrast to the widespread belief among academics and seminarians that falsifiability reveals the essence of scientific propositions.

Materials and Methods

The article employs a critical-analytical methodology, drawing on historical, philosophical, and sociological perspectives on science. The author examines primary texts from Popper, the positivists, and post-positivist critics, alongside contemporary Islamic philosophical discourse, particularly the works of Javadi Amoli. The analysis proceeds through several stages:

1. Critical examination of essentialist approaches: The author deconstructs the notion that science has a fixed essence, demonstrating that both the term "science" and the phenomenon of science have no reference to any essence or nature.

2. Analysis of the conventional nature of demarcation criteria: Drawing on Popper's explicit acknowledgment that his falsifiability criterion was a "proposal" for "agreement or convention," the article shows that demarcation criteria are not discoveries about the nature of science but rather conventional decisions.

3. Critique of Javadi Amoli's essentialism: The article examines Javadi Amoli's claim that "science, if it is science, never becomes un-Islamic" and that science is "essentially" compatible with religion. The author argues that such essentialist definitions either freeze science in a mummified form or offer imaginary conceptions unrelated to historically-actualized science.

4. Analysis of the role of beliefs and values: The author develops an alternative account of science as a human construct constituted by a complex contingent network of values and valuations --- consisting of ideals, aspirations, needs, and wants --- and belief-system --- consisting of intuitions, visions, presuppositions, hypotheses, theories, and concepts. This account draws on examples from the history of science and the social sciences, including the major divergent approaches of Durkheim, Marx, and Weber.

5. Examination of the implications for indigenous science: The article explores the implications of this anti-essentialist account for debates about "indigenous science," "Islamic science," "Christian science," and similar constructs.

Discussion and Results

The article's analysis yields several key results:

1. The impossibility of a universal demarcation criterion: The author demonstrates that no fixed, trans-historical, universal boundary between science and non-science is possible. The term "science" and the phenomenon of science have no inherent and recognizable reference to any essence or nature. Consequently, all interpretations of science are, in a sense, permissible and can at best share "family resemblances."

2. The conventional nature of science: Following Popper, the author argues that what we call "science" is always conventional or subject to the decisions of individuals or communities. The reason is that neither the term "science" nor the phenomenon of science points to any essence or nature; otherwise, after more than two centuries after the Enlightenment, we would have discovered it.

3. Science as human construct: Science is understood as the product of human efforts to achieve individual or collective ideals, aspirations, needs, and wants. These efforts necessarily involve understanding natural and social phenomena as they affect human life and the realization of human values and valuations. The subject matter and importance of phenomena are themselves conditioned by the everchanging networks of values and beliefs.

4. The role of values and beliefs: The author develops a detailed account of how human beings are not blank slates or mirror-like minds. Instead, we possess an extraordinarily complex and gradually evolving network of "attachments"(i.e. ideals, aspirations, needs and wants)  and "belief-system" that conditions and constitutes our conceptions, , experiences, and understanding of objects and phenomena. This explains the diversity and multiplicity of human experiences of a single phenomenon or event.

5. Critique of Javadi Amoli's essentialism: The article demonstrates that Javadi Amoli's essentialist approach, which posits fixed essences for science, religion, and the philosophy of science, either freezes these phenomena in a mummified form or offers imaginary conceptions unrelated to historical reality. The author argues that Javadi Amoli's claim that science is "essentially" compatible with religion is based on an imagined essence that has no relation to historically-actualized science.

6. The impossibility of "comprehensive and exclusive" definitions: The article shows that any attempt to provide a "comprehensive and exclusive" definition of science — one that includes all instances of science and excludes all non-science — is impossible. Such definitions either mummify science by removing it from historical development or offer imaginary conceptions that bear no relation to the actual science.

7. The dissolution of the demarcation problem: The author concludes that the demarcation problem, rooted in scientism or science-worship of the Enlightenment, has lost its legitimacy for two reasons: first, due to philosophical criticisms within the community of philosophers of science; second, and more fundamentally, due to criticisms from the postmodern movement directed at modernity and, consequently, at scientism as one of its three important pillars.

8. The nature of "indigenous science": The article argues that debates about "indigenous science," "Islamic science," "Christian science," and similar constructs are fundamentally misguided because they presuppose the existence of a universal, trans-social, trans-historical, absolute Science. Since no such science exists, the question of "indigenous science" becomes a question about how different human communities, with their diverse network of values and belief-systems, engage in the human activity of understanding phenomena.

9. The role of metaphysical ideas: The author emphasizes that metaphysical ideas, whether viewed positively or negatively, are always present in the foundation of what we call scientific thought. Scientists in the natural sciences cannot divest themselves of their contingent, rich, multi-dimensional, and evolving networks of values and views.

10. The critique of the distinction between "context of discovery" and "context of justification": The article shows that the positivist-negativist distinction between the "context of discovery" and the "context of justification" — which held that all non-epistemic and non-scientific factors are gradually eliminated in the "context of justification" — was widely criticized in the second half of the twentieth century in all three branches of science studies.

Conclusion

The article concludes that science emerges from human efforts to understand phenomena within their lived contexts, making any definitive, trans-historical demarcation between science and non-science impossible. The author argues that:

1. Science has no essence: Neither the term "science" nor the phenomenon of science has any essence, nature, or fixed substance. What we call "science" is always conventional or subject to the decisions of individuals or communities.

2. The demarcation problem is dissolved: The problem of demarcating science from non-science, rooted in Enlightenment scientism, has lost its legitimacy due to philosophical criticisms and postmodern critiques of modernity.

3. Science is a human construct: Science is a human, historically-constituted, culturally-embedded activity shaped by a complex network of values and views. It is the product of human efforts to understand phenomena as they affect human life and the realization of its ideals and aspirations.

4. Essentialist approaches are inadequate: Essentialist approaches, such as that of Javadi Amoli, either freeze science in a mummified form or offer imaginary conceptions unrelated to historically actualized science. Such approaches cannot account for the historical development, cultural diversity, and interpretive flexibility of science.

5. Indigenous science is a legitimate concept: The concept of "indigenous science" is legitimate insofar as it recognizes that different human communities, with their diverse networks of values and views, engage in the human activity of understanding phenomena in ways that reflect their specific historical, cultural, and social contexts.

6. The need for a new understanding: The article calls for a new understanding of science that recognizes its conventional, human, and historically-constituted nature, and that abandons the search for a universal, trans-historical demarcation criterion.