Philosophy of Science

Investigating the Relationship Between Institutional and Physical Facts: With an Emphasis on the Role of Phenomenal Consciousness

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

Hossein Shahidi Khah 1
Mahdi Zakeri 2

1 Ph.D. Candidate of Philosophy, Farabi Campus, University of Tehran

2 Associate Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Theology, Farabi Campus, University of Tehran

10.30465/ps.2026.55207.1841
Abstract
One of the fundamental questions in the philosophy of society is whether institutional facts can be reduced to physical facts. Despite the prevailing accounts in social ontology, the relationship between institutional facts and phenomenal consciousness has remained relatively under-explored. By reconstructing and supplementing John Searle’s social ontology based on the foundations of David Chalmers’ philosophy of mind, this paper defends the irreducibility of institutional facts. The primary argument is that institutional facts are grounded in collective intentionality, and intentionality itself cannot be realized without phenomenal consciousness—namely, the subjective quality of experience. Since phenomenal consciousness, according to anti-physicalist arguments, does not logically supervene on physical facts and defies reductive explanation, institutional facts, given their dependence on it, are similarly irreducible to physical facts. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that anti-physicalist arguments, such as the Conceivability argument and the Chinese Room thought experiment, can, with appropriate reconstruction, be employed to defend this claim.

Keywords

Phenomenal Consciousness
Collective Intentionality
Logical Supervenience
Institutional Facts
Reductive Explanation
Subjects
Chalmers, David (2022). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Translated by Seyyed Mostafa Hosseini. Tehran: Khazan. [in Persian]
Searle, John (2017b). Philosophy in a New Century. Translated by Mohammad Yousefi. Tehran: Qoqnoos. [in Persian]
Alter, T., & Walter, S. (Eds.). (2007). Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
Bourget, D., & Mendelovici, A. (2026). "Phenomenal Intentionality." In E. N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (Eds.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2026 Edition). Stanford University. Retrieved July 14, 2026, from https://plato.stanford.edu/
Braddon-Mitchell, D., & Jackson, F. (2007). Philosophy of Mind and Cognition (2nd ed.). Blackwell.
Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. J. (2002). "Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?" In T. Szabó Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. J. (Ed.). (2002). Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. J. (2010). The Character of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crotty, Michael (1998). The Foundations of Social Research. London: Sage Publications.
Jackson, F. (1982). "Epiphenomenal Qualia." The Philosophical Quarterly, 32(127), 127–136.
Jackson, F. (1986). "What Mary Didn't Know." The Journal of Philosophy, 83(5), 291–295.
Kim, Jaegwon (1998). Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kripke, Saul A. (1972). "Naming and Necessity." In G. Harman & D. Davidson (Eds.), The Semantics of Natural Language. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Levine, J. (1983). "Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64(4), 354–361.
Nagel, T. (1974). "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450.
Searle, John R. (1990). "Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion and Cognitive Science." Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 13, 585–642.
Searle, John R. (1995). The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Free Press.
Searle, J. R. (1997). The mystery of consciousness. The New York Review of Books
Searle, John R. (1998). Mind, Language and Society. New York: Basic Books.
Searle, John R. (2004). Mind: A Brief Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Searle, John R. (2010). Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Philosophy of Science
Volume 15, Issue 2 - Serial Number 30
(Autumn & Winter)
February 2026

Home

Guide for Authors

Submit Manuscript

Reviewers

Contact Us