Philosophy of Science

The Use of “Use” to Solve Three Problems in Kripke’s Theory of Reference

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

Hossein Nasrollahi 1
Morteza Sedaghat Ahangari Hossein Zadeh 2

1 . M.A Student in Philosophy of Science, Amirkabir University of Technology

2 Assistant Professor of Amirkabir University of Technology (Tehran Polytechnic), Department of Management, Science and Technology

Abstract
There are, at least, three problems in Kripke’s theory of reference, including: 1. the problem of proper names referring: a proper name may refer to different referents in different possible worlds; 2. the problem of reference failure; and 3. the problem of referential infallibility of theoretical terms. In this paper, first we elaborate these problems in more details. Then we show how Kripke himself solves the first problem appealing to the concept of ‘use’ and then we investigate how the other two problems can be solved with the same strategy. We also refer to Davidson’s triangulation thesis to show that linguistic community contributes in the determination of referent.

Keywords

use
Kripke’s theory of reference
possible worlds
triangulation
rigid designator
theoretical terms
initial baptism
منابع
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Philosophy of Science
Volume 4, Issue 8 - Serial Number 8
March 2015
Pages 107-121

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