Philosophy of Science

The Theory-Ladenness of Observations; A Critical Examination

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

Majid Bidarmaghz 1
Morteza Sedaghat Ahangari Hossein Zadeh 2

1 . M.A Student in Philosophy of Science, Amirkabir University of Technology (Tehran Polytechnic),

2 . Assistant Professor in Amirkabir University of Technology (Tehran Polytechnic), Department of Management, Science and Technology, mortezasedaghat@aut.ac.ir

Abstract
The view that one's observations are depended on his/her epistemological network and are flexible due to trainings and expectations, is a long-lasting view which has a special place in the philosophy of science. The opposite view says that there is an impenetrable layer in observation which is resistant to influence of any educational and epistemological structure. In this paper, we first present these views according to Churchland and Fodor, the main figures in the camps respectively. Second, more importantly, we will defend a more moderate view which is based on a graded account of observation. The latter view accepts rigidity in the level of sensation while acknowledges that observation is flexible in higher levels. According to this view there is no need to appeal to flexibility of sensations to explain why there are discrepancies in observational reports and judgments.

Keywords

Theory-ladenness of observations
sensational perception
observational judgment
flexibility of perception
graded perception
Churchland
Fodor
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Philosophy of Science
Volume 4, Issue 7 - Serial Number 7
October 2014
Pages 21-51

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